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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since its beginning the process of European integration has been 
faced with the “existential drama” which generally affects most 
forms of social organization, i.e. the dilemma of reaching an 
equilibrium between – on one hand – a respect for the autonomy of 
the individual unit, freedom of choice and diversity of action, and – 
on the other hand – the societal need for cooperation, integration, 
harmony and unity. 
In the context of dynamic relationships occurring between the EC 
and its Member States such desire for this equilibrium has gradually 
become more intense and noticeable, being it related not only to a 
general need for a functional optimization and rationalization of 
economic and social welfare, but also to a more profound and never-
ending effort aimed at the establishment of a common democratic 
order, which is at the same time consonant with the ideals of liberty 
and justice shared by the EC Member States. The tensions that exist 
between the two poles – the one only Union and the presence of 
many peripheral entities, i.e. the Member States – and the specific 
solutions for their reconciliation on one side in the context of north 
American federal system, on the other side within the European 
Community constitute the object of this thesis, particularly focused 
on the pre-emption theme. 
Formerly the pre-emption doctrine was developed in the context of 
American federalism by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has over the 
last century established a sophisticated modern pre-emption 
framework. Apparently, some decisions taken by the European Court 
of Justice validate the idea of a transposition of the doctrine of pre-
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emption into the European experience, which has seemingly offered 
it a suitable and fitting habitat where to become one of the most 
effective tool used by the ECJ itself, in order to achieve and defend 
the aims of European integration. Hence the purpose of this thesis is 
– from a theoretical point of view – quite simple: first of all I would 
like to examine such peculiar legal phenomenon and some of its 
implications within its former legal context (the American one); 
secondly, I would try to discover whether it is possible to 
hypothesize the presence of pre-emption – properly conceived – 
within the context of the European semi-federal experience or not, 
and possibly to discover which are the required perspective 
adjustments needed. 
For now a very approximate definition of the pre-emption theory is 
adequate, as we will come back on it in the future. Within the 
American experience, as well as in the European one, such legal 
doctrine has revealed to be deeply connected to the very essence of 
the constitutional structure, by playing a crucial role in the allocation 
of legislative and regulatory competences, as well as in the exercise 
of the relevant powers between central authority and peripheral 
entities. According to the largest number of commentators, within a 
federal or quasi-federal system the word ‘pre-emption’ identifies the 
mechanism that “determines, even before an express central measure 
in point exists, whether a whole policy area has been actually or 
potentially occupied by the central authority in such way as to 
influence the intervention of the states in that area”1, by obstructing 
a priori Member States from the adoption of other/different legal 
                                                
1 See M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, J.H.H. Weiler, Integration through Law, 
Vol. 1, de Gruyter, 1985. 
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acts within the same legislative area. The difficulties stemming from 
the pre-emption doctrine clearly arise from its very potentiality, 
which makes it hard to define in advance which areas are pre-empted 
and under what conditions, and also whether powers in such areas are 
concurrent or exclusive2. From a comparative point of view my 
analysis will thus try to answer to a huge question, as so to discover 
whether it is possible or not to talk about a ‘transmigration of 
models’ at the supranational level. 
The basic difficulty in such comparative task surely derives from the 
fact that we are going to juxtapose two extremely different 
constitutional experiences: on one side the United States of America, 
a proper federation of States which derives its State sovereignty and 
legitimacy directly from its own people and not from its constituent 
States3; on the other side the European Community, an international 
organization which lacks its own unitary people and is composed of 
more or less sovereign nations trying to establish a common higher 
legal order, as so to bring about a closer union among their peoples4. 
                                                
2 According to M. Cartabia and J.H.H. Weiler during the 1970’s the European 
Court of Justice started a jurisprudential path subsequently developed into two 
parallel core principles, embodied on one side the exclusivity which features 
some Community competences, and on the other side the complementary pre-
emptive nature of such powers (see L’Italia in Europa, p. 77 and 175, ed. Il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2000). 
3 In the U.S.A. a common national feeling arose since the beginning, and was 
later strengthened by the Revolution. The U.S. Constitution’s opening recalls 
“We the people of the United States”, together to form a more perfect Union 
and to achieve common aspirations. Such “People” is the only people arising 
from the dissolution of political borders between States within the Union. 
4 See the Preambles to the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) 
and to the Treaty on the European Union (TEU): express references are made to 
the mutual effort aimed at creating “an ever close union among peoples of 
Europe” and ensuring its development. See also the Preamble to the Draft 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which remarkably recall the 
various European national identities by referring to the idea of unity in the 
diversity. 
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Any comparison between the United States and the Community today 
must of course acknowledge the fundamental difference occurring 
between, on one hand, maintaining a semblance of balance in the 
power relations between the federal government and the States in a 
system designed along federal lines from its very beginning, and, on 
the other hand, consciously imposing a new multi-layered legal 
system on a continent historically dominated by sovereign Nation-
States, themselves mostly unitary in structure. 
In order to overcome the structural diversity occurring between a 
Federal State and a community of States, we need to think of 
federalism as an unicum, as so to refer to it both constitutional 
experiences, identifying in the concept of federalism the common 
comparative ground which allows our inquiry to prevail over the 
abovementioned gap. Such approach may be strengthened by the fact 
that in many areas and legislative fields the Community has adopted 
solutions that clearly resemble those belonging to the proper federal 
experience. Accordingly, some of the jurisprudential doctrines 
developed to describe the relations occurring between Community 
law and State legal orders seem to emulate those doctrines elaborated 
by the United States jurisprudence. The ‘minimum common 
denominator’ occurring between these two different legal 
                                                                                                                                          
Art. 189 TEC remarkably describes the European Parliament as “consist[ing] of 
representatives of the peoples of the States”, as if an express reference to a 
unitary “European people ” was too inappropriate. According to some 
commentators such explicit reference could not be made because of the 
subsequent implied application of traditionally national categories to a non-
national legal experience (see S. Dellavalle, La legittimazione del potere 
pubblico europeo, in “Teoria politica” XIX, n. 1, 2003, p. 57). For this reason, 
the (even hopefully) recourse to the idea of a whole “European people” would 
not be possible, being such entity currently not existent (no demos thesis): 
hence Europe can be seen only as formed by the aggregate of different national 
peoples, each maintaining its own identity and history. 
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experiences can thus be identified in a wider concept that allows 
evaluating both juridical phenomena as expressions of the same 
underlying philosophy, i.e. federalism. 
The idea of integration is deeply rooted within the European legal 
experience: such term is featured by an implied looseness which 
allows to encompass a whole spectrum of activity in it, ranging from 
mere cooperation between different entities, to ultimately complete 
unification in one only organization. The element of completeness 
and unity which integration includes does not negate, however, but 
rather implies the possibility of compositeness: the term is primarily 
concerned with how various independent entities come together and 
interrelate so as to form an identifiable whole. On one hand 
“integration” connotes the process of integrating; but it is also 
concerned with the final results, the integrated system and the degree 
of integration that they achieved, for the process may successfully 
stop well before unification. Both these elements – the process and 
the final results – are essential to an analysis of integration, for the 
success of a process can be assessed only in term of its results, 
whereas a result which represents only one step in an ongoing 
process may lose much of its significance if assessed out of its 
developmental context. 
In order to evaluate the accomplishment of the integration purpose it 
is necessary to establish a connection with the concept of federalism, 
which embodies the ideology the integration process seeks to 
promote. Such integrational ideology incorporates not only the idea 
of partnership or community in a democratic government, but also 
notions of western civil libertarianism. Our inquiry is thus aimed at 
studying both the integration process and its final results, inspired by 
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the federal idea as a common point of departure which legitimatize a 
comparison between the U.S.A and the EC. In 1982 Judge Pierre 
Pescatore of the European Court of Justice echoed this rationale 
while actually comparing the American and European experiences, 
by stating that “[…] [t]he methods of federalism are not only a 
means of organizing states. It would rather seem that federalism is a 
political and legal philosophy which adapts itself to all political 
contexts on both the municipal and the international level, wherever 
and whenever two basic prerequisite are fulfilled: the search for 
unity, combined with genuine respect for the autonomy and the 
legitimate interest of the particular entities”5. Such overview – 
expressly based on the balance between two core values, such as the 
common research for unity and the effective care for national 
interests – fully fits the dualistic conception of supranationalism 
identified by the doctrine6. Accordingly, an EC description that 
renders it as an organism ranking above Member States7 would 
provide a too old-fashioned and archaic overview of the Community 
system, whose structure on the contrary comprehends “bits and 
pieces of the national governments”8 playing a part in all the EC 
dynamics. Just like every other federal model9 the European 
                                                
5 P. Pescatore, Foreword, in Courts and Free Markets: Perspectives from the 
United States and Europe, Vol. 1, Sandalow and Stein, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford/New York, 1982. 
6 Cf. J.H.H. Weiler, The Community System: the Dual Character of 
Supranationalism, in Yearbook of European Law, (1981) 1, p. 267 - 306. 
7 Cf. A.H. Robertson, Legal Problems of European Integration, in Recueil des 
Cours, Volume 91 (1957-I), pp. 105 e 143. 
8 See A. Shonfield, Europe: Journey to an Unknown Destination, Penguin, 
1974, p. 17. 
9 The term ‘federal’ is featured here by a wide meaning, inclusive of all the 
relations between entities which have subscribed an agreement concerning 
government powers sharing: according to D.J. Elazar “[t]he original use of the 
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Community is featured by a tension between the whole system and 
the parts, a clash of centripetal and centrifugal forces. In the classical 
understanding and evaluation of European legal and political 
integration a large number of analysis has always tended to 
emphasized uniformity and the concept of higher legal order, by 
favouring the concept of supremacy and exclusive Community 
competence: accordingly, each time the Member States asserted their 
dominance within the Community system, this has been taken to be a 
retrograde step in the process of integration, and any development in 
the Community detracting from the centrality of EC institutions in 
favour of the Member States has been regarded as a symptom of 
disintegration, being therefore integration identified with a 
strengthening of the centre at the expense of the periphery (or, at 
least, with an ever-tightening hold of the centre over the periphery). 
On the contrary, if we accept that at least one construction of 
federalism offers a counter concept to the centre-periphery model, it 
may be possible to give a new interpretation to integration as well: 
according to this understanding, federalism concerns the whole frame 
and not merely a centre surrounded by revolving peripheries10. 
Subsequently, and in accordance with a federalist view of 
integration, the concept of unity as an absolute value shall be 
                                                                                                                                          
term deals with contractual linkages that involve power sharing - among 
individuals, among groups, among states. This usage is more appropriate than 
the definition of modern federations, which represents only one aspect of the 
federal idea and one application of the federal principle” (Self Rule/Shared 
Rule, Turtledove 1979, p. 3). 
10 See again Elazar, id.: ““Integration on [this] model is potentially quite 
different from integration around a common centre. […] [The] measure of […] 
integration is not the strength of the centre as opposed to the peripheries; 
rather the strength of the framework. Thus both the whole and the parts can 
gain strength simultaneously and, indeed, must do so on an interdependent 
basis”. 
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rejected, regarding integration and federalism as “twin concepts”11 
both expressing the societal philosophy and organizational principle 
which require a particular balancing of individual and shared 
interest, a balance between particular and general, peripheral and 
central, and between autonomy and heteronomy. 
Many other elements will harden the inquiry on pre-emption within 
the EC system: we must keep clear in mind that the analysis will 
involve two experiences that, even if featured by some mutual 
attributes (such as the presence of similar organs exercising 
somehow comparable functions), deeply differ from a purely geo-
dimensional point of view, to cultural, linguistic, historical, juridical, 
political and economical backgrounds: any comparative discussion of 
European integration and the American federal experience must thus 
rest on an appreciation of each system as the product of a peculiar 
history. 
Three cautionary remarks can be drawn over such impressions: first 
of all, an analysis of the EC in federal or quasi-federal terms must 
take account of the evolutionary character of the Community12, 
clashing with the relatively stable character of today’s American 
federal system. We can surely affirm that the idea if integration is 
easily linked to the evolutionary character of the Community, while 
it seems to have lost much of its relevancy in the (now stabilized) 
United States system: as a matter of fact, while the integrative 
                                                
11 See M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe e J.H.H. Weiler, Integration through Law, 
Vol. 1, p. 15 
12 Since the beginning the European experience was not featured by a general 
stability, neither for what it concerns the exercise of Community activities nor 
in relation to the principles inspiring the institutional organization. Such feature 
characterized also the univocal identification of organs able to exercise 
decisional powers, and generally all the relationships occurring between 
Community and Member States (cf. Weiler, id. p. 269). 
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supremacy and uniformity of federal law over States common law15: 
in the Community, where the central authority has been weak, the 
courts (both those of the Member States and that of the Community) 
have had to play an important role in defending Community 
prerogatives against Member States encroachment. From this point of 
view, the distinction between the U.S. as a nation and the EC as, in 
part, an international organization has relevant consequences for the 
ability of each system’s judiciary to serve as an integrative force. 
Surely the American experience serves as a positive precedent for the 
hopeful success of the European integrative iter, even if it is true that 
it took a long time for the American federal judiciary to secure a 
sound jurisdictional base for carrying on its integrative task16. In a 
similar way, in Europe the fear of Community power dissuaded 
Member States from granting to (both governmental and judiciary) 
Community institutions too wide powers and prerogatives17 and from 
establishing a body of lower Community courts18. Community 
                                                
15 It is also true that especially in the early XX century another function of the 
American judiciary (to protect constituent States against encroachment by the 
central authority) came to special prominence. 
16 The United States Supreme Court was still being faced with defiance of its 
appellate jurisdiction over State courts decisions some three decades after 
Congress gave it that jurisdiction in 1789. Additionally, although Congress 
created lower federal courts in the same 1789 statute, it was not until 1875 that 
they were given general jurisdiction over cases arising under federal law. 
17 Such reluctance arose from the first version of art. 228 EC, whose initial 
formulation did not point out any possible countermeasure suitable for Member 
States not complying with the judgement of the Court of Justice. The 
Maastricht Treaty tried to solve the problem by setting out an inquiry procedure 
and the potential imposition of a penalty payment. 
18 We must recall the role of art. 234 EC, which attributes to the ECJ the 
competence to give preliminary rulings over questions raised before any court 
or tribunal of Member States, in order to interpret Treaty and acts of the EC 
institution. Accordingly, the ECJ serves as a federal court (determining for 
example with final authority, for all courts of the Community, questions of law, 
including questions of private law) and as a constitutional court (by 
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institutions are clearly more limited in their activities than the 
American federal government is19: such limitation is intimately 
linked to the abovementioned evolutionary feature of the EC 
experience. The American experience was equally featured by an 
evolution represented by the increase of federal powers attributed to 
the Government: in the beginning such powers were limited and 
precisely enumerated by the Constitution, then they grew through an 
extensive reading of constitutional provisions and through the 
creative use of the Necessary and Proper clause20. 
While the United States was a nation from a time long antedating 
Independence, on the other hand the European Community can 
usefully be seen as a symbiosis between inter-governmental and 
supranational elements, uniting some features of an international 
organisation of the traditional kind and some features of a federal 
state. Both systems include checks and balances on the vertical and 
on the horizontal levels, and in both experiences heavy reliance was 
                                                                                                                                          
determining the compatibility with the Treaty of Community legislation, or by 
adjudicating on the division of competences between the Community and the 
Member States). 
19 Such limitation directly flows from the attributed competences principle 
(principle of conferral - competence d’attribution) stated by art. 5 EC. 
Accordingly, the Community EC enjoys no general competence, but rather the 
specific competences or enumerated powers conferred on it by its constitutive 
Treaties, while all residual powers are left with the Member States. The 
application of such principle gets harder “[…] the stronger is the belief that it 
is important to preserve the original allocation of normative powers, as so to 
protect States’ essential identity” (cf. M. Cartabia, J.H.H. Weiler, id. at 102). 
20 See art. 1, s. 8 of the American Constitution: “The Congress shall have 
power […] to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all the other Powers vested by the 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof”. The first extensive reading of such clause was provided in the 
1819 case McCulloch v. Maryland (17 U.S. 316), when the implied powers 
doctrine was established (see infra par. 1.4.2). The American Necessary and 
Proper clause finds its European analogue in art. 308 EC, a provision that is 
potentially unlimited in its scope (see infra, par. 3.5). 
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placed on the judiciary system as so to lead the integration process. 
In the U.S. the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts system 
played a central role in supporting the integration process, “drawing 
on a tradition that views them as the authentic voice of a national 
community’s values”21; in Europe, on the contrary, still there is no 
certain answer about whether and when a similar evolution will 
completely occur. 
In the American checks and balances system context the pre-emption 
doctrine embodies one of the most used mechanism employed by the 
central authority at the legislative level in order to occupy – 
preventively or not – a specified legislative field: such ‘device’ 
stands besides the supremacy doctrine22 and the implied powers 
doctrine, which have defined the current relationship existing 
between national law and States’ laws. On the contrary, for what it 
concerns the European legal order, while there is plenty of literary 
essays and reports about the supremacy doctrine, the doctrine of pre-
emption seems to be a little bit absent, as long as it is pretty hard to 
find general treatments of it in the majority of today’s European law 
textbooks. The pre-emption principle in the Community law was 
(implicitly) stated by the European Court of Justice through a series 
of cases placed in the early 1970s and continued thereafter, in which 
the main achievement was the establishment of the complete and 
                                                
21 See F.G. Jacobs and K.L. Karst, in Integration through Law, Book 1, p. 173. 
22 In this respect, the distinction between federal law and common law refers to 
the legislative authority involved from time to time: the term federal law (or 
statutory law or regulatory law) indicates the federal national law issued by the 
United States Congress through regulations, or the law issued by federal 
agencies delegated by the Government to adopt specific acts or statutes, in 
order to regulate specific areas. On the other hand, the so-called common law 
identifies the jurisprudentially formed law (case-law), developed by each 
State’s courts system. 
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exclusive competence of the EU in a number of specific fields, most 
importantly in Common Commercial Policy. In those fields Member 
States were precluded from taking any action per se, whether or not 
their actions conflicted with a positive measure of Community law; 
in other fields the exclusivity was not an a priori notion: here only 
the positive Community legislation caused a pre-emptive effect, 
barring Member States from any action, whether or not in actual 
conflict with Community law. 
As already said, there is an enormous amount of essays dedicated to 
the doctrine of Community law supremacy, while the very concept of 
pre-emption has remained foreign to the Community legal order: in 
most cases it has been assimilated or linked to the supremacy 
question, and this is the most probable reason of its under-
theorization. 
In my enquiry I will try to demonstrate that though related, the two 
doctrines should be kept apart: supremacy denotes the superior 
hierarchical status of the Community legal order over the national 
legal orders – thus giving Community law “the capacity to pre-empt 
national law”23. Once stated the pre-eminence of Community law 
over national legislations, the matter is “determining the scope of 
application of disposition of Community law with a view to deciding 
if in a given situation a conflict between Community law and 
national law has arisen. The problem in other words is to define the 
limits for national legislative activity set by the Community law”24. 
 
                                                
23 Robert Schütze, Supremacy without pre-emption? The very slowly emergent 
doctrine of Community pre-emption, in C.M.L.Review, 43, 2006, at 1033. 
24 P. Baumann, Common organizations of the market and national laws, in 
C.M.L.Review, 14, 1977, pp. 303-327. 
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Chapter 1: American federalism 
 
1.1 1787 Federal Constitution main features 
 
Even if the United States Constitution is not featured by the express 
presence of the word federalism, we can surely affirm that such 
conception represents one of the main cornerstones of the whole 
American constitutional system. 
The federal American Constitution is at the same time featured by 
some typical elements of confederate system and by the presence of 
some peculiar aspects usually present in unitary systems: this seems 
to be the fundamental premise for the birth of a federal structure 
under which some specific political powers were originally delegated 
to the Congress, while all the remaining ones were given to the 
Member States25, according to the general presumption under which 
while some issues – such as national defence and inter-State 
relationship as commerce, for instance – are better managed on a 
national level, some others problems locally relevant require a 
decentralized governance. 
It is wise to keep clear in mind that as a matter of fact the presence 
of the 1787 Constitution together with the Amendments represents 
the main distinctive attribute of the American common law 
experience, if compared with the British one. Originally the 
Constitution embodied the post-revolutionary dissatisfaction arising 
                                                
25 According to the X Constitutional Amendment “The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”. 
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from the decennial confederative experience26: such document is 
therefore an outstandingly complicated act, whose description would 
require a specific and dedicated essay as it appears to be featured by 
several different details, everyone of which is remarkable. 
As the greatest part of the political acts adopted during transitional 
periods, the American Constitution embodies desires arising from the 
past, wishes coming from the present and hopes for the future, 
everything bound up with different elements inspired by various 
constitutional models acquired through ages. Additionally, it 
exemplifies several different ideologies – such as the federalist, 
republican and liberal ones – which after various conflicts and 
frictions managed to reach a definitive settlement with the end of the 
Convention meetings in Philadelphia. 
Every ideology there involved, usually supported by clearly different 
political projects, managed to bring to debate its own requests, which 
were adequately represented in the final version of the act, as it was 
ratified by every Member State at last27. Furthermore, a striking 
tension gradually built up between federal forces – willing to 
constitute a unitary nation – and centrifugal forces, primarily fearing 
the establishing of a too solid Union, able to gain excessively 
powers, sovereignty and rights at Member States’ expenses. 
During the 18th century and even after the Civil War the idea of 
“sovereign legal order” was automatically connected on one side to 
                                                
26 Cf. in general A.H. Kelly, W.A. Harbison, The American Constitution, Its 
Origin and Develpoment, rev. ed., 1955. 
27 Among the various essays dedicated to the American constitutional history, 
referring widely to the colonial experience and to the pre-unitary model, see 
L.W. Levy, The Framing and Ratification of the Constitution, 1988; T. Ball, 
J.G.A. Pocock (ed.), Conceptual Change and the Constitution, 1988; D. Lutz, 
The Origins of American Constitutionalism, 1988. 
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the concept of legal order itself, i.e. to the fact that such order had 
been originally created according to the autonomous determination of 
its Founding Fathers. On the other side, it was linked to the idea of 
necessary correspondence between authority and exercise of 
governing powers: as a direct consequence, according to natural law 
the idea of ‘sovereignty’ (meaning the power to give authoritative 
orders toward the People, organized in a social structure) belonged to 
the People itself. While in other legal orders, according to positive 
law sovereignty belonged to different subjects (to the king or to an 
aristocratic elite, for instance), after the Declaration of Independence 
from the British Commonwealth the fact that in the new born union 
the People could be the only legitimate owner of sovereignty was 
undoubted, being therefore the People seen as the unitary entity 
which delegated to the various Member States its sovereign power 
through the adoption of several Constitutional Charts. 
Even if as a matter of fact the concept of sovereignty was 
unmistakably related to the idea of ‘People’, different issues emerged 
in relation to the operative extent of such idea within the Union’s 
federal framework. Jurists from Southern States generally held that 
the thirteen original States delegated to the new federal government 
relevant portions of their sovereign rights, by the means of the 
Constitution: accordingly, laws produced thereon from the new 
central government were to be considered as prevailing on those 
produced individually by every Member State government. However, 
States were supposed to retain both the power of evaluate every 
possible outbound exercise of power by central authorities, and the 
subsequent power to recede from the Union in case of severe or 
repeated illegitimate excesses carried out by federal authorities. The 
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supreme touchstone of sovereignty was thus located in such residual 
power, given to every Member States as so to withdraw 
autonomously from the federal partnership. 
On the contrary, jurists from Northern States perceived the Union as 
a prevailing legal order directly founded on the federal Constitution, 
having the exclusive right of interpreting in a binding way the 
effective extent of the sovereign powers delegated to the centre. Any 
outbound exercise of power could be rectified through particular 
procedural iters specifically designed, such as the Supreme Court’s 
judgment. Therefore Member States could neither unilaterally judge 
on Constitution potential violations nor recede from the Union: 
accordingly, the American People unitarily considered were the only 
sovereign, able to act within the terms of the Constitution. 
It could be useful to recall briefly some of the constitutional articles 
defining the relationships occurring between federal authority and 
Member States. Formally the whole constitutional framework is 
based on seven original articles establishing the foundations of the 
whole system of government and of the allocation of powers between 
States and federation; to these articles were then added several 
subsequent Amendments. The separation of powers rationalization – 
very favoured at that time because of the popularity of 
Montesquieu’s De l’ésprit des lois – became a dominant aspect of the 
constitutional Chart structure28, which now contains the unmissable 
checks and balances system according to which governmental 
powers limit each others in the effective exercise of their functions, 
as so to cooperate in order to achieve their constitutional goals. 
                                                
28 Cf. C.L. Secondat de Montesquieu, De l’ésprit des lois, 2 volumes, I, book 
XI, in particular Ch. 6 (1748, Classiques Garnier, Paris, s.d., I, at 163.). 
 19 
American Republic Founding Fathers put the separation of powers 
idea into practice both vertically – i.e. between a higher central 
federal authority and the Member States – and horizontally, between 
legislative, judiciary and executive powers, to which the first three 
articles of the Constitution have been dedicated29. The first article, 
composed of ten sections, is dedicated to the legislative power; the 
second article, composed of four sections, is dedicated to the 
executive power; the third article, composed of three sections, is the 
so-called judicial article. 
The legislative power was conferred to a bicameral organ called 
Congress, formed by a Senate (elected on a State basis) and by a 
House of Representatives (elected on national basis)30. Some of the 
dispositions founding the vertical separation of powers are included 
in the first article, according to which some specific entitlements are 
reserved to the central system of government, while the residual ones 
are part of the Member States’ competences. Federal authority can 
legitimately produce law on some specific reserved areas: such 
                                                
29 During the 19th century and until the New Deal revolution such double vision 
has been partially consolidated and partially modified: it allowed the deep 
fragmentation of political power and supported the autonomy of civil society, 
according to the idea under which the form of government should serve at best 
the achieving of the desired relationship between community and government. 
See G. Bognetti, La divisione dei poteri, at 121-24, ed. Giuffrè, Milano 2001. 
30 The institution of a bicameral system constituted a real compromise, as the 
task of creating a new government was not easy accomplished: disputes among 
the States’ delegates nearly ended the Convention on several occasion. Larger 
States favoured the Virginia Plan, under which population would determine the 
number of representatives a State could send to the legislature. Smaller States 
supported the New Jersey Plan, which proposed that all the States would have 
an equal number of representatives. The Connecticut delegates suggested a 
compromise that settled the problem: their plan provided for equal 
representation in the Senate, along with representation in proportion in the 
House of Representatives: this proposal became known as the Connecticut 
Compromise or the Great Compromise. 
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legislative powers are divided in express or enumerated powers and 
implied powers. 
The first set of powers is listed in section 8 of article 131, while the 
implied set of powers finds its premises in the last paragraph of the 
                                                
31 Art. 1, Section 8: 
 
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, 
Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; 
 
To borrow money on the credit of the United States; 
 
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes; 
 
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on 
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; 
 
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and 
fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; 
 
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and 
current Coin of the United States; 
 
To establish Post Offices and Post Roads; 
 
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries; 
 
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; 
 
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations; 
 
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; 
 
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that 
Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; 
 
To provide and maintain a Navy; 
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same section, according to which the Congress is entitled to make all 
the laws considered necessary and proper in order to carry into 
execution the abovementioned express powers32 (Necessary and 
Proper clause). 
As already stated, article 2 of the Constitution is dedicated to the 
executive power which is represented by the President, formally 
elected through an indirect system of election that manages to ensure 
the complete democratic legitimacy33. 
                                                                                                                                          
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and 
naval Forces; 
 
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the 
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 
 
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and 
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of 
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the 
Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia 
according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; 
 
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such 
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of 
particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the Seat 
of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like 
Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the 
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection 
of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful 
Buildings; And 
 
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof. 
 
32 See supra, footnote 31, last paragraph. 
33 More specifically on the presidential election procedure, and generally on the  
United States presidential form of government see A. Barbera, C. Fusaro, Il 
governo delle democrazie, ed. il Mulino, Bologna 2001. 
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The third article34 of the Constitution represents the core of the whole 
American judicial system, as it can be clearly seen as the necessary 
premise of the so-called federal jurisdiction. First of all the 
Constitution sets up the necessary premises as so to guarantee 
judicial branch’s independence from other institutional powers; then 
it states that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in cases 
                                                
34 Art. 3: The Judicial Branch 
Section 1 
 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the 
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good 
Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services a 
Compensation which shall not be diminished during their 
Continuance in Office. 
 
Section 2  
 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme 
Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before 
mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both 
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such 
Regulations as the Congress shall make. 
 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by 
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes 
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, 
the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by 
Law have directed. 
 
Section 3 
 
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War 
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and 
Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the 
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession 
in open Court. 
 
The Congress shall have power to declare the Punishment of 
Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of 
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted. 
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affecting governments and their representatives and in cases to which 
a State government is one of the parties, meaning that cases of this 
kind are directly judged by the Supreme Court. In other cases, the 
Supreme Court has only appellate jurisdiction, meaning that the 
cases are tried firs in a lower court and may come up to the Supreme 
Court for review, if Congress has authorized an appeal for such kind 
of cases35. 
Additionally, the relationships between Member States and federal 
Union are shaped according to the X Constitutional Amendment36, 
which briefly outlines the powers allocation scheme between central 
Government and peripheries. According to this disposition “[t]he 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people”. During our constitutional survey we will realize 
how such constitutional guideline actually collides with the general 
vagueness of the Constitution in defining the relationships between 
Union and Member States, and how the Supreme Court tried to 
provide a satisfactory answer to related issues37. 
Before going into the deep examination of pre-emption related issue 
it is wise to keep clear in mind how during centuries American jurists 
handled the Constitution in a very peculiar way, shaping its modern 
interpretation by overlapping to the formal articles partitioning a new 
substantial division which tends to individuate the so-called clauses. 
A clear example of this practice can be easily found in the 
                                                
35 See infra, par. 1.2 dedicated to the judicial power. 
36 See supra, footnote 25. 
37 A bright overview of the legal oscillation concerning the interpretation of 
Amendment X cf. M.A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority: the Demise of A Disguided Doctrine, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 1985. 
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abovementioned Necessary and Proper clause, a flexible general rule 
according to which Congress is entitled to take all the necessary and 
proper actions as so to carry on its constitutional functions and fully 
achieve its objectives as stated by article 138. Many legal theories (as 
the pre-emption one, for instance) have been developed by the 
doctrine in relation to this circumstance, as so to legitimate 
Congressional actions and legislative steps even beyond what was 
originally conceived by the Founding Fathers. Another relevant 
clause is located in article 1 as well. I am referring the so-called 
Interstate Commerce clause39, which grants federal Congress the 
exclusive power of regulate commerce both externally (i.e. with 
foreign nations) and internally (i.e. relating to all the commercial 
activities occurring within the Nations, between Member States). 
For what it concerns pre-emption, the most relevant clause is 
undoubtedly the so-called Supremacy clause40, according to which on 
one side the federal Constitution and all the laws adopted as so to 
assure its full execution “shall be the supreme law of the land”, and 
on the other side every State legal and judicial order is bound to the 
observance of such supreme laws. In this statement were found both 
the premise of federal law’s hierarchical predominance in case of 
conflict with State law, and also the constitutional prescription of a 
                                                
38 See supra, footnote 31, last paragraph. 
39 See supra, footnote 31, 3rd paragraph: “The Congress shall have power […] 
[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes”. 
40 See art. 6, 2nd paragraph: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all the Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of ant State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding”. See also Ch. 2. 
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judiciary pyramidal scheme according to which the greatest part of 
the decisions delivered by every State highest court can be reviewed 
through the final judgment of the federal Supreme Court. The 
Supremacy clause had a prominent role especially during the 19th 
century, as the Supreme Court often referred to it in order to find a 
solution to recurrent conflicts between State law and federal law 
enacted by Congress41, being such federal organ not expressly given 
a real power of removing any conflicting State law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 See infra, footnote 243. 
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1.2 Judicial power and the concept of Federal Common Law 
 
As already mentioned above, the Constitution’s third article 
established the judiciary as a separate and independent branch of the 
Federal Government. The judicial power of the United States was 
vested “in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”42. The judges 
were to be appointed for life, during good behaviour, and they were 
protected against reduction of their salaries43. 
As so to challenge “the prevalence of local spirit”44 existing among 
State courts, the First Congress did establish a system of lower 
federal courts45 that today have jurisdiction where the opposing 
parties are of different States, where the United States is a party, or 
in a case arising under the Constitution or other federal law. The 
Supreme Court sits not only at the apex of the pyramid of federal 
courts but also as the final appellate jurisdiction in cases involving 
federal law that arise in the State courts46: the decision of a State’s 
highest court concerning a question of federal law can be reviewed 
by the Supreme Court, with or without the State court’s blessing. 
In carrying out both the “federal” and the “constitutional” judicial 
function, the Supreme Court is thus joined by a nationwide body of 
                                                
42 U.S. Const, Art. 3, par. 1. 
43 Id. 
44 A. Hamilton, The Federalist, at 486. 
45 See the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73. 
46 The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is established in U.S. Const, Art. 3, par. 2, 
and in 28 U.S.C. par. 1251-58. At least some of the Framers of the Constitution 
expected the federal judiciary to enforce the Constitution by refusing to enforce 
legislation that violated its terms: thus, when the Supreme Court announced the 
principle of judicial review in 1803 (See Madbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137) it broke no new theoretical ground. 
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lower federal courts whose judges are appointed by the President 
with Senate approval, and which basically operate separately from 
the courts of the States. The existence of this federal court system 
has proved fundamental to the development of the federal legal 
system in America, as the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
over State court judgments on question of federal law is essential not 
only for the uniformity of interpretation of federal law, but also for 
the supremacy of federal law over inconsistent State law: the 
Supremacy clause47, which provides the substantive basis for the 
supremacy of federal legislation, finds in the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction an institutional mechanism for translating that 
supremacy into case-by-case reality. 
The jurisprudential iter followed by the Supreme Court was strongly 
influenced by the judicial nationalism doctrine promoted during the 
19th century, according to which there is a federal “general common 
law” – apart from the common law of each of the several States – 
that should govern decisions by the federal courts in cases not 
governed by statute. Such federal common law was thus seen as an 
opportunity for the federal judiciary to serve as a unifying force, 
developed under the supervision of the federal courts. Justice Story 
helped building such notion in the 1842 decision of Swift v. Tyson48, 
where at issue was the enforceability of a type of secured credit in 
pre-Civil War America, recognized in most States but not in New 
York, the site of litigation. The spread of interstate commerce 
necessitated some form of uniform rules concerning the 
                                                
47 U.S. Const. Art. 4, par. 2. 
48 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See S. Issacharoff & C.M.Sharkey, Backdoor 
Federalization, American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 
Paper n. 39, 2006, p. 154-163. 
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enforceability of commercial paper, regardless of the State in which 
the holder in due course might seek to enforce judgment. Justice 
Story held that, in the absence of express State statutes, federal 
judges were charged with articulating a general common law to be 
developed through the federal courts: a federal court in a diversity-
of-citizenship case was thus to apply such general common law, even 
if the decision of State courts were contrary to that general law. State 
courts seemed persuaded that such reasoning would have led to a 
desirable uniformity in commercial matters, and above all the 
decision seemed a clarification of the role of the “general common 
law” as it applied to commercial transactions unaffected by the 
particularized concerns of local law. As the Swift rule began to 
intersect the decidedly more interventionist jurisprudence of the 
Supreme Court after the Civil War, it emerged as a symbol of the 
critical fault line in a system premised on dual sovereignty: as the 
same case could well be decided differently depending upon the 
accident of citizenship of the parties, the rule encouraged litigants to 
select a State or federal court on the basis of the rules of law that 
each court might be predicted to apply to their cases. This forum-
shopping opportunity meant that while the “general common law” 
might be uniform from one federal court to another, the result of a 
case in a give State may vary, depending on whether it was brought 
in a State or federal court: as long State courts continued to exercise 
jurisdiction over commercial matters that were insulated from 
appellate review by the Supreme Court, Story’s dream of uniformity 
of commercial law could not be realized. 
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After a century, in 1937 the Supreme Court overruled Swift v. Tyson 
by stating in Erie v. Thompkins49 that federal courts are supposed to 
apply State law and not to develop their own common law, otherwise 
States’ authority would be infringed by such judicial activism. Here 
the Supreme Court pointed out that when a federal court decides a 
case not governed by statute, it normally must follow the decisions of 
the courts of the State in which it sits50. If there is any “general 
common law” today, it is to be found either in acts of Congress 
(which is the institution explicitly entitled by the Constitution to 
produce federal law) or in the parallelism to be found in State 
common law precedents or in the adoption by the States of uniform 
legislation51. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
49 304 U.S. 817 (1937). 
50 There is one major exception: federal courts will follow the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure even where State procedural rules would produce significantly 
different results (see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1865)). 
51 Such as the Uniform Commercial Code. The “Federal Common Law” 
nonetheless remains alive – although reduced in stature – in a number of fields 
such as maritime cases, cases in which governments are in contention with each 
others, certain cases in the area of foreign relations. Apart from those limited 
fields, however, the “American Common Law” is the law of the several States, 
and its most authoritative interpreters are the highest State courts (the U.S. 
Supreme Court will not review a decision of a State court that rests 
independently on a ground based on State law, even when there is a federal 
issue in the case: see Cappelletti & Golay, footnote 4 at par. 4.B.3.a in M. 
Cappelletti, M. Seccombe e J.H.H. Weiler, Integration through Law). 
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1.3 Dual federalism and cooperative federalism 
 
The supreme federal legal order created by the United States 
Constitution shares its operative field with other fifty legal orders 
belonging to the several Member States who joined the Union: 
according to the X Amendment they retained their original sovereign 
powers, limited only by the constitutional restrictions on which they 
freely agreed. 
The fundamental need for a flexible constitutional framework, 
suitable for the surrounding conditions and for unpredictable 
requirements made the Founding Fathers chose a constitutional 
wording which is not too elaborated or detailed, as so to describe 
generally the edges of a framework which is capable of adaptation in 
order to find the most suitable balance between striking needs 
through the interpretative action of the Supreme Court. 
Since its birth and still nowadays north American federalism deeply 
evolved, and such transformation has been read in different ways, 
referring to two opposite ways of interpretation. The first concept of 
such phenomenon is called dual federalism: it has long been the 
common starting point in legal debates about American legal 
structure52 prevailing during the whole 19th century. As the Supreme 
Court has expressly stated, “[The American legal system] is a ‘dual 
                                                
52 See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa 
L. Rev. 243, 246 (2005) (noting that dual federalism “continues to haunt 
contemporary discussions of federalism”); id. at 251–52. The Court frequently 
invokes “dual sovereignty” as the foundation of its federalism jurisprudence. 
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (“As every schoolchild 
learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the 
States and the Federal Government.”). 
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system of government’”53 in which State governments and federal 
government are two uncoordinated domains, operating in separate 
and clearly demarcated spheres54. Although many commentators 
generally hold that until the 19th century American federalism was 
mainly featured by a dual structure (later replaced by a cooperative 
structure with the New Deal revolution, during the first half of the 
20th century), and despite repeated declarations of the death of dual 
federalism55, this vision of constitutional structure continues to hold 
a strong grip over the modern jurisprudence. As a matter of fact some 
Authors agree with a view according to which Member States are 
units acting separately and autonomously from the central federal 
government56. 
During the 19th century American federalism was featured by a dual 
structure according to which judiciary and legislative allocation of 
competence was strongly demarked and imperative: federal 
government and States were allowed to act only within their 
functions field, as the total lack of competence on other subjects 
                                                
53 Cf. Commc’ns Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 53 (1982) (quoting Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1942) and United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 
379 (1886). 
54 According to E. Corwin, the dual federalism model is composed of four 
principles: 1) The national government is one of enumerated powers only; 2) 
Also the purposes which it may constitutionally promote are few; 3) Within 
their respective spheres the two centres of government are “sovereign” and 
hence “equal”; 4) The relation of the two centres with each other is one of 
tension rather than collaboration (see The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 Va. 
L. Rev. 1 (1950)). 
55 Cf. G. Bognetti, Lo spirito del costituzionalismo americano, Vol. 2, at 203, 
Giappichelli ed., Turin 2000; Joseph F. Zimmerman, National-State Relations: 
Cooperative Federalism in the Twentieth Century, Publius: J. Federalism, 
Spring 2001, at 15. 
56 See J.C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 
Ind. L. Rev. 35, 41-43 (1998). 
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strictly precluded any outbound action. Foreign affairs issues and 
foreign relations belonged to the federal authority, whilst federal 
action in domestic affairs was so narrow as so not to infringe 
traditional Member States’ prerogatives on them. In relation to these 
subjects federal action was allowed only for specific reasons, such as 
the defence of individual fundamental freedoms or national 
commercial market protection against invasive State regulation. 
Basically the allocation of competence was founded on one side on 
the exclusive (or largely prevalent) sovereignty given to central 
authority in foreign matters and in some domestic related issue, 
while on the other side Member States retained exclusive competence 
relating to some the greatest part of domestic issues57: such sovereign 
authority was limited only by constitutional safeguard limits, 
therefore outside the influence of central government. This 
conception of constitutional structure, often described as a layer 
cake58, posits the federal government and state government operating 
in separate, clearly demarcated spheres, both on the legislative and 
the judicial sphere. 
The New Deal revolution upset such system, as it inspired and 
favoured a whole new way of interpretation of the constitutional 
articles and rules (such as the Interstate Commerce clause) which 
identified and defined central authority’s prerogative: basically it 
allowed the substantial overlap of federal legislation on States’ 
legislations in many relevant social and economical fields: 
                                                
57 Civil law, tort law and penal law, which include the so-called “traditional 
state policy powers”. 
58 See N.M. Davidson, in Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration 
in an Era of State Sovereignty, Virginia L. Rev. 93-2007, p. 959-1034. 
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accordingly, the concurrent competences area between centre and 
peripheries grew dramatically, thus allowing federal authority to 
penetrate deep into almost every related area, following therefore the 
noticeable reduction of State rules’ application, as a direct 
consequence of the Supremacy clause enforcement at a national 
level. Accordingly, during the 1950s some commentators held that as 
a matter of fact, on the juridical and constitutional level American 
federalism was unable to provide any real guarantees for Member 
States’ prerogatives: the enumerated powers principle had been 
somehow forgotten to the detriment of States’ legislative 
competences. 
Such dualistic conception of federalism – featured by a complete 
separation between States and centre – has constantly been held by 
the Supreme Court until the first half of the 1990s, with the 
exception of a single landmark decision where the Court attempted to 
distinguish between traditional and non-traditional State functions59. 
Notwithstanding such extensive cancellation of competences 
allocation both on a formal and substantial level, Member States 
managed to keep a relevant role as political and administrative 
centres of law production. As a matter of fact federal law now relates 
to all the necessary and relevant subjects as so to assure a robust 
                                                
59 In National Leagues of City v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) the Supreme 
Court held that Congress may not apply the Commerce power arising from the 
Commerce clause by forcing State to follow its determinations in the State 
government functions area: the Court divided 5 to 4 in striking down a 
congressional statute that extended federal wage-and-hour provision to almost 
all State employee. The Court listed State functions as traditional and exempt 
from congressional control through the Commerce power, but such decision 
was overruled nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985), again by a 5-4 vote. During the 1990s, the Court has 
once again revisited this issue, casting doubts on Garcia through a string of 5-4 
decisions. 
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economical national development, whilst the States are supposed to 
manage the regulation and definition of all the legal instruments and 
institutions through which everyday civil society life can carry on. 
The vision of federalism there emerging is usually identified as 
cooperative federalism: in spite of the dualistic vision it involves a 
presumption according to which Member States and central power 
are constitutionally bound to cooperate. Such conception has 
frequently been described as marble cake60, a metaphor that perfectly 
fits the interstitial nature that features centrally produced federal law, 
if compared to the common law body produced by the Member 
States. 
The cooperative model allows finding a remedy to some of the 
negative outcomes arising from the dual model, which basically 
masks two different aspects of federal constitutional structure. First, 
as a description of actual intergovernmental relations, dual 
federalism ignores the ubiquity of policies that involve cooperation 
rather than conflicts, while cooperative federalism involve ongoing 
cooperation rather than clear and separate spheres of competing 
authority. Second, in contemplating two, and only two, sovereigns, it 
tends to ignore all the cooperative and collaborative relationships 
that may occur among different government levels, by excessively 
squeezing the roles and functions of all the local governance 
intermediary levels. 
Although the dual-sovereignty model predominates in judicial 
account of federalism, in practice Congress has long chosen to 
approach regulations, spending and enforcement through regimes that 
                                                
60 See N.M. Davidson, supra footnote 46. 
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actually blur the boundary between national and state authority61, 
involving varying shades of pre-emption and the beginning of a 
collaborative trend between States and federal power, as so to reflect 
the existing dynamism of relationships between different levels of 
government62. 
Starting most notably with the environmental protection statutes 
enacted during the 1970s, federal regulatory programs increasingly 
adopted such collaborative spirit by relying on State agencies in 
order to implement federal law63: in enacting such programs, 
                                                
61 See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the 
Globe, 111 Yale L.J. 619, 624 (2001) (“The contemporary debate about 
whether to prefer, a priori, the states or the federal government for certain 
forms of lawmaking misses dynamic interaction across levels of governance. In 
practice, federalism is a web of connections formed by transborder responses 
(such as interstate agreements and compacts) and through shared efforts by 
national organizations of state officials, localities, and private interests”). 
In addition to cooperative federalism as a primary alternative to dual 
sovereignty, contemporary accounts in the legal literature emphasize a variety 
of other theoretical frames for understanding the federal-state relationship. 
Process federalism, for example, emphasizes procedural and political 
protections, rather than strict judicial enforcement, to manage the federal-state 
balance. See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 
Vill. L. Rev. 1349, 1350, 1390–91 (2001). Empowerment federalism, by 
contrast, seeks to magnify state and federal power without limiting either. See, 
e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 
U. Kan. L. Rev. 1219, 1221, 1234 (1997); Deborah J. Merritt, Federalism as 
Empowerment, 47 U. Fla. L. Rev. 541, 541–42 (1995). Robert Schapiro 
proposes yet another alternative, which he labels interactive or “polyphonic” 
federalism, emphasizing intergovernmental dialogue as a hallmark over 
cooperation or confrontation (see R.A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of 
Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 243, 246, 2005). 
62 A survey on cooperative federalism is provided in P.J. Weiser, Towards a 
Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 
668-73 (2001). 
63 For example, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 
anticipates that State agencies will act in lieu of the federal government to 
administer and enforce its hazardous waste program (24 U.S.C. § 6962(b) 
1994), making clear that any State agency action “has the same force and 
effect” as action taken by the federal Environment Protection Agency; see 
Harmon Indus. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894, 899 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that 
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Congress opts for the benefits of diversity in regulatory policy within 
a federal framework. Rather than pre-empting the authority of State 
agencies and supplanting them with federal branch offices, 
cooperative federalism programs invites State agencies to 
superintend federal law. Cooperative federalism has allowed thus 
Congress to set forth some uniform federal standards – as embodied 
in the statute, federal agency regulations, or both – but leaves State 
agencies with discretion to implement the federal law, supplement it 
with more stringent standards64, and, in some cases, receive an 
exemption from federal requirements. 
Such mutual cooperation allowed State to experiment with different 
approaches and tailor federal law to local needs and conditions; 
additionally, greater authority has generally been granted to State 
organs involved in the implementation of federal law, given their 
effective participation in the enforcement procedure65. 
                                                                                                                                          
RCRA gives state agencies prime responsibility of implementing this federal 
law). 
64 Cooperative federalism statutes regularly include savings clauses, which 
explicitly allow states to impose more stringent requirements than federal law 
demands. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1370 (1994); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 
U.S.C. §9614(a) (1994); Telecom Act, 47 U.S.C. §251(d)(3) (Supp. IV 1998). 
As the Second Circuit put it in Mianus River Pres. Comm. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 
899, 906 (2d Cir. 1976): 
 
“By the contemplation of minimum federal standards, however, 
Congress did not intend to relegate the States to the status of 
enforcement agents for the executive branch of the federal 
government. To the contrary, it is indisputable that Congress 
specifically declined to attempt a pre-emption of the field in the area 
of water pollution legislation, and as much as invited the States to 
enact requirements more stringent than the federal standards”. 
 
65 In some cases, the cooperative federalism statute takes the form of allowing 
state law to operate within a federal scheme: see Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 
U.S. 91, 110 (1992) (calling state water quality standards promulgated by states 
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A critical feature of cooperative federalism statutes is the balance 
they strike between complete federal pre-emption (a pre-emptive 
federalism where State legislative acts are superseded by paramount 
congressional intent and supreme federal law) and uncoordinated 
federal and State actions in distinct regulatory spheres (a dual 
federalism where federal and States’ authorities act separately and in 
an uncoordinated way, producing sometimes unclear legislative 
schemes, lacking exactness and accuracy of details to the detriment 
of third regulated parties66). The rationale for cooperative federalism 
regulatory strategy makes sense thus as the benefits it ensures of 
allowing for diversity in federal regulatory programs grants the 
compromise between the need for national uniformity and the search 
for specific solutions, locally oriented. By allowing Member States 
to adopt legislative acts that encourage the local adaptation of 
national standards to local needs, and by favouring State 
implementation of federal law, Congress frequently opted for a 
collaborative attitude instead of governing without State cooperation. 
In particular, there are at least two related reasons why the federal 
government has decided to promote diversity in federal regulatory 
regimes: (1) to allow States to tailor federal regulatory programs to 
                                                                                                                                          
with EPA’s guidance under Clean Water Act “part of the federal law of water 
pollution control”). 
66 This aptly characterizes the challenges under the old dual federalism regime 
set forth in the Communications Act of 1934. See § 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (current 
version codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). Other statutory 
regimes create similar challenges for the regulated parties. See Silkwood v. 
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (noting “tension” under Atomic 
Energy Damages Act (Price-Anderson Act), 42 U.S.C. §2210 (1994), where 
“Congress assumed that state-law remedies, in whatever form they might take, 
were available to those injured by nuclear accidents […] even though it was 
well aware of the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s] exclusive authority to 
regulate safety matters”). 
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local conditions and to promote competitions within a federal 
regulatory framework; and (2) to permit experimentation with 
different approaches that may assist in determining an optimal 
regulatory strategy67. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
67 Some commentators have suggested that a fourth possible reason in favour of 
decentralised implementation of statutory regimes is enhancement of political 
participation. See Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the 
Antitrust State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and 
Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1203, 1232 
(1997) (“Political participation is likely to increase as policy responsibilities 
are decentralized to state and local governments.”). In a succinct explanation 
of the significance of federalism that touches on these four reasons, the 
Supreme Court explained that:  
It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to 
the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases 
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it 
allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and 
it makes government more responsive by putting the States in 
competition for a mobile citizenry. (Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452, 458 (1991)). 
See also Deborah R. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: 
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Columbia L. Rev. 1, 3-10 (1988). 
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1.3.1 Local tailoring and interstate competition 
 
A cooperative federalism approach recognizes that many regulatory 
problems “are so complex that they cannot be resolved by one level 
of government acting alone; rather, they require cooperation among 
all levels”68. Such “reconstitutive” approach to regulatory programs 
is embodied by a strategy which can “afford flexibility to 
accommodate diverse subsystem conditions and values, broaden 
decisional responsibility, and reduce costly and dysfunctional 
centralized decisionmaking”69: in some cases the federal 
government’s interest is clearly to cooperate with States’ 
administrations by requiring their legislative enforcement and 
cooperation as it simply does not have the know-how and resources 
to tailor broad standards to local circumstances70. Additionally, 
another benefit which may emerge from such a cooperative approach 
may be found the so-called interstate competition, i.e. the belief that 
by adopting a flexible federal regulatory regime a cooperative 
federalism program allows for a degree of competition between the 
States for residents, capital, and economic activity in an increasingly 
                                                
68 Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New 
Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 
187, 215 (1996). 
69 Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 Md. L. Rev. 86, 92 (1986). 
70 See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1544 
(1994): “Realistically speaking, Congress [cannot] […] have federal 
bureaucrats assume full responsibility [for administrative programs]”; cf. also 
John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption:  
Lessons From Environmental Regulation, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 
& Autumn 1997, p. 220: “To be effective, regulatory officials must be 
knowledgeable about local conditions and concerns to set appropriate 
regulatory priorities and to plan for future developments”. 
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mobile society71. One classic approach for achieving these objectives 
is to set a federal minimum standard legislative “floor” that provides 
flexibility to the States to enact stricter standards, in order to adapt 
federal rules to their local situation: such scheme, which has been 
adopted by almost all federal environmental statutes, appropriately 
recognizes a role for central administration involvement, but 
remarkably leaves the States with important flexibility in order to 
adapt federal legislative provisions to local conditions, compete for 
superior regulatory approaches, and experiment with various 
normative arrangements72. As an important case in point, modern 
environmental regulation convincingly demonstrated how the need to 
tailor environmental policy to local conditions and the even more 
important need to use State technical and personnel resources force 
Congress to share part of its authority73, by favouring State tailored 
implementation: a notable case in point concerns a federal body 
(namely the Federal Environmental Protection Agency – EPA) which 
during the 80’s stepped in for the of Idaho State, in order to 
                                                
71 See Jacque LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of 
the Federal Commerce Power, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 555, 559-60 (1994), 
discussine Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. 
Econ. 416 (1956). 
72 Another way to encourage local competition may be exempting State from 
federal requirements when they supplement federal law with more stringent 
standards (see David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in 
a “Reinvented” State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and 
Reality, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 31 (2000) 
73 See John D. Edgcomb, Comment, Cooperative Federalism and Environmental 
Protection: The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 58 Tul. 
L. Rev. 299, 313 (1983): “One of the primary reasons for utilizing the 
cooperative approach is the great variation in geological and ecological 
conditions under which surface mining is conducted.”. As one example, 
Congress structured 1977 SMCRA (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation 
Act) to enable State to regulate surface mining in a manner that best fit local 
needs and conditions. 
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administer its air quality regulatory program: the federal agency 
clearly was not up to the task, reportedly spending almost five times 
as much as the State administration would have spent to carry on and 
complete the same operations74. As a result of this need for 
cooperation, both the States and the federal government are well 
aware that they are tied together in their ability to administer 
cooperative federalism programs, and the resulting interdependence 
gives each important influence over the other. 
                                                
74 Martha Derthick, American Federalism: Madison’s Middle Ground in the 
1980s, 47 Pub. Admin. Rev. 66, 70 (1987). 
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1.3.2 Legislative experimentation within the States 
 
In defence of federalism, Justice Brandeis in 1932 recalled the 
concept of legislative experimentation by explaining that “[i]t is one 
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens so choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country”75. 
When Congress allows States to enjoy significant regulatory 
discretion, they are enabled to experiment and test different 
normative solutions, learning from one another when performing 
complex regulatory tasks. One of the most relevant cases of 
cooperative federalism experimentation concerns an environmental 
protection related area, namely water and air pollution: between the 
second half of 1960s and the beginning of 1970s Congress enacted a 
string of federal acts defining environmental standards and 
requirements on a national level: such standards were binding for 
Member States, which were however allowed to adopt the final 
legislative implementation by choosing the necessary and proper 
means. Most provisions of the federal Clean Air and Water Act set a 
federal “floor” on a particular issue, leaving the States free to impose 
more rigorous standards above that level. Others, such as the mobile 
                                                
75 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Justice 
Brandeis, dissenting Opinion). See also S. Issacharoff & C.M.Sharkey, 
Backdoor Federalization, American Law & Economics Association Annual 
Meetings Paper n. 39, 2006 (http://law.bepress.com/alea/16th/art39). 
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source provision of the Clean Air Act76, impose non-discretionary 
standards that set both a floor and a ceiling. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Clean Air regime is 
California’s exemption from the mobile source provisions, which 
allows California to set significantly more stringent standards for 
emissions by autos and other vehicles than would otherwise be 
permitted under federal law77. The exemption illustrates two central 
federalism values:  the value of state experimentation (the exemption 
is based in part on California’s pioneering efforts in the field) and 
the need to tailor regulatory solutions to local conditions. 
In the context of California legislative experimentation two other 
aspects are particularly interesting: first of all if the experiment 
works out properly then the nation as a whole may benefit through its 
adoption at the federal level; secondly, Californian legislative 
experimentation in the environmental area has also been followed by 
two other remarkable outcomes: on one side it corroborates the 
assumption under which adopting experimental legislative solutions 
may provide a benefit for the nation as a whole, because if such 
experimentation works out fine it can be then adopted at the federal 
level; on the other side such phenomenon highlights the fact that 
relying on their local needs some States may increase their level of 
influence and importance within the Union political balance, by 
adopting legislative solutions exempt from pre-emption and therefore 
emerging as more autonomous than other States78. 
                                                
76 See Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89272, 79 
Stat. 992 (1965). 
77 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1). 
78 As E. Young properly points out, “California is so big that its policies have 
an impact even if they are never adopted outside the boundaries of the Golden 
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Resisting the immediate institution of a uniform national rule hedges 
the federal government’s bet by waiting to pick a single standard. 
Especially on complicated subjects, the evaluation and survey of 
State specific solutions may lead to the individuation of a federal 
definitive standard, avoiding thus the premature selection of 
suboptimal national standards. The absence of a federal standard in 
difficult regulatory policy areas can help ensure that the regulatory 
regime does not “lock in” a suboptimal standard: in this context 
national uniformity is not seen as an absolute value which as to be 
enforced at any cost, but as a relative value which should be 
favoured only if empirical observation of States legislative 
experimentations’ effects justify its adoption79. 
Such considerations reinforce the impression that pre-emption is 
generally deregulatory in nature. While the federal statutes may 
originally have been enacted as responses to State inaction, the Clean 
Air and Water Act experience evidences that State governments 
today often seek to go further in protecting the environment than 
federal law provides: under such circumstances pre-emption becomes 
important where the States have not only enforced the federal “floor” 
but gone further by imposing more stringent standards, and regulated 
                                                                                                                                          
State.  California on its own outpaces most of the world’s nations in energy 
consumption, and its auto market is sufficiently large that no automaker, even 
foreign ones, can afford to ignore its requirements”. Cf. R.A. Epstein, M.S. 
Greve (ed.), Federal Preemption: States’ Power, National Interests, AEI Press 
2007. 
79 According to some Commentators, “[u]niformity mandated at the ‘wrong’ 
level, or administered incompetently even at the ‘right’ one, may well be worse 
than heterogeneous outcomes among the states.”: see Peter H. Schuck, Some 
Reflections on the Federalism Debate, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 19 (1996). 
Put differently, where the optimal approach is unclear, “the learning model of 
the law suggests that values other than uniformity may be primary”: Mary 
Loring Lyndon, Tort Law, Preemption and Risk Management, 2 Widener L. 
Symp. J. 69, 80 (1997). 
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entities seek relief from these additional regulatory burdens by 
invoking federal law80. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
80 See, e.g., Central Valley Chrysler-Plymouth v. California Air Resources Bd., 
No. CV-F-02-5017, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20403 (E.D. Cal. June 11, 2002) 
(issuing a preliminary injunction, on pre-emption grounds, against California’s 
new zero-emissions-vehicle rules). 
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1.4 Cooperative federalism constitutional grounds 
 
As already stated, the American federal Constitution includes a set of 
provisions meant to safeguard the allocation of powers between 
Union federal government and Member States. Such provisions are 
expressed through restrictions, limitations and constraints towards 
the constitutional institutions there involved. We can surely affirm 
that the interpretation of such provisions, as it was delivered during 
the first half of the 18th century, established the grounds of the 
current federal constitutional theory. 
Between 1801 and 1835 John Marshall was appointed Chief Justice 
at the United States Supreme Court: during that period of time he 
managed to shape the Supreme Court jurisprudence by exercising its 
extraordinary influence and by imposing its dynamic view of the 
Constitution, deeply related to its expansive understanding of 
national powers81. At the end of the century the expansive view 
embraced by Marshall was replaced by a more restrictive approach, 
which lasted until the 1930s, when because of the severe economical 
crisis a stronger governmental intervention was required. In 1933 
Congress started adopting a string of economical legislative acts as 
so to find a solution to the crisis, while the Supreme Court gradually 
favoured the New Deal regulatory programme. 
                                                
81 In one of its well known Opinions he declared: “we must never forget that it 
is a Constitution we are expounding” (McCulloch v. Maryland, 17. U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819), on which see infra par. 1.4.2). In opposition to 
Marshall’s interpretative efforts, see S.C. Hoke, Trascending Conventional 
Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 Connecticut Law R., 
829, 1992, where the Author highlights the unreasonably nationalistic extent of 
the principles expressed in McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden, 
cases which apparently destabilized the delicate asset of powers as originally 
stated by the Constitution. 
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In 194182 the Court started reinforcing the “constitutional revolution” 
officially begun in 193783 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt: for 
what it concerned the system of relationships occurring between 
national federal law and Member States various legal orders, the 
most important restrictions on the latter arose from the Supremacy 
clause84 – which ensures federal law primacy on every conflicting 
State law – and from the tenth section of article 185, which expressly 
grants federal power the exclusive competence on some subjects to 
the detriment of Member States’ prerogatives. The aim of such 
constitutional restrictions is namely to preserve the Union’s 
existence by neutralising probable centrifugal forces: therefore such 
limitations are primarily addressed to the States, whereas the federal 
power as well has to comply with them, by not enacting legislative 
acts which can potentially authorise States to go beyond the limits set 
by the Constitution. 
Such restrictions can be conceptually categorised in two classes. The 
first class includes all those limitations whose respect is granted by 
the attribution to Congress of specific coercive powers, suitable to be 
exercised toward Member States in case of necessity. It includes all 
the limitations listed in abovementioned section tenth of article 1, 
according to which without the consent of Congress the States cannot 
tax goods entering or leaving their territory, and cannot make treaties 
or negotiate with foreign countries. Therefore such limitations on 
                                                
82 See United States v. Derby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941): here the Court’s unanimous 
Opinion embodies its approval for the New Deal plan. 
83 See the case National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 
301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
84 See infra Ch. 2. 
85 According to such section “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of the 
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be 
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws”. 
 48 
States’ powers arise from the Constitutional system considered as a 
whole, because of the mutual relationship between the their listing 
and the correspondent granting to Congress of the consent power, by 
the means of which State actions may be authorised. On the contrary, 
the second class of restrictions on States’ powers includes all those 
limitations abstracting from any potential granting of specific powers 
to Congress, such as the impossibility of unilateral rescission from 
the federal Union agreement or the core principle according to which 
neither the States nor the Congress can legitimately modify relations 
and representative instruments occurring between the People and its 
federal representatives, as disciplined by the constitutional text86. 
In such context, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Dormant 
Commerce clause and of the Necessary and Proper clause helped 
defining the relationships occurring between federal power and 
States’ prerogative, deeply influencing the balance of powers 
between centre and peripheries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
86 See, generally, L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 3rd ed, Vol. 1, 
Foundation Press.  
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1.4.1 Interstate Dormant Commerce clause and congressional 
consent to State laws 
 
Over the last half-century the powers of the federal government have 
expanded through an increasingly muscular reading of the Commerce  
clause. With the broadened scope of federal power, the Supreme 
Court has engaged the delicate balancing act inherent in a dual 
sovereign world, increasingly determining whether State law has 
been pre-empted by federal laws, policies, and regulations87. 
Underlying the balance between federal and state power is the 
critical recognition that, “[t]he extent to which a federal statute 
displaces (or pre-empts) state law affects both the substantive legal 
rules under which we live and the distribution of authority between 
the states and the federal government”88. 
According to the provision stated in article 1, section 8, third 
paragraph, of the federal Constitution the Congress is the only 
constitutional organ entitled to regulate commerce with foreign 
Nations, among the several States and with the Indian Tribes89. Even 
if the constitutional text explicitly tends to limit States’ influence in 
                                                
87 At least since McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), and Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), the Supreme Court has recognised the ability of 
federal law to trump inconsistent or conflicting state law. 
88 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 225 (2000).  That said, “[t]he  
powers of the federal government and the powers of the state overlap 
enormously. Although the Constitution makes a few of the federal government’s 
powers exclusive, the States retain concurrent authority over most of the areas 
in which the federal government can  
act.” Id. See also Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937) (“Under our 
constitutional system, there necessarily remains to the States, until Congress 
acts, a wide range for the permissible exercise of power appropriate to their 
territorial jurisdiction although interstate commerce may be affected”). 
89 Such provision is the so-called Commerce clause: see supra, footnote 39. 
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the sole area of commerce with foreign Nations90, for at least 150 
years91 the Supreme Court deemed the Commerce clause as relevant 
not only in such cases, but also in all cases of commercial activity 
between the States, including additionally not only transactions 
across State boundaries but also any activity that affects commerce in 
more than one State within the Nation. The Court has thus construed 
this clause as incorporating an implicit negative restraint on State 
power even in the absence of congressional action, perceiving it as 
the real basis of a substantive restriction on permissible State 
regulation of interstate commerce92. 
As stated by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudential interpretation, 
although Congress failed to enact legislation pre-empting State 
commerce regulations, nevertheless State regulations should be 
deemed as invalid, as a violation of the Commerce clause93. The 
Court held such view when it found that such regulations either 
discriminate against out-of-state interests or unduly burden the free 
flow of commerce among the States. The Commerce clause in its 
“dormant” state is thought to invalidate such State regulations, 
although it is accepted that Congress may choose to overrule the 
                                                
90 See Art. 1, par 10, 2nd par.: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, 
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely 
necessary for executing its inspection Laws”. 
91 Since the historical case Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 
318 (1852). 
92 See Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) 
(Justice Scalia, joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment: “The 
‘negative commerce clause’ […] is negative not only because it negates State 
regulation of commerce, but also because it does not appear in the 
Constitution”). 
93 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (State statute requiring 
prescribed packaging for native fruit sold outside State unconstitutionally 
burden interstate commerce); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 
(1959) (State statute requiring specific type of read fender mudguard for truck 
unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce). 
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judicial invalidation of a particular State regulation by statutorily 
authorising it94. The Dormant Commerce clause is featured thus by a 
negative implication whose theory founds its basis in the 
interpretation of one of those “great silences”95 which feature the 
constitutional text, and it has been gradually developed and 
supported by the Court’s judicial activism: the Court held that 
“[a]lthough the language of th[e] Clause speaks only of Congress’ 
power over commerce […] it also limits the power of the States to 
erect barriers against interstate trade”96. The contours of the 
Dormant Commerce clause are fairly clear, although the doctrine is 
often the target of criticism both on and off the Court97. 
                                                
94 In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, Chief Justice Stone, 
speaking for the Court, stated that Congress has “undoubted” power to “permit 
the states to regulate commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be 
permissible” 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945). See generally Prudential Ins. Co. v. 
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 421-40 (1946) (McCarran Act constitutionally 
validated state statute that discriminated between foreign and domestic 
insurance companies). 
95 Cf. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949): (Justice 
Jackson)“Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written word, this 
Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning 
it has given to these great silences of the Constitution”. See more specifically 
v. R.J. Pierce, Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: 
Agency Power to Pre-empt State Regulation, Univ. of Pittsburgh Law R., Vol. 
46:607, 1985. 
96 Cf. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 446 (1991). 
97 Some Commentators disagree with this view by holding that the supposed 
negative implication flowing from the Commerce clause lacks a foundation or 
justification in either the Constitution’s text or history: Congress’s power to 
regulate interstate commerce has grown only through judicial interpretation, 
and such implied extent of the Commerce clause alters the delicate balance of 
federalism clearly manifested in the constitutional text, by undermining the 
Constitution’s carefully established textual structure for allocating power  
between federal and state sovereigns: “[It has been argued] that the Court may 
“read into” the Constitution’s broad precepts that lack a specific basis in text – 
what has been referred to as the “unwritten constitution”. Such a position has 
in fact been specifically urged as a justification for the dormant commerce 
clause” (M.H. Redish, S.V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce clause and the 
Constitutional balance of Federalism, Duke Law Journal, September 1984 no. 
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The historic foundations of the Dormant Commerce clause doctrine 
can be found in two landmark cases (Gibbons v. Ogden98 of 1824 and 
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.99 of 1829), with particular 
focus on the Opinions delivered by Chief Justice Marshall’s, the 
greatest advocate and architect of a strong central government. Under 
his leadership the Court established itself as a co-equal branch of the 
federal government, rather than a s a mere subordinate of the 
legislative and executive branches; furthermore, the Marshall Court 
systematically established the national government as the political 
and legal superior to the State governments: this latter achievement 
was realised principally by Marshall’s expansive interpretation of the 
Supremacy clause in McCulloch v. Maryland100 and by the standards 
for federal pre-emption of State law he enunciated in Gibbons v. 
Ogden. Since this latter case the Supreme Court has struggled with 
the issue of whether Congress’s power to regulate commerce among 
the several States was exclusive or concurrent with the States: a 
concession law enacted by the State of New York granted to Mr. 
Ogden a monopoly on the right to operate steamship between New 
York and New Jersey, whilst Thomas Gibbons, a citizen of New 
Jersey who had a coasting licence under Congress’s Federal 
Navigation Act of 1973, was held by State courts to have violated 
                                                                                                                                          
4, pp. 569-617). See also General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 312 
(1997) (Justice Scalia, concurring: “The so-called ‘negative’ Commerce Clause 
is an unjustified judicial invention”). 
98 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). According to V. Dinh this case “is considered 
the foundation of the ‘dormant commerce clause’” (see V. Dinh, Federal 
Displacement of State Law: the Nineteenth Century View, in R.A. Epstein, M.S. 
Greve (ed.), Federal Preemption: States’ Power, National Interests, AEI Press 
2007. 
99 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). 
100 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 53 
such monopoly. He appealed the Supreme Court, arguing that the 
federal law conflicted with and trumped the State monopoly: the 
Court was thus asked to solve the conflict between the federal 
licensing law and the State monopoly. Justice Marshall observed in 
his opinion that Congress’s power over commerce was “complete in 
itself, [as it] may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges 
no limitations, other than prescribed in the Constitution”101: 
Marshall’s gloss on the Supremacy clause’s directive to set aside 
“contrary” State laws was condensed in the ruling that State laws that 
“interfer[e] with, [or are] contrary to” federal law must be 
displaced by federal law, which “in every such case […] is 
supreme”102. To determine whether the federal act did indeed 
conflict, Marshall turned to statutory construction, as so to decide 
whether the word “licence” meant permission and entitlement to 
trade or merely, as Ogden argued, conferred an American identity103. 
The Court adopted Marshall’s opinion as so to design the statutory 
hierarchy of the federal system, by stating that Congress has 
complete authority to define the distribution of federal and State 
regulatory power over what is concerned to be interstate commerce. 
Therefore, a State could not enact a regulation concerning interstate 
trade, as this whole area is exclusively granted to the Congress. 
The very brief decision in Willson104 most directly demonstrates that 
Marshall recognized a negative implied aspect to the commerce 
power, as the word “dormant” was here employed for the first time, 
                                                
101 22 U.S. at 196. On Justice Marshall Opinion see G. Buttà (ed.), “John 
Marshall, ‘Judicial Review’ e stato federale”, Giuffrè Editore, Milan 1998, p. 
165. 
102 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210. 
103 Id. at 213-15. 
104 See supra, footnote 99. 
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in relation to the Commerce clause. In the case at issue the Court 
uphold a Delaware authorizing act concerning the building of a dam 
across a navigable waterway even though it could have been 
construed as contrary to general federal provision for navigation, 
which is clearly related to the congressional exclusive power over 
commerce: the State regulation at issue was considered valid by the 
Court, as Congress’s commerce power still was latent at the time of 
the controversy105. 
Even under Chief Justice Marshall, after Gibbons the Court did not 
invalidate all State laws that could be construed as regulating 
commerce. Instead, the Court’s Commerce clause jurisprudence drew 
a distinction between “commerce” regulations and “police” 
regulations: Marshall was apparently the first to employ the rubric 
“police power” in order to describe the residual prerogatives of 
sovereignty which the States had not surrendered to the federal 
government, while the “commerce” regulations were State 
regulations unduly relating to interstate commerce. In the years 
between Gibbons v. Ogden and the middle of the 19th century, the 
legislative tensions between States and federal government were 
frequently resolved by reference to Marshall’s distinction: State 
regulations were either deemed invalid because of their character as 
“regulations of interstate commerce” or valid because of their 
character as “police power regulations”. 
                                                
105 See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. at 252: Marshall declared “we do 
not think the act […] can, under all the circumstances of the case, be 
considered as repugnant to the powe to regulate commerce in its dormant state, 
or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject”. 
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In 1851, the landmark case Cooley v. Board of Wardens106 brought 
coherence to Commerce clause doctrine and additionally addressed 
the question concerning the power of Congress to permit State 
commercial regulations, which would otherwise not be permissible. 
In 1803, the State of Pennsylvania enacted a law that required ships 
entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia to engage a local pilot to 
guide them through the harbour; nearly half a century later, 
petitioners contended that the Pennsylvania law was invalid for two 
reasons: on one side they argued that Congress had exclusive power 
under the Commerce clause to regulate navigation, including the 
subject of pilots; on the other side it was contended that Congress 
lacked power, through consent, to validate those State laws within 
the field of exclusive federal power. 
Even the State act at issue manifestly and purportedly affected 
interstate commerce, the Court upheld it not because Congress had 
validated the law by its consent, but because it fell within State 
power to regulate interstate commerce which was “local and not 
national; […] best provided for not by one system, […] but by as 
many as the legislative discretion of the several States should deem 
applicable to the local peculiarities of the ports within their 
limits”107. The Court held that the concerned State law had no 
national relevance, as it regulating a subject that was local rather 
than national, and therefore not requiring a uniform exclusive 
Congress legislation. To bolster its own conclusion the Court 
invoked a congressional statute purporting to authorize such State 
                                                
106 53 U.S. 299 (1851). 
107 Id. at 319. 
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regulation108: therefore the result of the Court’s decision was to 
validate not only the 1803 Pennsylvania law, but the decision of the 
first Congress to leave the subject of pilotage to State control until 
Congress enacted further laws. The Cooley doctrine held thus that 
“States are free to regulated those aspects of interstate and foreign 
commerce so local in character as to demand diverse treatment, 
while Congress alone may regulate those aspects of interstate and 
foreign commerce so national in character that a single, uniform rule 
is necessary”109: when Congress expressly determines, as it did in 
Cooley, that the nature of the commerce in question does not require 
exclusive regulation, the States may exercise power over that 
commerce. Alternatively, when Congress determines, by enactment 
of federal legislation, that certain objects of commerce require 
exclusive federal regulation, the conflicting State regulations are 
clearly invalid under the Supremacy clause110. Under Cooley, when 
Congress has not regulated the objects of commerce in question, the 
Court itself determines whether the nature of the commerce requires 
exclusive federal regulation: therefore the Court in testing State 
legislation essentially makes what amounts to an intrinsically 
legislative determination as to whether a particular type of commerce 
                                                
108 In its reasoning the Court invoked an act of Congress of August 7, 1789, 1 
Stat. 54, which permitted the States to regulate pilotage but did not purport to 
authorize States to enact regulations discriminating against foreign or interstate 
commerce, as Pennsylvania’s statutes appears to have done. The Cooley 
doctrine became thus a device to justify the power of consent, because 
Congress can authoritatively declare which subjects are local and it has power 
to ensure the validity of State laws which might otherwise fall foul of the 
Commerce clause. 
109 See L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional law, p. 1048. 
110 See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. (1981); Raymond 
Motor Transportation Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). Cf. also Cappelletti, 
M. Seccombe e J.H.H. Weiler, op. cit. Book 2, p. 284; G. Bognetti, Lo spirito 
del Costituzionalismo americano, p. 214. 
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requires exclusive federal regulation. The Cooley theory was later 
employed by the Court in a large number of decisions concerning 
State legislation111: it became clear that whether a given subject 
matter should be judged appropriate for State regulation often 
depended upon how the State proposed to regulate it in the particular 
case and depending on the overall context in which the State act was 
placed, as so to set State’s action limits and its possible 
justifications. Such analysis was at first conducted by classifying the 
impact of State regulation on interstate commerce as either “direct” 
or “indirect”. Before the New Deal period State regulations affecting 
interstate commerce were permitted by the Supreme Court only if the 
concerned regulatory impact on interstate commerce was felt “only 
indirectly, incidentally, and remotely”112. 
Since the mid-1930s, the Court’s analysis of State regulations of 
commerce evolved remarkably, as the Court’s analysis gradually 
focused on those State interstate regulations explicitly featured by a 
discriminatory extent113: since the New Deal revolution the Dormant 
Commerce clause has been employed increasingly and Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce has grown through judicial 
interpretation to the point where today it is virtually unlimited in its 
reach. In that period the Court interpreted the clause by invalidating 
                                                
111 Cfr. ad es. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railways Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 
557 (1886); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866); Ex parte 
McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1872). 
112 Cf. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888); Accord Erb v. Morasch, 
177 U.S. 584 (1900); Chicago, R.I. & Pacific Ry. Co.v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 
(1911). 
113 Cf. cases Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. (1981); 
Raymond Motor Transportation Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978). For what it 
concerns the doctrine see also supra, M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, J.H.H. 
Weiler, Book 2, p. 284. 
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a large number of State regulations114: under this approach, a State 
law had to, in the first instance, concern a legitimate State end115; 
second, it had not to discriminate unduly against interstate or out-of-
State commerce116; third, it had not to impose on interstate commerce 
a burden which was “clearly excessive in relation to the putative 
local benefit”117 arising from it. 
The severe test employed by the Court clearly highlights how State 
legislative authorities may adopt acts that import spillover effects, 
i.e. State laws that, by their operation, shift costs and favours their 
own citizen while disproportionately affecting out-of-State interests, 
by imposing externalities on other States118. This problem is most 
                                                
114 Such regulations were related to many different areas and topics, such as the 
imposition of compulsory requirements in transportation (Di Santo v. 
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 1927; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 1925); 
freight trains and road truck length (Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 
761, 1945); imposition of compulsory requirements related to sales and prices 
(Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 1977; 
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 1951; Baldwin v. G.A.F. 
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 1935). According to some Commentators there is no 
effective limit to the potential reach of Congress’s regulatory power, as it can 
potentially affect every aspect of economy: all the possible limits have only a 
political weight (cf. F. Jacobs e K. Karst, The “Federal” Legal Order: The 
U.S.A. and Europe Compared – A Judicial Perspective, in M. Cappelletti, M. 
Seccombe e J.H.H. Weiler, Integration through Law, Book 1 pp. 169-243). 
115 See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982). 
116 See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 511 
U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
117 Cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970): here the Court 
formulated a test according to which “[w]here the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on 
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden 
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefit”. 
118 See R.M. Hills, Against Pre-emption: How Federalism can Improve the 
National Legislative Process, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 
27, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=412000 
(“Congress frequently regulates activities because state regulation or lack of 
regulation of those  activities imposes external costs on neighboring states.  
The whole point of the federal scheme is to suppress state creativity, which 
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acute when a State enacts commercial laws that regulate 
extraterritorial trade, so that unrepresented outsiders are affected 
even if they do not cross the State’s borders. Because regulations 
unduly burdening or discriminating have been thought to result from 
the inherently limited constituency to which each State or local 
legislature is accountable, the Supreme Court has viewed with 
suspicion any State action which imposes special or distinct burdens 
on out-of-State interests unrepresented in the State’s political 
process119, invalidating a wide range of legislative measures not by 
the involved interests’ adequate representation.  
State regulations are rarely struck down for the explicit reason that 
they are the products of unrepresentative political processes; rather, 
this political defect has been seen as underlying the forms of 
economic discrimination which the Supreme Court has treated as 
invalidating certain State actions with respect to interstate 
commerce: subsequently, the negative implications of the Commerce 
clause derive principally from a political theory of Union, not from 
an economic theory of free trade: hence the function of the clause is 
to ensure national solidarity, not necessarily economic efficiency120. 
Recently, however, the Court has in several opinions espoused the 
economic language of the “free market” as being the basis of the 
Dormant Commerce clause: in General Motors v. Tracy121, for 
example, the Court highlighted a passage from the then almost half-
                                                                                                                                          
might consist only in creatively gaining benefits for their own citizens at the 
expense of non-residents”); see also S. Issacharoff & C.M.Sharkey, Backdoor 
Federalization, American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 
Paper n. 39, 2006, p. 120; G. Bognetti, supra, p. 214. 
119 Cf. Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & 
Electric Co., 237 U.S. 83 (1827). 
120 See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1935). 
121 519 U.S. 278 (1997). 
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century old case H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond122, which stated 
that the Commerce clause’s aim is to foster for “[…] every farmer 
and every craftsman […] free access to every market in the Nation” 
and that “every consumer may look to the free competition from 
every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation 
by any”123. The Court’s operative definition of “discrimination” has 
been fairly broad in this context: any disparity in the treatment of in-
State and out-of-State interests constitutes discrimination, even if the 
disparity is slight124. Additionally, the Court held that “where 
discrimination is patent, […] neither a widespread advantage to in-
State interests nor a widespread disadvantage to out-of-State 
competitors need to be shown” as so to invalidate the law, and that 
nor does a finding of discrimination necessarily depend on purely 
economic analysis125. This expansive notion of “discrimination” has 
particular importance because it affects the strict scrutiny of 
discriminatory measures, through which the Court can apply its 
balancing test weighing the burden on interstate commerce against 
the benefit to the State’s legitimate interests. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
122 336 U.S. 525 (1949). 
123 This viewing agrees with the dissenting Opinion delivered by Justice Scalia 
in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992), where he held that “[O]ur 
negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence grew out of the notion that the 
Constitution implicitly established a national free market […]”. 
124 See for example supra, footnote 106. 
125 See New Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276 (1988): 
here the Court found discrimination even though only one company was hurt, 
and only one company was benefited by the challenged State action. 
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1.4.2 McCulloch v. Maryland and the implied powers doctrine 
 
The so-called Necessary and Proper clause is located in the first 
article, 8th section, last paragraph, of the federal Constitution. During 
its jurisprudential iter the Court delivered an interpretation of this 
provision that has always been featured by an expansive spirit. 
According to such provision Congress is allowed to adopt all those 
necessary and proper acts functionally useful as so to put into effect 
its constitutionally enumerated powers126. 
The interpretative activity provided by the Court has therefore been 
central to the complete and effective fulfilment of Congress’s federal 
prerogatives, and the roots of the implied powers doctrine is 
unanimously found127 in Chief Justice Marshall’s Opinion delivered 
in McCulloch v. Maryland128. This 1819 case clearly showed how the 
“implied powers” could have caused institutional uncertainty, if not 
explained and defined properly. 
                                                
126 “The Congress shall have power […] [t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”. 
127 Cf. T.M. Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United 
States of America, op. cit. p. 92; G. Buttà, John Marshall. ‘Judicial Review’ e 
stato federale, op. cit. pp. 83 ss.; M. Cappelletti e D. Golay, The Judicial 
Branch in the Federal and Transnational Union: Its Impact on Integration, in 
Cappelletti, Seccombe, Weiler, Integration Through Law, Book 2. p. 280; S. 
Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, UCLA School of Law 
Research Paper No. 05-33, 2005 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=821324), e 
Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, vol. 74:795 Texas Law Review, 1996; C. 
Nelson, Preemption, vol. 86:225 Virginia Law Review, 2000; D.E. Engdahl, 
Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. Colo. L. Rev. 58, 1973-1974. 
128 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, (1819). See S.C. Hoke, Trascending Conventional 
Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause (see above, footnote 
70); S. Gardbaum, The Nature of Pre-emption, 79 Cornell Law Rev, 767 
(1994). 
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The McCulloch facts are well known: as the Bank of the United 
States tried to establish and open new branches across the whole 
Country, it aroused strong opposition in the States, where the 
national Bank competed for business with local concerns; 
furthermore, bank officers allegedly committed fraud and 
embezzlement thus exacerbating the whole situation. As a response, 
the Maryland legislature chose to impose a tax on any corporation 
not chartered by the State, and when the Bank refused to pay the tax, 
process was issued against a Bank officer who had been exposed as a 
speculator and an embezzler. The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld 
the State’s power to collect the tax, and the parties presented two 
questions to the Supreme Court in order to find out whether the 
Congress possess the power to incorporate the Bank, given that this 
power was not expressly enumerated in article 1, and – assuming 
creation of the Bank was a proper exercise of Congress’s power – 
whether it was susceptible to the Maryland tax. 
Chief Justice Marshall elaborated the Supremacy clause’s import in 
answering both questions, holding that being the Congress explicitly 
granted of the powers to tax, regulate commerce and organize a 
national centralised economy, it was implicitly granted as well of all 
those necessary powers by the means of which it could put into full 
effect its constitutional prerogatives129. He recalled national 
supremacy as a supra-constitutional value, according to which 
“States have no power […] to retard, impede, burden, or in any 
manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by 
                                                
129 “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and 
all means which are appropriate, and which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
Constitution, are constitutional” 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
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Congress […]”130. Remarkably, Marshall decided to describe the 
interrelation between State and national laws as “conflicting”, 
somehow anticipating the mode of analysis adopted: this assumption 
that the powers themselves were inherently in conflict foreclosed a 
more limited inquiry into the actual effect of State regulation on the 
federal entity, and whether the State’s exercise of its powers was, in 
this instance, proscribed. Another presupposition was that the Union 
was “supreme within its sphere of action”131, as it “result[ed] 
necessarily from its nature”132: accordingly, speaking about the 
necessity and properness requirements he seemed to overshadow the 
first one, while placing great emphasis on the latter element, by 
holding that Congress was thus enabled to adopt not only the strictly 
necessary means but every proper means (among which the creation 
of new National Bank branches across the Country) as so to achieve 
the full satisfaction of its enumerated powers. 
It is wise to keep clear in mind that the Necessary and Proper powers 
theory neither does expand the extent of constitutionally granted 
powers, nor it grants Congress brand new powers: it can be seen as a 
core principle according to which all the proper means granted to 
Congress are somehow ‘included’ in the constitutional provisions 
defining the so-called enumerated powers. According to the 
predominant doctrine, the notion of implied powers is linked on one 
side to a general extension of Congress prerogatives, and on the other 
side to the concomitant presence of implied limitation on States’ 
powers: for example, if Congress has been accorded the power to 
                                                
130 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436. 
131 McCulloch, at 405. 
132 Id. 
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regulate commerce among States and with foreign Nations, such 
power impliedly excludes States from the related regulatory fields; 
on the contrary, pre-emption would be present where Congress has 
effectively exercised its powers by adopting a legislative act that 
occupies the whole area, by precluding Member States from enacting 
further legislation on the same subject133. 
As already stated, a subject not expressly related to the enumerated 
powers can be regulated by Congress if and only if such action is 
suitable as so to achieve the complete fulfilment of a congressional 
enumerated power: for instance, while Congress is not generally 
supposed to regulate the manufactory industrial area (as it is not per 
sé closely connected to interstate commerce issues134), which belongs 
to States legislative competence, it is obvious that commercial 
monopolies built in such area or workers’ conditions therein135 may 
be regulated by Congress, as these two element can potentially affect 
commerce among States: under such circumstances, the relevant 
federal act becomes a necessary and proper means as so to regulate a 
field connected to the exclusive competence of Congress (or to 
effectively put into action another enumerated power). 
                                                
133 Stephen Gardbaum is the only Author according to which such dual 
categorisation does not exist: pre-emption entirely abstracts from any actual 
conflict between federal and State law, as it would find its rational basis in the 
Necessary and Proper clause (see Ch. 2) 
134 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Swift & Co. v. 
United States, 196 U.S. 375, 397 (1905). 
135 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 65  
Chapter 2: Pre-emption in the United States 
 
“Most commentators who 
write about pre-emption 
agree on at least one 
thing: modern preemption 
jurisprudence is a 
muddle”136 
 
Before going into detailed pre-emption analysis, it is wise to keep 
clear in mind that in the 19th century there was no “pre-emption 
doctrine” as such. The word “pre-empt” only entered the 
constitutional lexicon when Justice Louis Brandeis used it in a 
dissenting opinion in 1917137: borrowing from a longstanding aspect 
of property law which favoured the first developers of unoccupied 
land138, he turned it into a metaphor for the relationship of 
overlapping State and federal law, so as to describe the case of 
federal law capable of fully occupying a certain regulatory field. 
Many authors and commentators focused their attention on the 
                                                
136 See C. Nelson, Preemption, vol. 86 Virginia Law Review, 86, 2000. 
137 See New York Central R.R. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 169 (1917) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting). Rejecting the notion that the New York statute at issue had been 
displaced by federal regulation, Justice Brandeis declared “Congress has [not], 
by legislating on one branch of a subject relative to interstate commerce, pre-
empted the whole field […]”. See also Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of 
Preemption, (id.), noting that Winfield seems to be the first case to use the 
word “pre-empt” in the constitutional context. 
138 Federal legislation had, from the earliest times, established laws regarding 
private acquisition of public land which favoured those who first settled on and 
developed the land: see, e.g. Sweeney’s Lessee v. Toner, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 129, 
130 (1791); Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 327 (1890) (“Congress, by a system 
of laws called the ‘Pre-emption Laws,’ […] confer[red] a priority of the right 
of purchase on the persons who settled upon and cultivated any part of this 
public domain”). 
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federal pre-emption theory as developed by the Supreme Court from 
the 40’s onward: through decades such arcane topic has generated 
much public debate and institutional dispute, as broad federal pre-
emption claims allegedly interfered with the States’ historic police 
powers to protect their citizens. Remarkably, the debate on pre-
emption is particularly prominent for what it concerns the tort law 
area. Congress has increasingly exercised its legislative powers in 
many subjects and gradually regulated so many products in so many 
areas139 by enacting federal statutes which frequently overlapped 
existing States’ regulations: the products liability cases present 
themselves as a particularly propitious area of inquiry, because of the 
fact that tort law is so thoroughly a traditional area of State 
governance, the federalisation of this branch of common law 
threatens a serious reallocation of power in the delicate U.S. system 
                                                
139 From cigarettes (see the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising 
Acts and the 1969 Publich Health Cigarette Smoking Act, which imposed 
compulsory requirements relating to advertising and promoting cigarettes, pre-
empting thus any State law liability claim and forbidding States from requiring 
any additional statement relating to smoking and health (cf. Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992), on which see infra)), drugs (see Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 (1994)), cars (see the 
1966 National Traffic and Motor Safet Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (1994), 
which establishes a minimum floor in motor vehicle safety standards: in Geier 
v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (529 U.S. 861, 2000) the Court was asked 
whether such federal statute pre-empted all State law and therefore also 
common law tort rights, which were subsequently compared to additional 
requirements), and medical devices (see Medical Device Amendments of 1976 
to the Fedral Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k, 379, 379a 
(1994)), to workplace safety (see Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994), establishing standards aimed at making the 
workplace safer and healthier), nuclear power safety (see Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297g-3 (1994); see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
State Energy Res. Cons. & Dev Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205 (1983)), and labor 
relation (see National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988), see 
also Allison Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)). Cf. also B.J. Grey, 
Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort Remedies, 77 
Boston Univ. L. Rev. pp. 559-627, 1997. 
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of dual sovereignty. Following the enactment of federal pre-emptive 
legislation by Congress, which gradually reduced the amount of 
existing State regulation, chiefly by placing a ceiling or prohibition 
on stricter State regulation, a large amount of essays and papers has 
been produced, arguing that probably pre-emption questions cannot 
be reduced only to the judicial exegesis of (often ambiguous) federal 
statutes involved, but also raising profound questions of institutional 
design and constitutional understanding, in relation to the 
competence allocation issue between centre and peripheries. 
Additional relevance to the topic is given by the fact that the pre-
emption analysis delivered by the Court through its huge case law 
has often shown inner incoherence and conflict, gradually leading to 
the birth of a confused doctrine. Hence the pre-emption theory can be 
described as a “messy universe”140 lacking a shared consensus even 
on its main foundations or issues: basically, such pervasive confusion 
arises from the fact that “notwithstanding its repeated claims to the 
contrary, the Supreme Court’s numerous pre-emption cases follow no 
                                                
140 Cf. R.A. Epstein, M.S. Greve, Federal Preemption: Principles and Politics, 
in Federalist Outlook, No. 25, June 2007; see also supra, note n. 137. As many 
authors pointed out, pre-emption appears to be messy in general, not only in 
relation to a specific legal field: according to S.C. Hoke the U.S. Supreme 
Court “has failed to articulate a coherent standard for deciding pre-emption 
cases, and its haphazard approach fails to provide meaningful guidance to 
lower courts, legislators, and citizens” (cf. Preemption Patologies and Civic 
Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. Rev. at 687, 1991). D.P. Rotschild pointed out 
that “what had been a classic division of functions between the Federal 
Government and the States and localities has become a confused mess”, mainly 
because of a lack of coherence in the Supreme Court case law: in its decisions 
the Court seemed “to be relying more often on an ad hoc balancing of interests 
based on the particular facts of each case”, letting thus pre-emption doctrine 
proliferating “to the stage where there is too much conflicting precedent for the 
courts to apply the doctrine with precision” (see A Proposed “Tonic” with 
Florida Lime to Celebrate our New Federalism: How to Deal with the 
“Headache” of Preemption, 38 U. Miami L. Rev. 829, 1984). 
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predictable jurisprudential or analytical pattern”141: if the purpose 
of Congress appears to be the “ultimate touchstone”142 in every pre-
emption case, then the Court’s pre-emption decisions necessarily 
vary across the different statutory schemes at issue. 
Although individual judgments may vary, surely the basic analytical 
framework should not differ across cases presenting essentially the 
same question: whether and to what extent federal law has displaced 
State law. Problems and accusation of judicial activism arise when 
the Court professes adherence to established analytical framework 
and principles, but as a matter of facts adopts decisions that 
somehow betray such conceptual homogeneity143, changing its course 
within the span of a few decisions: the Court’s approach appears to 
be highly fact-dependent, without relying on a set of fixed guiding 
principles. 
While on one side powers granted to Congress are enumerated and 
                                                
141 V. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Pre-emption, Georgetown Law Journal, 88, 
2085 (2000). 
142 Cf. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992). 
143 The Court’s “schizophrenia” and tendency to produce fractured opinions is 
particularly noticeable with regard to those cases in which a State tort remedy 
is involved: with increasing frequency corporations have attempted to assert 
federal pre-emption as a defence to State common law actions, by turning the 
federal statutes from regulatory acts into private “shields”, contending thus the 
complete pre-emption of the recovery of damages under State tort law. Whether 
to allow the pre-emptive defence is of critical importance to accident victims, 
because if the defence is upheld, they may be left without recourse to a damage 
remedy. Current federal legislation concerning product safety, for example, 
typically does not provide a damages remedy, requiring instead only that 
manufacturers engage in certain affirmative conduct, such as putting warnings 
on products or meeting certain safety standards (see the Federal Cigarette and 
Advertising Act, requiring warnings on labels and advertisements, but providing 
no damage remedy for injuries from failure to meet these standards; 49 U.S.C. 
§§ 44701-44723 (1994) establishing minimum safety standards for civil 
aircraft, but providing no damages remedy for injuries resulting from failure to 
meet these standards). 
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explicitly stated in the Constitution144, on the other side States hold 
concurrent competence on a large amount of subjects and areas on 
which as a matter of fact Congress is enabled to legislate as well. 
Products liability law shows how almost every statute federally 
enacted can potentially overlap a State legislative act: federal pre-
emption is an increasingly favoured mechanism used to centralize 
power nationally and to assure national uniformity by suppressing 
State creativity. This aspect of the American federalism system 
highlights the great relevance given to the evolving relationships 
occurring between State and federal law, in relation to issue of the 
internal division of political power: on the basis of the pre-emptive 
potentiality of a federal act we are able to determine the rules which 
as a matter of fact regulate the subject at issue, in order to define the 
real allocation of competence between States and federal 
government145. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
144 Cf. U.S. Const. Art. 1, s. 8, par. 5, and s. 10, par. 1, exclusively allowing 
Congress to coin money; Art. 2, s. 2, par. 2, and Art. 1, s. 10, par 1, granting 
Congress the exclusive power to make Treaties with foreign Nations. 
145 For this reason the pre-emption theory “is almost certainly the most 
frequently used doctrine of constitutional law in practice” (cf. S. Gardbaum, 
The nature of preemption, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 767, 768 n. 65, 1994). 
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2.1 Pre-emption categories in the Supreme Court case-law 
 
Statutory pre-emption, i.e. the constitutional mechanism by the 
means of which State laws may be superseded following to the 
enactment of a federal statute finds its roots back to the Court’s 
decisions in McCulloch v. Maryland of 1819 and Gibbons v. Ogden 
of 1824146. Over time, the Supreme Court jurisprudence and the 
doctrine have refined the concept of pre-emption, currently applying 
these categories: express, implied, conflict, field and obstacle pre-
emption. According to the greater part of the doctrine such 
categorization has only a descriptive extent, while it lacks a 
prescriptive purpose147: for this reason, the presence of some of the 
prominent attributes of a category does not necessarily preclude, for 
instance, the simultaneous presence of another category’s features. 
Hence the various types of pre-emption do not exclude each other: 
they frequently overlap and such coexistence identifies a large 
amount of “grey areas” which cannot be univocally labelled. Such 
grey areas embody the more difficult pre-emption cases, where 
instead of applying an express pre-emption clause (which clearly 
identifies the superseding intent of Congress) the Court has to 
reconstruct congressional intent by interpreting the whole statute and 
its often-ambiguous language148. 
                                                
146 See Ch. 1. 
147 See P.E. McGreal, Some Rice With Your Chevron?: Presumption and 
Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 Case Western Reserve Law Review 
823 (1995); L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 3rd Edition, Vol. 1, 
Foundation Press. 
148 Such issue is particularly remarkable in relation to the distinction between 
express and implied pre-emption. Interestingly, while some Commentators 
(such as L.H. Tribe or V. Dinh) believe that the former category should be 
considered as a genuine form of pre-emption, some others (see S. Gardbaum, 
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During the 1990’s the Supreme Court’s effort was aimed at defining 
an analytical standard capable of being applied to every pre-emption 
case, by describing a conceptual univocal framework which could 
actually address and solve any possible case of conflict occurring 
between federal and State law: remarkably, there occurred a striking 
contradiction between the principles stated by the Court (favouring 
express textualism in statutory interpretation) and its definitive 
decisions, in which frequently as a matter of fact the distinction 
between express and implied pre-emption has been deemed as 
insubstantial149. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
S.R. Jordan, C. Massey) hold that it cannot be considered as actually existing, 
autonomously from other categories: accordingly, pre-emption should be found 
only where Congress had decided to use an express language, while it cannot be 
retrieved if it stands on purely implied basis. This viewing is coherent with the 
presumption against pre-emption, according to which if Congress intends to 
supersede State law has to choose an express language that clearly defines its 
goal. Another debate concerns the categories of field and obstacle pre-emption 
(on which see infra): some authors hold that that they stands on autonomous 
basis, while some others think that they should be regarded only as secondary 
expressions of implied pre-emption (see S. Issacharoff & C.M.Sharkey, 
Backdoor Federalization, American Law & Economics Association Annual 
Meetings Paper n. 39, 2006, note n. 35; J. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs 
Preemption, Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economic Working Paper No. 116, 
2nd  series, p. 29, available on http://www.law.uchicago.edu). 
149 See infra, par. 2.3.1. 
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2.1.1 Express and implied pre-emption: a distinction without much 
difference 
 
As most cases assert that the congressional legislative authority 
derives directly from the Supremacy clause150, the judicial pre-
emption inquiry is conventionally described as being a matter of 
discerning Congress’s intent151: the Supreme Court has insisted that 
congressional intent to pre-empt state law has to be clear so as not to 
impinge unduly upon States’ powers152. Thus, the Court has often 
held that it assumes Congress does not intend federal law to 
supersede “the historic police powers of the States […] unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”153: however, 
Congress often does not attempt to expressly articulate its intent 
regarding pre-emption, and in such circumstances courts may infer 
pre-emptive intent either form the fact that a statute “occupies the 
field” or from the fact that state law directly conflicts with or 
somehow “stands as an obstacle to” the objectives of Congress154. 
Although the Supreme Court has insisted that Congress must make a 
plain statement when it enacts legislation that alters the balance of 
powers between the state and federal governments, it has been 
suggested that this “plain statement” rule may conflict with some 
implied pre-emption cases155, and as a matter of fact implied pre-
                                                
150 See par. 2.2. 
151 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987). 
152 Cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-461 (1991), requiring a “plain statement” by 
Congress. 
153 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
154 Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Cons. & Dev. Comm., 461 
U.S. 190, 204 (1983). 
155 H.H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second 
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emption doctrines have always been in tension with the Court’s claim 
that congressional intent has to be plain. 
Theoretically express pre-emption should be found where Congress 
has clearly and unambiguously declared its intention to preclude 
State regulations of a described sort in a given area156: a specific pre-
emption clause usually defines the extent of the federal act by stating 
that no State or other regulatory authorities may impose any 
additional requirements or prohibition. Here the Supremacy clause 
“makes clear that pre-emption provision takes precedence over 
conflicting State law, and all State laws within the defined scope of 
the pre-emption provision are by definition in conflict with it, and the 
latter is supreme”157, and subsequently the work of the Court here 
should be quite simple and straightforward: through a plain operation 
of statutory construction it has to find the original meaning of the 
express pre-emption clause and determine which part of State law 
falls within its scope158. 
According to this the doctrine of express pre-emption is easily stated, 
                                                                                                                                          
Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 
Fordham L. Rev. 469, 528 (1993). 
156 See Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab. Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985): 
“[W]hen acting within constitutional limits, Congress is empowered to pre-
empt state law by so stating in express terms”. Where congressional intent can 
be inferred from the overall meaning of the federal act there occurs implied pre-
emption: “In the absence of express pre-emptive language, Congress’s intent to 
pre-empt […] state law […] may be inferred” (id. Hillsborough County v. 
Automated Med. Lab. Inc.). 
157 See V. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 Georgetown Law J. 
2085, July 2000, p. 7. 
158 See D.P. Rothschild, A Proposed “Tonic” with Florida Lime to Celebrate 
Our New Federalism: How to Deal with the “Headache” of Preemption, 38 U. 
Miami Law Rev. 829, 843 (1984): “The majority view is that an explicit 
statement in a statute that certain federal regulations are exclusive, or a 
statement prohibiting state action in a given field, bars states from enacting 
measures that address the same area as the federal standards”. 
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while as a matter of fact its application has always been far more 
problematic, since before an express pre-emption clause can be 
applied to State action, a court must inquire whether the clause is 
truly applicable to the particular state action considered. Since an 
express provision can bar all state action to which it applies, the 
dispositive factor in such cases is whether the express pre-emption 
provision is applicable, by its own terms, to the particular state 
action at issue in the case. 
Historically, the courts have addressed this question by determining 
the legislative intent of the Congress: this freewheeling approach 
allowed the adoption of a broad-based inquiry, which as a matter of 
fact permits courts to go to great lengths to find pre-emption of state-
law claims by simply finding some perceived obstruction of 
congressional purpose in enacting legislation, despite what Congress 
may have stated in its legislation about its pre-emptive intent. 
Subsequently courts have been allowed a certain discretion in 
invoking pre-emption, and their approach on this issue often turn out 
to be frustrating and incoherent, because even after the most through 
examination of relevant legislative history the intent is often found to 
be ambiguous or non-existent159. Therefore the main problem in 
ascertaining congressional intent is not limited to ambiguous pre-
emption clauses, as even unambiguous statements of statutory intent 
require deep analysis to determine the scope of the pre-emption 
clause. 
                                                
159 See NOTE – Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of 
Construction, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 208 (1959); cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State 
Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 103 S. Ct. 1717, 1728 (1983): 
“[I]nquiry into legislative motive is often an unsatisfactory venture. What 
motivates one legislator to vote for a statute is not necessarily what motivates 
scorse of others to enact it”. 
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The modern incoherence in pre-emption analysis begins with the 
1992 decision of Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.160, concerning the 
pre-emptive extent of two federal acts (namely the 1965 Federal 
Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act161 and the 1969 Public 
Health Cigarette Smoking Act162): in 1983 petitioner Cipollone 
maintained a suit against three different cigarette manufacturers on 
behalf of his mother, who died of lung cancer allegedly caused by 
smoking respondents’ cigarettes: the suit involved the common-law 
tort theories of strict liability, negligence, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, conspiracy to defraud and the theory of express 
warranty163. Each tobacco company asserted an affirmative pre-
emption defence contending that the two-abovementioned federal 
acts pre-empted any state law tort claims164. 
                                                
160 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
161 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1331-1340 (1994)). 
162 Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1331-1340 (1994)). 
163 For a complete overview on this well-known case, see H.V. Kehoe, 
Narrowing the Scope of Federal Preemption: Tabacco Torts Become 
Winneable, 38 Loy. L. Rev. 1191, (1993); M.A. Bakris, Constitutional Law-
Preemption-The Federal Cigarette and Advertising Act’s Express Preemption 
Provision Defines the Pre-emptive Reach of the Act and Must be Construed 
Narrowly, 70 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 487 (1993); J.F. McCauley, Note, 
Cipollone & Myrick: Deflating the Airbag Preemption Defense, 30 Ind. L. Rev. 
827 (1997); S.R. Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption that Never Was: Pre-
emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 Arizona L. Rev., p. 1379, (1998); D.E. 
Seidelson, Express Federal Preemption Provisions, State Law Action for 
Damages, Congress, and the Supreme Court: A Penitent Seeks Redemption, 58 
La. L. Rev. 145 (1995); J.R. Stern, Preemption Doctrine and the Failure of 
Textualism in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 80 Virginia Law Review, pp. 979-
1014 (1994). 
164 Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1149. The tobacco companies contended “that 
state tort law has a direct regulatory impact on an industry by redistributing 
losses caused by certain products from injured individuals to the products’ 
manufacturers” (id. at 1155). The Cipollone case represents the first time that 
cigarette manufacturers asserted a pre-emption defence: prior to this case the 
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Remarkably, prior to ascertaining the pre-emptive effect of the 
federal statutes, the Court set forth its pre-emption doctrine and in so 
doing appeared to work a significant change in the law of pre-
emption, as many had understood it up to that time165. The Court 
repeated the settled and familiar principles by stating that when in 
considering the issue of pre-emption the Congress has adopted an 
express language, including in the enacted legislation a provision 
explicitly addressing that issue, there is no need to infer 
congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive 
provisions’ of the legislation: apparently the Court needs only to 
identify the domain expressly pre-empted by each of the statute 
sections at issue166.  
Apparently the Court seemed to express in Cipollone a basic rule in 
pre-emption analysis: if pre-emption clearly emerges from 
congressional intent and if Congress has seen fit to express its intent 
in express statutory language only, then courts should be to spot 
Congress’s pre-emptive intent only from clear statutory text. 
According to this, courts should not be given free action to search for 
some other way to pre-empt state law, which result may even 
                                                                                                                                          
tobacco industry relied primarily on the affirmative defences of assumption of 
risk and contributory negligence. 
165 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part: “To my knowledge, we have never expressed such a rule before […]”); 
Bakris, supra note 163, at 500 (stating that Cipollone “represents a departure 
from both established principles of pre-emption analysis and prior case law”); 
McCauley, supra note 163, at 841 (“Federal pre-emption analysis changed 
dramatically with the Supreme Court’s decision in Cipollone […]”). But on the 
contrary see S.R. Jordan, supra note 163, at 1418. 
166 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 
497, 505 (1978) and California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 
272, 282 (1987)). The dissenters interpreted this statement basically to mean 
that once there is an express pre-emption provision, all doctrines of implied 
pre-emption are eliminated (Id. at 547: Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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contradict Congress’s clearly expressed intention. However, a closer 
look at the Court’s further analysis demonstrates that the principles 
held by the Court in Cipollone were in fact soon to be contradicted 
by reality: because the plaintiff in Cipollone sought an award of tort 
damages for the defendant cigarette manufacturers’ alleged 
intentional and negligent torts and breaches of warranties, the U.S. 
Supreme Court was required to address whether a federal statute that 
prohibited any requirement of a statement and one that prohibited 
any requirement or any requirement of prohibition under state law 
also prohibited common-law damage awards167. Despite that the 
Court’s majority labelled this as an express pre-emption case, it did 
not confine itself to the pre-emption provision alone and what it 
gleaned from the purportedly plain meaning: as a matter of fact the 
majority viewed the express terms as sufficiently ambiguous that it 
needed to resort to a general analysis of Congress’s purposes in 
enacting the legislation at issue, since the Court proceeded to 
                                                
167 The Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act (Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 
Stat. 282 (1965)), amended by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act (Pub. 
L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1969)). The Act establishes uniform standards 
involving cigarette labelling and advertising, and section 5 of the 1965 Act 
provides an express pre-emption provision under which: 
 
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the 
statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on 
any cigarette package; 
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in 
the advertising of any cigarette the packages of which are 
labelled in conformity with the provision of this Act. 
 
 Section 5(b) was amended by the 1969 Act to specify: 
 
    
No requirement of prohibition based on smoking and health shall 
be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or 
promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labelled in 
conformity with the provision of this Act. 
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determine that state common-law actions for damages would not 
conflict with those congressional purposes. 
Basically the Court used some implied pre-emption analysis in its 
express pre-emption assessment. Despite its declaration that the 
express terms alone governed, the majority thereby remained 
consistent with what the Court had permitted in the past: it went 
beyond the express terms to reach some mysterious congressional 
purposes, derived from statutory language or the structure of the act 
at issue, to search for some purpose that might have been obstructed 
by the federal law. The majority opinion therefore did not deviate 
from precedent in the application of the doctrine, and the core 
problem of pre-emption doctrine remained as heavy as before. 
The opinion delivered by Justice Blackmun168 probably provided the 
most coherent approach, as he held that when there existed express 
pre-emptive language “the Court’s task is one of statutory 
interpretation – only to ‘identify the domain expressly pre-empted’ 
by the provision”169, and also that the Court should resort to 
principles of implied pre-emption only if the Congress has been 
silent with respect to this issue170. Eventually Justice Blackmun 
agreed with the majority opinion, which found no pre-emption of 
state claims under the older version of the Act at issue, but disagreed 
with the balance of the decision: more specifically, he was of the 
opinion that the language chosen in federal statutes prohibited any 
                                                
168 Concurring in part, dissenting in part (id. at 540). Justice Blackmun provided 
an example of language that Congress has used that made clear its intentions 
toward state common-law: “ERISA statute defines ‘any and all State laws’ as 
used in pre-emption provision to mean ‘all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, 
or other State action having the effect of law.” 
169 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 532. 
170 Id. 
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“requirement or prohibition […] imposed under State law”171, and 
did not simply prohibit the application of State law in general. In his 
view the regulatory effect arising from State tort law is, if anything, 
only indirect and cannot be compared to the effect arising from true 
regulation acts: the function of tort law is basically to compensate, 
not to regulate, therefore “it cannot be said that damages claims are 
clearly or unambiguously ‘requirements’ or ‘prohibitions’ imposed 
under State law”172. Justice Blackmun pointed out that the two core 
elements in the Court’s pre-emption analysis should always be on 
one side the general presumption against pre-emption and on the 
other side the concomitant requirement that any intent to pre-empt 
must be “clear and manifest”173: this view was held also by some 
authors174 which pointed out that if such requirements are not binding 
in pre-emption analysis then courts can easily imply pre-emption and 
override state law by going beyond the express language, 
superseding almost all of the state common-law damages actions. 
On the contrary, in his opinion Justice Scalia175 criticized the Court’s 
new narrow approach to express pre-emption provisions by reasoning 
that if needed courts can imply pre-emption without any express 
language indicating Congress’s intent, agreeing thus with those 
                                                
171 Id. at 535. 
172 Id. at 538. 
173 See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977): “We start with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not superseded by 
the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”; 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947): “Congress 
legislated here in a field which States have traditionally occupied. So we start 
with the assumption that the historic police powers were not to be superseded 
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress”. 
174 Cf. S.R. Jordan, supra note 163. 
175 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 547 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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authors who hold that an unconditional preference for express 
textualism in statutory construction cannot be justified. 
Because both federal statutes contained express pre-emption clauses, 
the Court eventually determined that its sole task was to identify the 
“domain expressly pre-empted by each of those sections”176, and 
apparently there was no need to perform an implied pre-emption 
analysis. Additionally, to aid in its analysis the Court employed 
several tools of statutory construction, among which presumption 
against pre-emption. As a result of its analysis, the Court noted that 
none of the petitioner’s claims were pre-empted by the 1965 Act177: 
however, because the language of the 1969 Act was more broad, only 
some of the common law claims were pre-empted178. 
Three years after Cipollone the Supreme Court addressed the pre-
emptive effect of the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 1966 
(Safety Act) in Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick179, and again took the 
opportunity to clarify the rules of pre-emption analysis. The federal 
act at issue was passed by the Congress in response to mounting 
highway deaths and injuries, by increasing automotive safety through 
the promulgation of motor vehicle safety standards The federal Act at 
issue included an express pre-emption provision which forbidden 
states from “establishing [any motor vehicle] safety standard which 
                                                
176 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 475 U.S. 
497, 505 (1978)). 
177 Id. at 518-519. 
178 Id. at 530-531. On the contrary see Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., (825 F.2d 
620, 1st Cir. 1987), where the United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit ruled that the Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act at issue in 
Cipollone impliedly pre-empted state-based tort claims against cigarettes 
manufacturers, as such claims would upset the carefully wrought balance and 
thereby frustrate the overall intent of Congress. 
179 514 U.S. 280, 287-89 (1995). 
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is not identical to the Federal standard [promulgated by the federal 
agency]”180. The plaintiffs in Myrick sued defendants for negligent 
design of their products, while defendants defended in part on the 
grounds that the Safety Act and regulations promulgated under it 
either expressly or impliedly pre-empted state tort law claims for 
damages181. First, the Courts held that, whether or not common-law 
claims are considered “standards” under the act, the state law claims 
were not expressly pre-empted because there was no applicable 
federal safety standard in effect at the time of the lawsuit182. 
The most significant portion of the opinion was the Court’s 
explanation of the precise effect the Cipollone decision had on pre-
emption doctrine. In answering the plaintiff’s argument that in light 
of Cipollone the Court did not need to address defendant’s implied 
pre-emption argument, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, 
explained that the Court had not announced a “categorical rule 
precluding the coexistence of express and implied pre-emption […]”: 
it clarified that the Cipollone holding articulated only an inference, 
and not a rule, that where Congress has expressly pre-empted a 
certain area in a statute, matters outside that area are not pre-
empted183. 
                                                
180 Id. at 289 (quoting the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1392 (d)). 
181 The pertinent statutory language had forbidden states from establishing any 
motor vehicle “safety standards […] which is not identical to the Federal 
standard” (see the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C § 
1392(d)). 
182 Id. at 289. 
183 Id. at 288: “The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a 
statute “implies” – i.e. supports a reasonable inference – that Congress did not 
intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that the express clause entirely 
forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption […] At best, Cipollone 
supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied 
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In 1995 the Court was faced with another landmark pre-emption case 
in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr184, in which at issue was whether the 
Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA)185 – containing an 
express pre-emption provision186 – “pre-empt[ed] a state common 
law negligence action against the manufacturer of an allegedly 
defective medical device”187. In the course of setting out the general 
rules governing pre-emption questions the Court seemed to 
completely ignore Myrick and its cautionary directive that the mere 
existence of express pre-emption provisions does not foreclose the 
possibility that federal law impliedly pre-empts state law. 
Additionally, the Medtronic Court seemed to intersperse its express 
pre-emption analysis by introducing implied pre-emption 
considerations, even more clearly than it did in Cipollone188: it first 
did so in its long statement of the principles guiding the Court in 
these cases. After stating that the pre-emption analysis must be 
coherent to the express language used by the Congress189, the Court 
                                                                                                                                          
pre-emption; it does not establish a rule”. Justice Thomas pointed out that the 
Cipollone Court itself, despite its rethoric, had gone beyond the terms of the 
statute and “engaged in a conflict pre-emption analysis […]” (id.). 
184 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). See M.E. Gelsinger, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: Is 
Federal Pre-emption a Heartbeat away from Death under the Medical Device 
Amendments?, 25 Pepperdine Law Rev., pp. 647-684 (1998); G.J. Scandaglia, 
T.L. Tully, Express Preemption and Premarket Approval Under the Medical 
Device Amendments, 59 Food & Drug Law Journal, pp. 245-264 (2004). 
185 Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 1(a), 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 21 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.). 
186 “[N]o State […] may establish or continue un effect with respect to a device 
intended for human use any requirement (1)  which is different from, or in 
addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and 
(2) which related to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other 
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter” 
(21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)). 
187 Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2245. 
188 Id. at 2250. 
189 Id.: “We need not go beyond that language to determine whether Congress 
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held again that the interpretation of that language should be informed 
by the usual two presumptions about the nature of pre-emption190: the 
first one is the well-known one against pre-emption when the case 
involves the historic police powers of the States, whilst the second is 
the most troubling in the extent to which it goes beyond the language 
of the statute. The Court repeated that in statutory construction 
“’[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-
emption case”191 and explained that “[a]s a result, any 
understanding of the scope of a pre-emption statute must rest 
primarily on ‘a fair understanding of congressional purpose’”. 
Congress’s intent, of course, primarily is discerned from the 
language of the pre-emption clause and the ‘statutory framework’ 
surrounding it”192.  
Even if such statements flow from general rules of statutory 
construction and are therefore somehow consistent with a general 
principle of textualism, the Court held that “[a]lso relevant, 
however, is the ‘structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,’ as 
revealed not only in the text, but through the reviewing court’s 
reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the 
statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, 
consumers, and the law”193. 
Despite the notion of a supposed distinction between express and 
implied pre-emption, the Court purposely referenced approaches that 
                                                                                                                                          
intended the [statute] to pre-empt at least some state law”. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)). 
192 Id. at 2250-51(quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530 n. 27, and Gade v. 
National Solid Wastes Management. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). 
193 Id. at 2251. 
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do not stand for that proposition194: accordingly a consistent part of 
the doctrine195 pointed out that in the end the Supreme Court case-
law does not support an artificial and rigid distinction between 
express and implied pre-emption, highlighting that even if the 
existence of an express pre-emption provision tends to contradict any 
inference that Congress intended to occupy a field broader than the 
statute’s express language defines, disallowing an implied pre-
emption on an a priori basis may result in decisions that will not 
adequately address Congress’ purpose in enacting its substantive 
legislation. According to this approach, supplementing the analysis 
of whether a federal statute expressly pre-empts state law with an 
implied pre-emption analysis would allow a greater and more 
accurate balance of both the competing federal goals and of the state 
interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
194 In Medtronic the Court even stated that “it is impossibile to ignore [the] 
overarching concern [of the statutory and regulatory language] that pre-
emption occurs only where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere 
with a specific federal interest”(id. ad 2257): this language recalls the concept 
of obstruction of purpose – conflict pre-emption (on which see the next 
paragraph), showing the effective impossibility of demarcate a real separation 
between the several categories of pre-emption (see supra, note 148). 
195 Cf. S.J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law:  A Task for 
Congress or the Courts?, 40 Villanova Law Rev., 1 (1995). 
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2.1.2 Implied (or conflict) pre-emption’s sub-categories: field and 
obstacle pre-emption 
 
Depending upon the case, the Court has erected both varying 
categories of pre-emption and divergent standards for adjudicating 
pre-emption claims196. Accordingly, the supposedly distinct types of 
pre-emption are not so much opposed to one another as individually 
incomplete197. Although the Supreme Court is generally reluctant to 
find pre-emption when Congress has been ambiguous, the question 
whether federal law should be read to pre-empt state action in any 
given case necessarily remains, in the end, a matter of careful 
statutory construction: in the absence of an express pre-emption 
clause clearly defining the extent pre-emption, the touchstone of 
implied pre-emption analysis is congressional intent to pre-empt state 
law. 
As pre-emption cases involve a broad range of subject matters and a 
variety of statutes, each decision is specific: as a matter of fact the 
outcome in one pre-emption case will not necessarily determine the 
outcome of the next case198, and subsequently the analysis underlying 
each decision is important in ascertaining whether a consistent 
doctrine of pre-emption exists or not. In evaluating existing 
relationships between federal and state legislations, the Supreme 
                                                
196 See Wardair Can., Inc. v. Florida Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 6 (1986) 
(“[T]his Court has throughout the years employed various verbal formulations 
in identifying numerous varieties of pre-emption”) 
197 Cf. S.C. Hoke, Trascending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of 
the Supremacy Clause, at 731. 
198 See K.L. Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, Univ. Of 
Illinois Law Forum, 515 Vol. 1972, at 520-521: “The need of focusing on […] 
specific means that the Court’s preemption decision are largely based on ad hoc 
considerations, especially on the exact statutes in question”. 
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Court has declared generally that, in the absence of express pre-
emption language within the federal statute itself, federal pre-
emption of state laws, regulations or standards may be reasonably 
implied from the structure and purpose of the federal legislation at 
issue. 
Implied or conflict pre-emption could thus arise in either of two set 
of circumstances199: first, federal law may impliedly pre-empt state 
law where federal regulations are so extensive that there can be no 
room for state law to add to the comprehensive federal regulations in 
a certain area200 (field pre-emption); second, where a federal 
regulation makes it impossible to comply with both state and federal 
regulations in a given area, or where compliance with state law 
“stands as an obstacle” to the federal regulation, the federal 
regulation pre-empts state law (obstacle pre-emption)201. 
 
                                                
199 Cf. E.M. Martin, The Burger Court and Preemption Doctrine: Federalism in 
the Balance, at 1236; see also R.R. Gasaway, A.C. Parrish, Implied Conflict 
Pre-emption: A Formal Approach, in R.A. Epstein, M.S. Greve (ed.), Federal 
Preemption: States’ Powers, National Interests, AEI Press, 2007 
200 See English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79-80, n.5 (1990) (majority 
opinion of Blackmun, J.): “[F]ield pre-emption may be understood as a species of 
conflict pre-emption: a state law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with 
Congress’ intent (either express or plainly implied) to exclude state regulation”. 
201 According to L.H. Tribe, conflict pre-emption would occur “where Congress 
did not necessarily focus on pre-emption of state regulation at all, but where 
the particular state law conflicts directly with federal law, or otherwise stands 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal statutory objectives” (cf. 
American Constitutional Law, at p. 1176-77). According to V. Dinh, the idea of 
conflict pre-emption “[…] rest on a fundamental misconception of the nature of 
pre-emption and how it relates to the Supremacy Clause. Recall that the 
legislative power to pre-empt derives from the enumeration in Article I, Section 
8 and not from the Supremacy Clause. The latter is a constitutional choice of 
law rule specifying that federal law is supreme. So conceived, conflict pre-
emption is not implied pre-emption - it is not even pre-emption at all. Rather, it 
is the quintessential application of the Supremacy Clause to resolve conflicts 
between State and federal law” (cf. Reassessing the Law of Pre-emption at p. 
9). 
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2.1.2.1 Field pre-emption 
 
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that congressional 
intent to pre-empt state law may be inferred where the state law 
regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the federal 
government to occupy exclusively, impliedly intending to preclude 
any state regulation in the same area by legislating comprehensively 
in it202. Perhaps because of the danger of misinterpreting unexpressed 
congressional intent203, and being occupation of the field pre-emption 
the most comprehensive type of pre-emption, the Court has generally 
been hesitant to find that the federal legislation occupies the field, by 
requiring that congressional intent has to be “clear and manifest”204: 
this insistence offsets the comprehensive effect of occupation of the 
                                                
202 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947): here the Court 
found that Congress had legislated in the area of warehousemen and that 
“Congress in effect said that the policy which it adopted in each of the nine 
[matters charged in the complaint] was exclusive of all others […]” Id. at 235-
236. 
203 In addition to not having expressed its intent explicitly, Congress may not 
even have considered the pre-emptive effect of its legislation. See K.L. Hirsch, 
supra, note 274, at 542: the author notes that “[q]uestions of the relation of the 
federal law to existing and potential state law are seldom considered in detail 
in the drafting of federal legislation. Consequently, many federal acts are 
adopted without serious consideration of their impact on state law dealing 
directly with the same subject matter”. This fact further complicates the 
resolution of this type of pre-emption. 
204 See D.P. Rothschild, A Proposed “Tonic” with Florida Lime to Celebrate 
Our New Federalism: How to Deal with the “Headache” of Preemption, at 848-
854: the Court has identified several important factors in determining 
Congress’s intent to pre-empt state law: 1) the federal regulation may be so 
pervasive that a state cannot operate in the same area; 2) the federal interest 
may be so dominant in an area that the states are precluded from regulating it; 
3) the object to be obtained by the federal law and the type of obligations 
imposed by it may disclose the same purpose; and 4) the result of the state law 
may be inconsistent with the objective of the federal law. See also E.M. 
Martin, The Burger Court and Preemption Doctrine: Federalism in the Balance, 
at 1234. 
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field pre-emption205, in which therefore the Court maintains a general 
presumption against the pre-emption of state law206. 
When a court finds that Congress has occupied a field, it holds that 
the States are completely barred from regulating that area: courts bar 
states regulations not because the Constitution gives Congress certain 
exclusive and enumerate powers207, but because Congress has deemed 
it necessary and proper to exclude the States from a particular area. 
Congress may occupy a field even when it seems unlikely that the 
operation of state law would disrupt the regulatory scheme Congress 
has set. 
Hines v. Davidowitz208 constitutes the historical landmark case for 
field pre-emption209: in 1939 Pennsylvania enacted a law requiring 
                                                
205 Occupation of the field pre-emption is the most comprehensive type of pre-
emption because a state law can be pre-empted although it does not actually 
conflict with the federal law in any way. 
206 See Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148 (1902) (“It should never be held 
that Congress intends to supersede or by its legislation suspend the exercise of 
police powers of the States, even when it may do so, unless its purpose to effect 
that result is clearly manifested”). See also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (pre-emption of state law should not 
occur unless there are persuasive reasons for doing so); Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (police power of the States is not to 
be superseded by the federal law “unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress”); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 614 (1940) 
(congressional intent to pre-empt is not to be inferred unless clearly indicated). 
As explained above, the presumption against pre-emption is not limited to 
occupation of the field pre-emption: see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 
519, 525-26 (1977). 
207 As it happens in relation to the foreign affairs power and to the power over 
immigration, both granted by the Constitution (art. 1. § 8) (see J. Goldsmith, 
Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economic 
Working Paper No.116; E.L. Richardson, Checks and Balances in Foreign 
Relations, 83 American Journal of International Law, 736 (1989)). 
208 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
209 In the standard recitation of pre-emption tests in Supreme Court opinions, 
the “stand as an obstacle” formula is usually followed by a citation to Hines v. 
Davidowitz, (id. at 67: whether challenged state action has been pre-empted 
turns on whether or not it “stands as on obstacle to the accomplishment and 
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registration of all aliens inhabiting the State. At that time, no federal 
law required such registration; in light of growing international 
unrest, however, Congress enacted an alien registration statute in 
1940, but did not directly specify its intent regarding the survival of 
pre-existing state registration statute. Inevitably, a pre-emption 
challenge to Pennsylvania’s law found its way to the Supreme Court, 
which concluded that the federal act impliedly precluded concurrent 
state regulation from the whole field at issue. The Court began its 
analysis by demarcating the field, identifying as critically relevant 
the national government’s supreme power over foreign affairs210, 
holding that “where the federal government, in the exercise of its 
superior authority […] has enacted a complete scheme of regulation 
and has therein provided a standard […] States cannot, 
inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere 
with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or 
auxiliary regulations”211. 
Importantly, the federal act by its terms did not expressly pre-empt 
state law, which actually preceded Congress’s action and provided a 
model for the national statute. The Court defined the federally 
occupied field expansively, with little reference to legislative history 
and with no application of either the “clear statement” requirement or 
the presumption favouring concurrent state power. Rather, the Court 
                                                                                                                                          
execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress”). 
210 This recognition has led one commentator to suggest that when Congress 
exercises key national powers in the allegedly pre-emptive legislation, the pre-
emption analysis should proceed with more relaxed standards for permitting 
implication of pre-emption. Under this theory, federal regulation affecting 
foreign affairs and national security would legitimately yield expansive pre-
emption of state law, even without clear direction from Congress (see P. 
Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, at 103-05). 
211 See Hines v. Davidowitz at 66-67. 
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emphasized that the state statute implicated the foreign affairs power, 
thus producing consequence that Congress merely had to act on the 
subject for its statute to be deemed generously pre-emptive. 
The first of the Supreme Court’s modern pre-emption cases, 
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson212 repeats Hines’s orientation 
implying the presence of an exclusive federal regulatory field, but in 
the commercial area rather than the public sector: here the Court held 
that although Congress had not expressly directed pre-emption, the 
federal act involved impliedly pre-empted the state’s attempt to 
enforce its more stringent standards for the product. The Court 
reasoned that the strict state standards effectively “nullified federal 
discretion”213, determining that state standards which are higher or 
more exacting than those imposed by the federal scheme constitute 
an impermissible conflict with federal act: the underlying theory is 
that Congress has struck the precise regulatory balance desired, and 
also has stated whether and how the states are to be involved in the 
regulatory scheme: any state involvement other than that specified in 
the federal act thus constitutes intrusion into the federal field and 
must be ruled invalid214. 
                                                
212 315 U.S. 148 (1942). 
213 Id. at 168. 
214 Accordingly, some commentators pointed out that Cloverleaf Butter reverse 
the traditional presumption against pre-emption by establishing a presumption 
of federal pre-emption when state and federal regulations seek to operate 
concurrently (cf. Hoke, Pre-emption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 
71 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 685, (1991) at 742). Another element which here has 
been taken into account in the field pre-emption analysis is the 
comprehensiveness and the complexity of the federal scheme at issue: as long 
as pre-emption is a matter of congressional intent to supersede state law (see 
Metropolitan Life ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985); 
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) legislative 
complexity should not be considered as an element addressing Congress’s 
intent to pre-empt state law: instead, this approach forces courts to balance 
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A remarkable and relatively new area in which pre-emption problems 
have arisen is that of nuclear power215. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development 
Commission216 the Court upheld a California statute conditioning the 
construction of nuclear power plants on a state commission finding 
that adequate storage and disposal facilities were available for the 
nuclear waste. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, under which the 
federal government chose to exclusively regulate the nuclear and 
safety aspects of nuclear power plants, left the States free to regulate 
on economic questions such as generating capacity and rates. In 
Pacific Gas the Court did not have to infer Congress’s intent to pre-
empt, as it was clearly expressed: rather, the Court had to decide if 
the state law fell within the occupied field. Under the congressionally 
mandated system of dual regulation, the state statute needed only to 
be pre-empted if it regulated the safety aspects of nuclear power 
plants: according to the Court, Congress had not intended to 
accomplish the promotion of nuclear power “at all costs”217, as it 
“ha[d] left sufficient authority in the states to allow the development 
                                                                                                                                          
federal and state laws and to hold state laws pre-empted when the scheme of 
regulation is so broad and detailed as to be comprehensive, and because the 
scheme is comprehensive any further regulation by the States would disrupt 
Congress’s general vision for the field (cf. L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law, at 1206 (note no. 12); Wolfson, Pre-emption and Federalism: the Missing 
Link, at 73). For a more recent case employing an approach similar to 
Cloverleaf Butter, see City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 
633-34 (1973). To the contrary, in DeCanas v. Bica (424 U.S. 351 (1976)) 
although the pervasiveness of the federal act at issue the Court refused to the 
Congress did not intend to pre-empt state laws under an occupation of the field 
analysis. 
215 See D.R. Hague, New Federalism and “Occupation of the Field”: Failing to 
Maintain State Constitutional Protections Within a Pre-emption Framework, 64 
Washington L. Rev. 721 (1989). 
216 461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
217 Id. at 222. 
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of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic 
reasons”218 the statute served economic purposes because a waste 
disposal problem would lead to unpredictably high operating costs, 
thus making the building of the plant economically unfeasible219. By 
holding the state law pre-empted, the Court upheld the system of dual 
regulation which Congress had established – permitting the States to 
regulate aspects which were of local concern while not hindering the 
operation of a uniform system regarding the safety of nuclear power 
plants220. The Court realized that by finding occupation of the field 
pre-emption it would be performing, in effect, a legislative function, 
and eventually it declined to do so221. The Court concluded that “the 
only reasonable inference [was] that Congress intended the States to 
continue to make” judgments about need, reliability, economic 
consequences of service shutdowns due to waste disposal problems 
and other economic matters222. Thus, absent a more explicit 
congressional mandate than was present in Pacific Gas & Electric, 
                                                
218 Id. While declining to give pre-emptive effect to Congress’s general purpose 
of promoting nuclear power, the majority found that any state nuclear safety 
regulation would be pre-empted, whether or not it conflicted with broad federal 
objectives: “the Federal Government has occupied the entire field of nuclear 
safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the States” (id. at 
212). 
219 461 U.S. at 213-214. The Supreme Court interpreted the purpose of the 
statute as economic rather than safety related, because an “inquiry into 
legislative motive is often an unsatisfactory venture” (id. at 216).  
220 According to “Comment - Federal Supremacy Versus Legitimate State 
Interests in Nuclear Regulations: Pacific Gas & Electric and Silkwood”, 33 
Cath. U.L. Rev. 899 (1984), neither Pacific Gas nor Silkwood effectuates the 
purpose of federal occupation of the nuclear safety field. 
221 The Court also refused to pre-empt the state law under an obstacle conflict 
analysis: although the federal law sought to encourage the development of 
nuclear power, Congress had granted the States enough authority to slow down 
the development for economic reasons. The Court left it for the Congress to 
remedy the problem of a State which used that authority to “undercut a federal 
objective” (id. at 221-23). 
222 Id. at 207-08. 
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Congress’s decision not to regulate nationally the economic concerns 
of power generation was not to be equated with a congressional 
determination that the States may not enact their own regulations 
addressing those same concerns locally. 
Notwithstanding its decision in Pacific Gas which required the pre-
emption of any state law which sought to regulate the safety of 
nuclear facilities, the Court in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.223 held 
that state common law providing for compensatory and punitive 
damages for tort victims was outside that occupied field and 
therefore not pre-empted224. The Court rejected an argument that 
punitive damages are imposed as a punishment and, as such, regulate 
conduct in connection with safety, a regulatory filed which Congress 
had pre-empted225. Significantly, the Silkwood Court abandoned an 
occupation of the field pre-emption analysis in cases of damage from 
radiation injury226: according to the Court, pre-emption should be 
based “on whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between the 
federal and state standards or whether the imposition of a state 
standard in a damages action would frustrate the objectives of the 
                                                
223 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984). 
224 Id. at 626. Kareen Silkwood, an employee of Kerr-McGee, and her property 
were contaminated by radiation from the defendant’s nuclear facility. Silkwood 
died in an unrelated car accident, but her father, as executor of her estate, sued 
Kerr-McGee for damages on common law tort principles. 
225 Id. at 622. The Court determined “[t]hat Congress assumed that persons 
injured by nuclear accidents were free to utilize existing state tort remedies” 
and placed the burden on the defendant to show that Congress intended to 
preclude the award of punitive damages (id. at 623, 625). The Court admitted 
that its decision created “tension between the conclusion that safety regulation 
is the exclusive concern of the federal law and the conclusion that a state may 
nevertheless award damages based on its own law of liability” Nevertheless, 
the Court believed it could live with this tension because it assumed that 
Congress was doing the same (id. at 625). 
226 Id. at 626. 
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federal law”227. 
The Court also saved from pre-emption state tort claims for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in the context of a nuclear 
plant employee’s attempt to blow the whistle on alleged federal 
safety standards violations228. In concluding that such torts were not 
pre-empted, English v. General Electric Co. clarified how the pre-
empted field was defined in Pacific Gas & Electric. The Court in 
English first stated that it was not necessary that the purpose of the 
state law coincide with the purpose of the federal law in order for the 
former to be pre-empted. The Court went on to emphasize that the 
crucial question was whether the state law at issue would have a 
“direct and substantial” conflicting effect in the pre-empted field229: 
English thus seems to indicate that generally applicable state laws 
with only a remote relation to or impact on a pre-empted field will 
not ordinarily be trumped by federal law230. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
227 Id. 
228 See English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990). 
229 Id. at 84-85. Later, Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n, 505 
U.S. 88, 105, 107 (1992) (plurality opinion), indicated that non-conflicting 
concomitant state purposes were not enough to avoid implied pre-emption, 
matching English’s statement regarding concomitant effects in field pre-
emption. 
230 Whether this decision states a generally applicable principle of pre-emption 
doctrine remains a matter of dispute, as some Justices have recognized a 
potential distinction between “generally applicable” or “background” state law 
and more targeted regulatory efforts that parallel federal standards (see 
American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 235 (1995); Gade, 505 U.S. at 
107). 
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2.1.2.2 Obstacle pre-emption: 
 
Express pre-emption involves an actual conflict between the state 
law and some federal statutory language, while implied pre-emption 
doctrines displace state law absent any actual conflict with some 
federal provision. According to traditional Supreme Court’s case law, 
obstacle pre-emption (also known as frustration of purpose pre-
emption231) occurs where compliance with both federal and state law 
is impossible232, or where the States enact or enforce a legislative act 
in an area already governed by the Congress, by posing “an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress”233.  
In such cases the Supreme Court generally interprets the federal 
statute as so to ascertain Congress’s objectives234, determining 
                                                
231 Cf. V. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, at 9. 
232 Cf. E. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: Federal Pre-emption and 
State Autonomy, in R.A. Epstein, M.S. Greve (ed.), Federal Preemption: States’ 
Powers, National Interests, AEI Press, 2007. 
233 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). On the contrary, according to 
C. Nelson (cf. Preemption, at 265) as long as the Court presents the doctrine of 
obstacle pre-emption as a general rule of statutory interpretation (implying that 
all federal statutes should be read to imply a clause forbidding states to enact or 
enforce laws that would get in the way of Congress’s full purposes and 
objectives) a general constitutional doctrine of obstacle pre-emption cannot be 
logically supported. Therefore, whether a particular federal statute requires 
obstacle pre-emption depends on the specific words and context of the federal 
statute at issue. 
234 See id. at 67. The Court observed: “There is not – and from the very nature 
of the problem there cannot be – any rigid formula or rule which can be used as 
a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose of every act of 
Congress […]. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear distinctly 
marked formula”. 
In Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) the Court articulated a two-step 
analysis for deciding when an obstacle conflict exists. The Court’s job is to 
“first ascertain the construction of the two statutes and then determine the 
constitutional question whether they are in conflict” (id. at 644): thus, obstacle 
conflict pre-emption allows the Court the discretion to determine initially what 
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whether the state law poses an obstacle to those objectives and 
considering the state and federal interests involved235. For example, 
in Felder v. Casey236 the Court held that a state law requiring 
plaintiff to file a notice of claim before suing governmental actors – 
and thus imposing a procedural hurdle to suit – was pre-empted 
because it stood as an obstacle to the congressional purpose behind 
“the compensatory aims of the federal civil rights laws”237. 
As previously highlighted, the ‘stand as an obstacle’ formula usually 
quoted from Hines v. Davidowitz was rarely cited until the issue 
clearly re-emerged twenty years later in Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers v. Paul238, a landmark case in which the Court’s majority 
held that the involved California law did not stand as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of Congress’s purposes and objectives239. The 
                                                                                                                                          
the federal objectives are and then whether the state law poses an obstacle to 
those objectives. 
235 For example, in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), the Court 
upheld the pre-emptive extent of a federal act toward a California statute which 
required the net weight label on food packages to accurately state the actual net 
weight of the food. When applied to packaged flour, the Court found that the 
statute posed an obstacle to the objective of the federal Fair Packaging and 
Labelling Act (“FPLA”) which was “to facilitate value comparisons among 
similar products” (id. at 541). The California statute did not permit variations 
between the stated and actual net weights while the FPLA allowed reasonable 
variations in weight due to the gain or loss of moisture (id. at 531-533). The 
Court concluded that the state statute would induce the overpacking of flour, 
while manufacturers operating under the federal statute would not need to 
overpack. Therefore, consumers would be comparing flour packages with the 
same stated net weights but different actual net weights (id. at 542-43). 
236 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
237 Id. at 141. 
238 373 U.S. 132 (1963). 
239 The majority upheld a California law that regulated the marketing of 
avocados sold in California on the basis of oil content in order to protect 
consumers from being disappointed by edible but unsavoury avocados. Federal 
regulations of Florida productions determined marketability on the basis not of 
oil content but of size, weight and picking date, with the same general 
objective. As a consequence, about six of every one hundred Florida avocados 
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majority understood its analysis simply to embrace two long-standing 
pre-emption tests: the existence of an actual conflict between federal 
and state laws, and the occupation of an entire field by Congress240. 
On the contrary, the dissenters introduced a new aspect to pre-
emption doctrine by concluding that, even without total occupation 
of the field, Congress had pre-empted state law because its purpose 
in enacting federal standards was to establish uniform standards of 
avocado quality throughout the whole national market241: even in the 
absence of a clearly expressed congressional intent to pre-empt the 
field, courts might therefore conclude that some federal regulation 
requires the exclusion of parallel state legislation. 
Following such view – which is remarkably consistent with the 
“comprehensiveness theory” connected to the field pre-emption 
theory explained above – courts should hold that State laws are pre-
empted whenever the federal government strikes a particular 
“delicate balance”242 among competing considerations that could be 
upset by more stringent state regulation. A significant example of 
this reasoning can be easily found in a more recent case in which the 
Court recognized that the federal Clean Water Act had not occupied 
the entire field of water pollution regulation, and concluded 
                                                                                                                                          
meeting the federal marketing standards were excluded from California’s 
market by that state regulation (id. at 140; see also L.H. Tribe, American 
Constitutional Law at 1199). 
240 Id. at 141. 
241 Id. at 169 (Justice White, dissenting): uniformity in commerce represented 
thus a predominant federal interest because “[l]ack of uniformity tends to 
obstruct commerce, to divide the Nation into many markets”. 
242 See also City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. at 638-39, 
where the Court held that Burbank’s ordinance prohibiting jet aircraft takeoffs 
from Burbank airport was pre-empted by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and 
the Noise Control Ac of 1972. After discussing the “pervasive” control of 
aircraft flight by the federal government the Court stressed that the FAA had 
established a “delicate balance” between the two most important factors. 
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nonetheless that by setting up an elaborate permit system for the 
discharge of polluting effluents, Congress had established a delicate 
balance that should not be upset by the application of the state law 
involved243. 
If, virtually every federal regulatory statute reflects a delicate 
balance among competing interests, and if the Supreme Court 
concludes – as it happened in the case at issue – that such a carefully 
planned balance should have a pre-emptive outcome, the States 
would always be left with only a tiny amount of legislative authority. 
The “delicate balance” theory overlooks the fact that at least two 
levels of legislative activity operate in the United States. Congress’s 
decision to strike a particular balance on the federal level does not 
necessarily mean that it is unwilling to have the balance potentially 
altered by the States: a conclusion that Congress has established such 
balance requiring automatically pre-emption of any State activity 
would have the identical effect as a conclusion that Congress has 
occupied the whole field and entirely divested States of authority in 
that subject area. If, however, Congress has not occupied the field 
but continues to operate under the assumption that state legislatures 
continue to pass laws, “delicate balance” pre-emption requires on one 
side that such balance must not be modified by the States, and on the 
other side that States may however continue to pass laws affecting 
the field of legislation considered. As a matter of fact therefore such 
pre-emption theory would reconvert itself back into a particular 
                                                
243 See International Paper Co. v Ouellette (107 S. Ct. 805 (1987)). Here the 
Court provided a surprising answer by stating that State nuisance law had been 
half pre-empted and half saved: Justice Powell, writing for the Court, 
concluded that the State law of the source State could continue to apply to 
trans-boundary pollution, but the State law of persons in affected states was 
pre-empted. 
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category of the occupying the field model, featured by the 
Congressional pre-emption of only a small field of the legislative 
area involved. 
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2.2 Supremacy clause and pre-emption 
 
As the Supreme Court acknowledges244, the pre-emption doctrine’s 
constitutional roots are to be found in the Supremacy clause, the core 
provision245 according to which valid federal law is hierarchically 
supreme in case of conflict resulting from concurrent State and 
federal powers. 
With a small number of exceptions246, the largest part247 of the 
                                                
244 See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 
(1982) (noting that pre-emption doctrine “has its roots in the Supremacy 
clause”); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 
317 (1981) (attributing “[t]he underlying rationale of the pre-emption 
doctrine” to the Supremacy clause);  Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141, 
143 (1977) (observing that “federal pre-emption of State statutes is, of course, 
ultimately a question under the Supremacy clause”). See also cases Chicago & 
Northwestern R.R. Co. v. Fuller, 84 U.S. 560, 570 (1873): “[State regulations 
are] to be valid until superseded by the paramount action of Congress”; the 
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 7 How. 283 (1849): “[T]he very language of the 
Constitution may be appealed to for the recognition of powers to be exercised 
by the states until they shall be superseded by a paramount authority vested in 
the federal government”; Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1820): “There is 
this reserve, however, that in cases of concurrent authority, where the laws of 
the states and of the Union are in direct and manifest collision on the same 
subject, those of the Union being "the supreme law of the land," are of 
paramount authority, and the state laws so far, and so far only, as such 
incompatibility exists must necessarily yield”. 
245 Cf. U.S. Const. Art. 6, par. 2. 
246 A remarkable exception in the pre-emption analysis is provided by the smart 
analysis offered by S. Gardbaum: the Author tends to separate the concept of 
pre-emption from the idea of supremacy, while the largest part of the doctrine 
tends to link each other. According to his survey (cf. The Nature of Preemption, 
79 Cornell L. Rev. 767 (1994); Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 Texas 
L. Rev. 795 (1996); New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the 
States, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 483 (1997); Preemption, in Encyclopedia of the 
American Constitution, Ed. Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst, 2nd edition, 
2000; Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, UCLA School of Law Research 
Paper No. 05-33, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=821324, 2005) pre-emption 
and supremacy are two separate, distinct and mutually exclusive methods of 
regulating the relationship between federal legislative powers and concurrent 
State competences: supremacy would simply embody a principle according to 
which in case of conflict federal law trumps State law (as stated by Art. 6 U.S. 
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Const.), regardless of any Congress’s intent; on the contrary, pre-emption 
would be related to a proper discretionary power granted to Congress, which 
thus may be or may not be exercised. Although both methods may be said to 
result in the displacing of State law, failure to distinguish them has had serious 
consequences for the law of pre-emption: such Congress prerogative could not 
derive from the Supremacy clause, which only states a feature of federal law 
without granting any specific power to Congress. Moreover, Congress’s power 
of pre-emption, when exercised to the full, has a far more radical impact on 
State law than the automatic characteristic of federal supremacy: first, by 
exercising its power of pre-emption, Congress can displace State law even 
where the latter is not in conflict with federal law; second, by exercising its 
pre-emption power, Congress may not only displace particular non-conflicting 
State laws, but redistribute general legislative competence between itself and 
the States: it may convert concurrent federal and State power over a give 
regulatory area into exclusive federal power, to deprive the States of their pre-
existing concurrent legislative authority, in whole or in part. Therefore, 
whereas supremacy means the displacement of conflicting state law, pre-
emption means the displacement of non-conflicting state law and/or concurrent 
state authority in a given field, leaving out of consideration potential conflicts. 
Pre-emption is not needed to – and does not – displace state laws that conflict 
with valid federal laws; they are automatically displaced by the operation of the 
Supremacy Clause. Thus, although both supremacy and pre-emption displace 
(or supersede) state law, they operate to displace different types of state law 
and do so by the different mechanisms of automatic consequence and 
discretionary power respectively. Additionally, like all powers of Congress the 
power of pre-emption must be an enumerated one, and its source cannot be the 
Supremacy clause, which only supplies the rule for resolving conflicts resulting 
from exercise of concurrent federal powers granted elsewhere in the 
Constitution: the constitutional justification for pre-emption would be the 
Necessary and Proper clause of article I, section 8 U.S. Const., which basically 
authorizes it as a means of effectuating other congressional powers: in certain 
areas and under certain circumstances, Congress needs to pass uniform national 
laws in order to exercise its express powers effectively. The Necessary and 
Proper clause provides the power to supersede State law, as the existence of a 
layer of State regulation, although not in conflict with the federal, is sometimes 
inappropriate: such power has nothing to do with the Supremacy clause, as the 
independent principle of supremacy is insufficient to guarantee the uniform 
national regulation that is sometimes required. 
247 See for example supra, L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, K.L. 
Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, Univ. Of Illinois Law 
Forum, 515 Vol. 1972; M.J. Alonso, Environmental Law: A Reevaluation of 
Federal Pre-emption and the Commerce Clause, 7 Fordham Law J., 515, 1979; 
S.R. Armstrong, Oil Spills – State Prevention and the Possibility of Pre-
emption, 30 Mercer Law Rev., 559, 1979; A.M. Segreti, The Federal 
Preemption Question – A Federal Question? An Analysis of Federal 
Jurisdiction Over Supremacy Clause Issues, Cleveland State Law Rev., Vol 
33:653, 1984-85; E.M. Martin, The Burger Court and Preemption Doctrine: 
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doctrine tends to identify such constitutional provision as the textual 
justification for pre-emption; furthermore, in the greatest part of 
cases arising from a conflict between federal and State law248 this 
constitutional provision was directly recalled by the Supreme Court, 
that frequently employed a language very similar to the one used by 
Chief Justice Marshall in the historical case Gibbons v. Ogden249. 
Under such circumstances, the Supremacy clause alone (instead of 
the whole constitutional framework) is conceived as the direct source 
of the pre-emption power granted to Congress, as under its operative 
extent all the conflicting State law are to be considered invalid. 
Remarkably, a rapid survey of the whole American Constitution 
                                                                                                                                          
Federalism in the Balance, Notre Dame Law R., Vol. 60:1233, 1985; E.L. 
Stettin, Federal Pre-emption: Time to Reestablish an Old Doctrine, 12 Nova 
Law Rev., 1331, 1988; J.D. Titus, Federal Pre-emption and the Cigarette Act – 
The Smoke Gets In Your Eyes, 20 Arizona State Law J., 897, 1988; R. Waltz, 
Environmental Protection and Pre-emption of State Common Law Tort Claims 
by FIFRA: Netland v. Hess, 11 Southeastern Environmental L. Journal, p. 114, 
2002. 
248 These cases are also known as the “Supremacy clause cases”: cf. Fidelity 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982) (“[…] 
preemption doctrine has its roots in the Supremacy Clause”); Chicago & N.W. 
Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (where“[t]he 
underlying rationale of the preemption doctrine” is linked to the Supremacy 
clause); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141, 142 (1977) (where it is 
pointed out that pre-emption of State laws “[…] is, of course, ultimately a 
question under the Supremacy Clause”); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963) (“We consider first appellants’ 
challenge to [the state law] under the Supremacy Clause”); Puerto Rico Dep’t 
of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum, 485 U.S. 495 (1988) (“Our Supremacy 
Clause cases tipically involve analysis of the scope of pre-emptive intent 
[…]”); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (“any state legislation which 
frustrates the full effectiveness of federal law is rendered invalid by the 
Supremacy Clause”). See also Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1, 3 
(1986); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 151 
(1978); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); Swift & Co. v. 
Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965). 
249 Cf. id. 211: “[…] acts of the State legislature [which] interfere with, or are 
contrary to the [valid] laws of Congress, are invalid under the Supremacy 
Clause” (see supra, footnote 98). 
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unveils that the Supremacy clause is actually the only provision 
where a United States legal system’s legislative hierarchy is 
articulated250. Under such clause it is stated that: 
 
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding”251 
 
The clause includes three different statements. According to the first 
one (a) the Constitution, treaties, and valid federal law enacted by 
Congress constitute a distinct category of law: they are “the supreme 
Law of the Land”, and in every State judges are bound thereby; 
secondly, it express the principle according to which (b) such 
specific category is supreme; thirdly, it states that (c) federal law is 
binding “any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
notwithstanding”. 
The first rule (a) sets out a rule of applicability of federal law, by 
pointing out that it applies not only in federal courts, but even in 
State courts: accordingly, federal statutes take effect automatically 
within each State and form part of the same body of jurisprudence as 
State statutes. In the absence of such provision, State courts might 
                                                
250 A potential exception may be represented by the Constitution’s Preamble, 
according to which the Constitution and the whole American federal Union are 
based on the determination expressed by the People of the United States. 
251 U.S. Const. Art. 6, par. 2. 
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have sought to analogize federal statutes to the laws of another 
sovereign (the federal one252), which they could ignore as they ignore 
acts enacted by foreign sovereign, under principles of international 
law. From this point of view the federal Constitution set a significant 
departure from the pre-unitary Confederation, which gave Congress 
only some specified powers253 and left all the remaining questions to 
the States, thus stating a substantial separation between concurrent 
legal orders. The inclusion of the Supremacy clause in the final 
Constitutional wording254 clearly established a unitary legal system 
                                                
252 Being these acts enacted by a legal order which is different from the State 
one, they could be considered as enacted by a foreign one: cf. Banks v. 
Greenleaf, 2 F. Cas. 756, 757 (C.C.D. Va. 1799) (No. 959) e Ingraham v. 
Geyer, 13 Mass. (12 Tyng) 146, 147 (1816). Similarly, a modern invocation of 
this analogy can be found in Testa v. Katt, 47 A.2d 312 (R.I. 1946), rev’d, 330 
U.S. 386 (1947), where the federal Supreme Court held that the Supremacy 
clause prevents State courts from refusing to enforce a federal statute on the 
ground that it is of a foreign sovereign (the federal one). 
On the basis of Article XIII of the pre-federal Confederation, Congress’s acts 
not necessarily became part of the law applied in State courts: each State 
legislature was supposed to pass laws implementing Congress’s directives. If a 
State legislature failed to do so, and if Congress’s acts had the status of another 
sovereign’s law, then Congress’s acts might have no effect in the courts of that 
State (cf. James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States 
(Apr. 1787), in Papers of James Madison 345, 352, Rutland & Rachal Editions, 
1975, noting that in practice even if not in theory “the acts of Congress […] 
depend for their execution on the will of the State legislatures”). 
253  For example, in foreign affairs Article IX of the Confederation gave 
Congress “the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and 
war” and of “entering into treaties”. 
254 The Supremacy clause inclusion procedure is extensively described by S.C. 
Hoke in Trascending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the 
Supremacy Clause (pp. 871-872). During the Constitutional Convention several 
alternative proposals were submitted: the so-called Virginia Plan, proposed by 
Governor E. Randolph on May 29, 1787, listed among the powers to be given 
to Congress the authority “to negate all laws passed by the several States, 
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union” 
(see The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, M. Farrand ed., rev. ed. 
1937, at 21). On June 15, 1787, W. Patterson introduced an alternative set of 
resolutions (known as the New Jersey Plan) not including any authority to 
negate State law.  
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by telling courts to treat valid federal statutes and treaties as “in-
State law” rather than as the law of another sovereign. 
The second aspect (b) of the Supremacy clause substitutes a federal 
rule of priority for the traditional temporal rule of priority usually 
employed in case of conflicting laws (lex posterior derogat priori): 
the Supremacy clause not only makes valid federal law part of the 
same body of jurisprudence as State law, but also declares that within 
that body of jurisprudence federal law is supreme. If federal laws 
were merely on a par with State statutes, than they would obviously 
supersede whatever pre-existing State law they contradicted, but they 
might themselves be superseded by subsequent acts enacted by State 
legislatures. Under this new rule of priority, when courts had to 
choose between following a valid federal law and a following State 
law, the federal law would prevail even if the State law had been 
enacted more recently. Such rule matters only when State law is in 
conflict with a valid federal law: hence the rule of priority comes 
into play only when courts cannot apply both State law and federal 
law, but instead must choose between them255. 
The third section of the Supremacy clause (c) defines a peculiar rule 
of construction concerning the dynamic relationship between State 
                                                
255 According to V. Dinh the pre-emption doctrine finds its roots in the 
Supremacy clause, which actually does not grant any affirmative power to 
Congress. Such constitutional provision “only prescribed a constitutional 
choice of law rule, one that gives federal precedence over conflicting State 
law” (cf. Reassessing the law of Preemption, id.). The Supremacy clause is 
relevant only at the post-enactment stage, where a State law conflicts to some 
degree with a federal law: it tells courts not to apply State laws repugnant to 
federal laws, while it is obvious that where the conflict is absent courts can 
freely apply both laws. Pre-emption would thus be a mechanism arising from 
the Supremacy clause as so to resolve legislative conflicts, not occurring where 
no conflicts arise (see also S.C. Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic 
Republican Values, id.). 
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and federal laws, by confirming the connection existing between pre-
emption and the implied repeals theory. The final part of the 
Supremacy clause is a global non-obstante provision256, whose 
interpretation appears to be particularly complicated, because of the 
Supremacy clause’s alleged redundancy: once it told that valid 
federal law is supreme and binding, apparently no reasons justify the 
statement under which it applies “any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding”. While the rule 
of applicability (a) told courts to treat the federal Constitution, 
treaties and valid federal statutes as in-State law, and the rule of 
priority (b) told them that the federal portion of in-State law trumped 
whatever aspects of the State portion it contradicted, the last 
                                                
256 History and meaning of the so-called non-obstante provisions in the 
American pre-unitary legal system are extensively described by C. Nelson (cf. 
Preemption, at 237, 245). During the 18th century, if a State legislature was 
aware of a particular statute that it wanted to replace with a new law, it could 
include a clause in the new law expressly repealing the old one. In order to 
avoid the burden of having to list all repealed statutory provisions separately, 
legislatures sometimes enacted general clauses repealing all prior legislation 
within the purview of the new statute by specifying that they applied 
notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary in prior laws (“any law to the 
contrary notwithstanding” or “any law, usage, or custom to the contrary 
notwithstanding” or “any thing in any law to the contrary notwithstanding”): 
given the well established principle that a new statute would abrogate contrary 
prior statutes anyway, such new interpretative principle seemed to be 
superfluous. The great use of such clause arose from the fact that it was well-
established that a new statute should not be read to contradict an earlier one if 
the two laws can possibly be harmonized, and such presumption against reading 
a statute in a way that would contradict prior law created an obvious problem 
for legislatures. Sometimes legislatures wanted a new statute to supersede 
whatever prior law it might contradict, but in the absence of some direction to 
the contrary, courts might give the new statute a strained construction as so to 
harmonize it with prior law. The presumption against implied repeals might 
then cause courts to distort the new statute. The non-obstante clause addressed 
this problem by establishing an important rule of construction: it acknowledged 
that the statute might contradict prior law and instructed courts not to apply the 
general presumption against implied repeals: courts were thus supposed to give 
the new statute its natural meaning rather than harmonize it with prior law. 
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statement included in the Supremacy clause set a general rule of 
interpretation according to which courts are supposed not to apply 
the traditional presumption against implied abrogation in determining 
whether federal law contradicts State law. Therefore, even if a 
federal statute or treaty do not contain a specific non-obstante 
provision, the Supremacy clause tell courts not to strain its meaning 
in order to harmonize with State law257. 
It goes without saying that such general provision does not affect the 
presumption against reading two federal statutes to contradict each 
other: in this situation, the normal presumption against implied 
repeals continues to apply fully. The non-obstante provision does 
caution against straining the meaning of a federal law to avoid a 
contradiction with State law: unless there is a particular reason to 
believe that Congress meant to avoid such a contradiction the 
Supremacy clause indicates that the content of State law should not 
alter the meaning of federal law. From a global reading of the whole 
Supremacy clause it emerges that the rule of applicability and the 
rule of priority combine as so to mean that courts must follow all 
valid rules of federal law. When courts can follow State law too, the 
Supremacy clause leaves them free to do so. Under the Supremacy 
clause, then, the test for pre-emption asks courts to disregard State 
law if, but only if, it contradicts a rule validly established by federal 
law. 
 
 
                                                
257 Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, noting that the presence or absence of a specific non-
obstante clause in the federal act at issue cannot affect the extent or operation 
of the act of Congress, because its laws need no non-obstante clause (id. at 30-
31). 
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2.3 Presumption against pre-emption, traditional State powers and 
exclusive State legislative competences 
 
The doctrine of federal pre-emption has deeply evolved through 
decades, and its current idea is striking different from the original 
conception that featured it: in the beginning, in case of conflict 
between federal law and State regulations pre-emption was usually 
seen by the Supreme Court as a direct consequence arising from the 
action of Congress in specific contexts, such as interstate 
commerce258. During the 1930’s, especially in connection with the 
New Deal revolution, an extensive reconstruction of the American 
federal system occurred and the so-called Commerce clause went 
under a substantive re-interpretation according to which 
congressional prerogatives were gradually made more extensive and 
pervasive259. Congress was thus able to exercise its regulatory action 
in an increasing number of areas and subjects260, by imposing a 
system of laws and regulations aimed at ensuring national 
                                                
258 See Southern Railyard Co. v. Reid, 222 U.S. 424, 442 (1912): here the Court 
struck down a State statute regarding railroad rates after the creation of the 
federal Interstate Commerce Commission, by pointing out that through its 
institution the federal power had taken full possession of the concerned field, 
having therefore States lost their concurrent competence. The Court held that 
“[i]t is well settled that if the State and Congress have a concurrent power, 
that of the State is superseded when the power of Congress is exercised” (id. 
436). 
259 See supra, footnote 31. 
260 See the Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1341 (1994); the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-393 
(1994); the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30169 (1994); the 
1976 Medical Device Amendments (21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k, 379, 379a); the 
1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994); the 
1954 Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297g-3; the National Labor 
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide 
and Rodenticide Act, U.S.C.A. § 136(v)(b) (West 2002). 
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uniformity. Subsequently, the number of conflicts occurring between 
State and federal laws grew remarkably, as far as Congress’s set 
compulsory minimum standard legislative floors and pre-emption 
cases involved all State common-law damage awards, which were 
considered as additional regulation or setting of standards and 
requirements. In its early decisions in the area of pre-emption of 
State tort actions, the Supreme Court analyzed pre-emption like the 
pre-emption of any State law261: if the State law purported to regulate 
the same conduct as federal law, generally the Court declared the 
State law pre-empted262, thus considering the specific purpose of the 
State act at issue as irrelevant. By the 1980’s, the Supreme Court 
decisions had changed focus, embracing the importance of ensuring 
that citizens had a means of seeking compensation and rejecting the 
notion that allowing State tort claims was akin to impose State 
regulation: in these decisions, the Court considered whether the 
purpose of the State law at issue clashed with the purpose of the 
applicable federal statute, suggesting that a general presumption 
against pre-emption of tort damages actions existed and applied 
when the federal law afforded no alternative remedy263. 
Both the enlarged idea of Congress’s prerogatives and the 
pervasiveness of the pre-emption phenomenon gradually imposed a 
                                                
261 See San Diego Building. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 
(1959) (stating that “judicial concern has necessarily focused on the nature of 
the activities which the States have sought to regulate rather than on the 
method of regulation adopted”). 
262 See id. (stating that when a State regulation “threatened interference” with a 
federal policy, “it has been judicially necessary to preclude the States from 
acting”). 
263 See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 497 (1987) (noting 
that the federal Clean Water Act pre-emption of nuisance claims under the laws 
of the affected State would not leave property owner without a remedy, because 
the owners could bring nuisance claims under the laws of the source State). 
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deeper analysis of its dynamics264, and gradually imported a general 
presumption according to which State laws is not pre-empted by the 
simply enactment of a federal statute on the same area, if Congress 
has not plainly and univocally intended to occupy the whole field of 
regulation. The Court in many cases265 has stated such guiding 
principle by the means of varying formulations, sometimes lacking 
clarity: on some occasions it held that such presumption was 
generally embodied by the “assumption that Congress did not intend 
to displace State law”266, whilst in other cases the extent of such 
negative presumption has been formulated in a stricter way, as so to 
protect not every possible legislative act produced by State 
legislatures but only the so-called States’ “historic police powers”267. 
In some other occasions the Court has pointed out that the negative 
presumption against pre-emption can be avoided only if Congress’s 
purpose to displace State law was clear and manifest268: in the 
absence of an express statutory language the Court has generally held 
a positive presumption in favour of State law (especially in field 
traditionally occupied by States’ legislative competences) according 
to which the analysis of the relationships occurring between State 
and federal law must take into account the assumption that “[…] the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
                                                
264 See infra par. 2.3, dedicated to the different types of pre-emption invoked by 
the Court. 
265 See for example some historical landmark cases, such as Savage v. Jones, 
225 U.S. 501 (1912); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. 331 U.S. 218, (1947); 
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 
534 U.S. 497 (1978); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Commission, 
461 U.S. 190 (1983); English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990). 
266 Cf. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). 
267 Cf. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
268 Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991); Rice, 331 U.S. (id. 
230). 
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Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 
Congress”269. 
After having stated such guiding principles, seemingly trying to 
ensure a univocal pre-emption analysis and to give full application to 
an unambiguous analytical framework, as so to protect States’ 
prerogatives against federal intrusions, the Supreme Court stated that 
even absent express language Congress’s “clear and manifest” 
purpose to displace State law could be perceived also impliedly, i.e. 
by determining what Congress intended the federal law to be or to do 
in relation to State law. Congressional intent can be thus be inferred 
by ascertaining whether the entire scheme enacted by Congress pre-
empted State action by implication: absent express language, a State 
law is pre-empted when it “[…] stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress”270. Such interpretative guidelines encouraged the growth 
of the constitutional debate: according to some commentators271 the 
Court has somehow blurred the principles, leaving the doctrine in a 
                                                
269 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. (id. 237). 
270 Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). On the obstacle pre-emption 
category see infra par. 2.3.2.2; see also L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional 
Law, p. 1176; S.R. Jordan, The Pre-emption Presumption that Never Was: Pre-
emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 Arizona L. Rev., p. 1391, (1998). 
According to S.R. Jordan, “[b]ecause common-law actions for damages have 
traditionally been firmly within States’ domain, […] the presumption against 
pre-emption and the clarity requirement dictate that State common law actions 
for damages get the highest order of protection against pre-emption” (id. at 
1428). 
271 Cf. M.A. Bakris, The Federal Cigarette Labelling and Advertising Act’s 
Express Pre-emption Provision Defines the Pre-emptive Reach of the Act and 
Must Be Construed Narrowly, 70 University of Detroit Mercy L. Rev., p. 487, 
(1992); H.V. Kehoe, Narrowing the Scope of Federal Preemption: Tabacco 
Torts Become Winnable, 38 Loyola L. Rev., p. 1191, (1993); S.R. Jordan, The 
Pre-emption Presumption that Never Was: Pre-emption Doctrine Swallows the 
Rule, op. cit. pp. 1379-1469. 
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state of uncertainty. The lack of an unambiguous rule actually able to 
guide lower courts in deciding pre-emption cases (especially those 
involving State common-law actions for damages) is precisely what 
continues to plague pre-emption questions: accordingly, State laws 
should be displaced only by clear congressional language, but the 
Court traditional approach seems to be dominated by too much 
discretion in determining Congress’s purposes, being free to 
disregard Congress’s express pre-emptive language and instead roam 
about a federal statute in a freewheeling search for federal purposes 
that may be obstructed by State common-law. 
In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.272 the Court held that Congress’s 
purpose to displace State law could be “clear and manifest” even 
absent express language. Furthermore, displacement of State law was 
Congress’s “clear and manifest” intent not only if the legislation 
showed the area involved one of dominant federal interest273, but also 
if it appeared that Congress intended to occupy the field of regulation 
or, more importantly, if State regulation would obstruct what 
appeared to be federal legislative purposes. 
Such incoherent interpretative approach basically eliminates any 
distinction between federal statutes that contain express language 
regarding the pre-emptive effect of statute and statutes that contain 
no indication at all of Congress’ pre-emptive intent. For that reason, 
when statutory ambiguity exists, courts should be extremely wary of 
finding congressional intent to pre-empt by exercising extreme 
caution before disrupting important State interests. Such presumption 
in favour of States’ prerogatives finds it roots in basic federalism 
                                                
272 331 U.S. 218, (1947) 
273 As in Hines v. Davidovitz (see footnote 208). 
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principles, which counsel a strong reluctance to displace tort 
remedies, for those remedies entail the States’ historic power to 
protect the health and safety of their citizens and to redress 
injuries274. Hence the presumption should be regarded as an essential 
device of interpretation that allows to carefully weigh the balance of 
federal and State interests before displacing State authority: it 
operates to confine extent of congressional action, and in the absence 
of a clear directive from Congress, the burden of proof of pre-
emptive intent ought to be on those asserting such congressional 
intent275. 
On the contrary, some other commentators hold that the clear and 
express formulation of congressional intent should be regarded as a 
compulsory requirement in order to find pre-emption, being thus the 
abovementioned presumption an unjustified interpretative device276: 
when Congress decides to produce a legislative act concerning one of 
its exclusive competence area, the Supreme Court’s task is to 
evaluate the act’s pre-emptive extent by employing its statutory 
construction abilities. To employ a general presumption favouring 
State laws would unduly expand the Court’s judicial competences: 
                                                
274 Cf. B.J. Grey:“Pre-emption in such circumstances will undermine the States’ 
effort to protect their citizenry – the core concern of federalism” (in Make 
Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Pre-emption of State Tort Remedies, 77 
Boston Univ. Law Rev., at 615). 
275 Cf. C. Massey, “Joltin’ Joe has left and gone away”: the Vanishing 
Presumption Against Preemption, 66 Albany Law Review p. 759, 2003: “The 
presumption is against a broad reading of federal law that purports to pre-empt 
the state law and that expressly acts like other clear statement rules to ensure 
that the federal political process has focused upon the displacement of state 
authority. Without such a rule, there is no assurance that Congress has in fact 
attended the consequences of displacing state authority”. 
276 Cf. J.R. Stern, Preemption Doctrine and the Failure of Textualism in 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 80 Virginia Law Review, pp. 979-1014 (1994); C. 
Nelson, Preemption, p. 290; V. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption. 
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furthermore, it would lead to an inappropriate alteration of the 
balance of powers set by the Constitution. The objection according to 
which the abovementioned presumption would stem from a 
constitutional provision (namely the Tenth constitutional 
Amendment, according to which “[t]he powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people”277) would be 
defeated by the fact that it does not have independent operating 
force, as it can be read simply as the flip side of the enumeration of 
congressional powers under article 1, section 8278. 
Such restrictive reading of the Tenth Amendment was provided by 
the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, which followed a 
controversial judicial path between the end of the 1970’s and the first 
half of the 1980’s. In the historic case National League of Cities v. 
Usery279 the Court divided five to four in striking down three 1974 
federal amendments to the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938. Such 
legislation extended minimum wage and maximum hour provisions to 
cover almost all employees of States and their political subdivision: 
the Court held that even if the statute passed by Congress was 
pursuant to the Commerce clause, the 1974 amendments directly 
displaced the States’ freedom to regulate areas of traditional 
                                                
277 See Ch. 1. 
278 Therefore, the assumption according to which “[…] the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress” would simply suggest that 
when Congress has to legislate in areas traditionally governed by the States it 
has to “[…] proceed more cautiously and provide an interstitial rather than a 
comprehensive or primary set of regulations” (cf. V. Dinh, Reassessing the 
Law of Pre-emption, at 8). 
279 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 115  
governmental functions280. From that case onward, the Supreme 
Court tried to draw a federalism doctrine based on the core 
differentiation between traditional and non-traditional State 
functions281, as so to create a legal theory that could actually protect 
States from inappropriate federal intrusions into State traditional 
legislative competence. The Court bifurcation between traditional 
and non-traditional governmental functions proved to be too abstract 
and vague for federal judges to apply with confidence or consistency, 
either in the lower courts or in the Supreme Court itself: lower courts 
frequently found a function to be “traditional” and thus within the 
area of State sovereignty; repeatedly, the Court would reverse these 
decisions and call the function non-traditional and beyond the 
protection of National League282. 
                                                
280 See the Opinion delivered by Justice Rehnquist (426 U.S. 852 id.). See also 
D.M. O’Brien, The Rehnquist Court and Federal Preemption: In Search of a 
Theory, 23 Publius: The Journal of Federalism, p. 15, Autumn 1993. Cf. also 
Fry v. United States, where the Supreme Court noted that the Tenth Amendment 
prohibited Congress from exercising power “in a fashion that impairs the 
States’ integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system” (427 
U.S. 542, 547 n. 7 (1975)). 
281 The traditional functions and activities related to States, as listed in National 
League were: schools and hospitals, fire prevention, police protection, 
sanitation, public health, parks and recreation. A final interpretation of these 
functions was delivered in 1979 by the Labor Department, which determined 
that libraries and museums were additional functions of States and their 
political subdivisions (see L. Fisher, N. Devins, Political Dynamics of 
Constitutional Law, p. 85, American Casebook Series, West Group, St. Paul, 
Minnesota, 2001). 
282 For example, in 1980 a federal district court concluded that land use 
regulation for surface coal mining represented a “traditional governmental 
function” reserved to the States under National League. A unanimous Supreme 
Court rejected the district court’s argument by holding that National League 
applied to “States as States” and not to the private business operations at issue 
in this case (cf. Hoodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Rcl. Ass’n, 425 U.S. 264 
(1981)). Two years later, the Court reversed another federal district court ruling 
that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act violated the Tenth 
Amendment theory articulated in National League (cf. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 
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Nine years after National League the Court reversed itself in Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority283, again by a five to 
four vote. Here the Court argued that the effort to distinguish 
between traditional and non-traditional State functions was not only 
unworkable, but also inconsistent with established principles of 
federalism284, according to which the federal Congress is the only 
institution legitimated to make constitutional interpretations about 
federalism and the Commerce clause; moreover, the Supreme Court 
announced that the protection of federalism largely depends on the 
political process operating within Congress285. 
According to the expectations arising from the National League of 
Cities v. Usery jurisprudence and from the statements delivered 
during the Reagan administration286 it was likely that the Supreme 
Court would have increasingly defended States’ prerogatives against 
excessive federal intrusions. On the contrary, as a matter of fact the 
Court majority never favoured an express limitation on Congress’s 
powers287: indeed, the Court recalled the basic assumption according 
to which the Constitution deprived States of their sovereign powers, 
therefore being federalism based on a organized framework where 
States’ interests are adequately represented in the national political 
                                                                                                                                          
U.S. 226 (1983)). 
283 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
284 Cf. the Opinion delivered by Justice Blackmun (id. at 531). 
285 Cf. From National League to Garcia, in L. Fisher, N. Devins, Political 
Dynamics of Constitutional Law, op. cit., pp. 81-85. 
286 According to which the presumption of sovereignty stands with States (cf. R. 
Reagan, in “Federalism: Executive Order 12612” of October 26, 1987, in 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, November 2, 1987, at 1231). 
287 Cf. Hoodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass’n. (supra, note n. 280); 
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982); United Transportation Union v. 
Long Island Railroad Company, 455 U.S. 678 (1982); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 
U.S. 222 (1983). 
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process and ultimately in the Congress, which is the only institution 
allowed to distribute competences between centre and peripheries288. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
288 The only case where the National League reasoning was recalled is New 
York v. United States (112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992)): here Justice O’Connor held that 
the national political process does not guarantee the most suitable balance of 
power, as prescribed by the federal scheme: subsequently, one of the Court’s 
task is to safeguard the borders of national and States competences, by avoiding 
mutual intrusions. 
 118  
 
 119 
Chapter 3: A sketch of European federalism: the competence 
problem and related issues 
 
As we have seen in previous chapters, without doubts the North 
American Federation of States embodies the principal model for a 
comparison with the European Community, since they are popularly 
treated as the epitome of the ‘federal State’. We do not need to 
outline here the numerous and profound differences existing between 
the European Community, on one hand, and – on the other hand – a 
federal State. The basic difficulty, however, derives surely from the 
fact that such comparison involves an entity which remains – perhaps 
permanently – composed of more or less sovereign nations and the 
object of which is to try to bring about a closer union among its 
peoples289, and a proper federation which derives its sovereignty and 
legitimacy directly from its own people and not from its constituent 
States290. 
As well as the American constitution the EC Treaty does not include 
any explicit reference to the ‘federalist’ concept: if compared with 
proper federal constitutional experiences, the European Community 
is featured by the outstanding role of its Member States in the 
configuration of Community activity and in the enforcement of the 
related legislative acts. Basically The EC does not employ its powers 
as so to actually apply its governance powers on the European 
territories: rather, it has a general function aimed at supervising and 
controlling Member States’ behaviours. 
                                                
289 See supra, Introduction. 
290 See supra, par. 1.1. 
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In the context of the Community legal order the so-called problem of 
competences – i.e. the question about the division of legislative 
powers between central entity and peripheries – arises in two linked 
aspects: first, it is not always possible to determine on an a priori 
basis who is legitimated to do what in the EC context, as the Treaties 
do not explicitly share out or clearly define boundaries between the 
competences of the Community and the Member States; secondly, the 
Treaties offer no statement of the consequences arising from the 
overlap of national competence and Community competence in a 
particular field. 
It is well known that for what it concerns legislative activity within 
the European borders the EC enjoys no general competence, but 
rather the specific competences or enumerated powers conferred on it 
by its constitutive Treaties, while all residual powers are left with the 
Member States. By the means of Articles 3 and 4 EC it is simply 
introduced a general outline of the whole Treaty, providing a list of 
subjects which is opened by a proposition according to which 
Community activities should be pursued “in accordance with the 
timetable set out [in the Treaty itself]”291, whilst the core provision 
included in Article 5 (ex Article 3b) EC states that the Community 
shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the 
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it by the Treaty292. In other 
                                                
291 See Art. 3 EC. 
292 It has also been stated by the Court in cases C-188-190/80 (France, Italy and 
United Kingdom v. Commission) (1982) that the Community legislative powers 
could not be described in terms of a general proposition, but resulted from 
different Treaty provisions attributing that power for each of the areas entrusted 
to the Community. Another core provision is Art. 10 EC, considered by the 
doctrine as the fundamental legal basis of the pre-emption theory, as it states in 
its second part that the Member States “shall abstain from any measure which 
could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty”. The whole 
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words, the EC is competent only in the areas in which its Treaties 
attribute competence to it: therefore, the principles of Community 
law apply only in areas falling within Community competence, and 
subsequently it is necessary to identify in the Treaty a specific legal 
base authorizing action before Community legislation is 
‘constitutionally’ valid and legitimate. 
The absence of an adequate legal base means that the Community is 
not competent to act, even if as a matter of fact the principles of 
Community law exert a remarkably wide influence outside EC 
competence field: such influence has been allowed by the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, which shaped and 
fixed the relationship between Community law and Member State 
law by establishing the supremacy doctrine293, attempting to render 
that relationship indistinguishable from analogous legal relationships 
in constitutional federal States. 
The European Court of Justice has assumed an outstanding key role 
in this field by keeping on construing the Treaties “[…] in a 
constitutional way rather than employing the traditional 
international law methodology. Proceeding from its fragile 
jurisdictional base, the Court has arrogated to itself the ultimate 
authority to draw the line between Community law and national 
                                                                                                                                          
jurisprudential path created by the ECJ finds its roots in these words, and 
starting from here the Court has implicitly defined the doctrine of pre-emption: 
it is an implicit definition because as a matter of fact the world “pre-emption” 
hardly occurs in the judicial discourse of the Court. 
293 See infra, par. 3.1.  
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law”294, so as to develop and affirm the so-called 
‘constitutionalization’295 of the Treaty. 
The debate over legislative competences allocation is at the heart of 
the discussion on the equivalent of federal pre-emption in the 
European Union (EU)/European Community (EC)296, which is 
ultimately a discussion on the delimitation of vertical (but also 
horizontal) competences297. This is one of the most contentious issues 
                                                
294 E. Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 
(1981) 75 American Journal of International Law, 1. 
295 In the landmark case Les Verts v. Parliament (C-294/83) the ECJ referred to 
the EC Treaty as a “basic constitutional charter”. Such perception was later 
confirmed in Opinion 1/91, where the Treaty was acclaimed as “the 
constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law” (see B. 
Brandtner, The ‘Drama’ of EEA – Comment on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92, 3 EJIL, 
1992, p. 300-328). Cf. also J.H.H. Weiler, The Community system: the dual 
character of supranationalism, 1 Yearbook of European Law 267 and The 
Transformation of Europe, (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2403; K. Lenaerts, 
Constitutionalism and the many faces of federalism (1990) 38 American Journal 
of Constitutional Law; F. Mancini, The making of a Constitution for Europe 
(1989) 26 Common Market Law Review 595. See also M. Cartabia and J.H.H. 
Weiler, L’Italia in Europa, id. at 79. 
296 The European Union consists of three pillars: the first one is made up of the 
three European Communities (EEC, Euratom, ECSC), which have been 
deepened and enlarged by the economic and monetary union. When the EU was 
established in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty, the ‘European Economic 
Community’ was renamed the ‘European Community’: the EEC Treaty became 
the EC Treaty, and this change was intended to give expression to the transition 
from a purely economic community to a political union. The first pillar 
embodies Community jurisdiction, and within the framework of the EC, the 
Community institutions may draw up legislation in their respective areas of 
responsabilities which applies directly in the Member States and may claim 
precedence over national law. The second pillar was established by the EU 
Treaty, and comprises common foreign and security policy: here common 
positions are set out, joint actions and measures carried out and framework 
decisions passed. The third pillar initially comprised cooperation in justice and 
home affairs, and after the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty it included also judicial 
cooperation (see G. Gaja, Introduzione al diritto comunitario, Ed. Laterza 
2003; M. Horspool & M. Humphreys, European Union Law, 4th edition Oxford 
University Press 2006). 
297 ‘Competence’ is the authority or power to undertake legislative, executive or 
judicial action: competences flow from the Treaty to the institutions of the 
Community, as pre-emption arises primarily in the first pillar. Vertical 
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within the legal debate concerning the EC, as it is permeated by an 
extensive view according to which the European Community tends 
somehow to usurp competences thereby eroding Member States’ 
statehood: on one side the delimitation of competences is not precise 
enough, while on the other side the European Community allegedly 
tends to legislate either in areas in which it is not competent (thus 
encroaching on the competence of Member States), or in areas where 
it is not appropriate for it to do so, or in a too detailed way298. The 
delimitation is also said to lack clarity, therefore obscuring 
responsibility and thus appearing to be moving inevitably toward a 
deeper democratic deficit299, as it is difficult for European citizens to 
understand how powers are divided between the EU and the Member 
States.  
A hopeful sign of change was given at first by the Laeken 
Declaration on the Future of the European Union300, according to 
which a delimitation of EC competences was meant to be clarified by 
the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe301: in a first 
                                                                                                                                          
competences denote the delineation between Member States and the European 
level, while horizontal competences denote the distribution of prerogatives 
among European institutions. 
298 See the NOTE from the Praesidium to the Convention of 28 March 2002 
(CONV 17/02) for the Constitution for Europe. Usually such criticism is based 
on the undetermined structure of Art. 308 EC and the finality driven structure 
of Art. 95 EC, on which see infra, par. 3.5. 
299 See F. Petrangeli, Processo di riforma dell’Unione e questione democratica, 
in “Democrazia e diritto” n. 2, 2003, pp. 114-140. See also G. Pasquino, Deficit 
democratico e leadership nell’Unione Europea, in “Teoria politica” XVI, n. 1, 
2000, pp. 3-23. 
300 Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union, in Presidency 
Conclusions, European Council meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001, 
SN 300/01, Annex 1 at 19, 20 (December 15, 2001), available at 
http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf. 
301 The final version of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
can be found online at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex. 
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step the (now abandoned) Constitutional Treaty tried to clarify the 
competences allocation by strengthening the subsidiarity principle in 
comparison with the status quo defined by the two fundamental 
Treaties, but it still drew criticism which finally turned into its fatal 
rejection by French and Dutch voters in referenda held in 2005. One 
of the main issues addressed by the abovementioned Constitutional 
Treaty302 was the general confusion arising from the fact that as a 
matter of fact the European system of alignment of competences has 
no list or catalogue of competence provisions, which on the contrary 
are found scattered all over the Treaties303. 
                                                
302 See Articles I-11 to I-18. 
303 As well as the abovementioned Constitutional Treaty, now defunct, the 
recent Reform Treaty (available at http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm) 
signed in Lisbon on 13 December 2007, seeks to describe and codify a proper 
division of competences between the Union and the Member States. The 
Reform Treaty does not constitute a third Treaty, nor it replaces the two current 
Treaties with a single Treaty (as the Constitution for Europe was supposed to 
do): rather, it is supposed to amend both the existing Treaties and also to 
rename one of them, as the EC Treaty will become the “Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union” (TFEU, or in some commentaries TOFU), 
and all references in the TEU and TEC to the “Community” or “European 
Community” will be simply made to the “Union”. 
One of the most important changes brought about by the Reform-Lisbon Treaty 
is the attempted establishment of a taxonomy of competences (see new Articles 
4 and 5 of the amended TEU, and the new Title I of the TFEU): it defines – or 
at least attempts to – who does what in the EC. The new Treaty maintains the 
existing (but frequently forgotten) system of conferred powers: according to 
that, the EC can only do what the Treaty expressly allows it to do and its 
competence cannot be extended with the agreement of the member States. 
Article 5 of the amended TEU states that “the limits of Union competences are 
governed by the principle of conferral”, under which “the Union shall act only 
within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in 
the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein”. The amended TEU 
(Article 4) confirms for the first time and in the clearest terms that 
“competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States”: the Union “shall respect [Member States’] essential State 
functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining 
law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State”. The Treaty 
provides for the first time lists setting out the divisions of policy areas into 
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In such context, when we speak about pre-emption within the 
European legal framework we are basically referring to the 
preclusion of national regulatory powers resulting from a decision by 
the European Court of Justice: for some, pre-emption should be 
regarded as one of the foundation of the European Community’s 
normative supranationality, along with the principle of supremacy of 
Community law and with the implied powers doctrine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
three types of competence (exclusive, shared and supporting competence): the 
TFEU expressly “determines the areas of, delimitation of, and arrangements 
for exercising [the Union’s] competences” (new Article 1, TFEU). Where the 
Union has exclusive competence (see Article 2(1) TFEU), only the Union can 
legislate and adopt legally binding acts, and the principle of subsidiarity does 
not apply. Shared competence exists in areas where the Union and Member 
States are both able to act: this is the case in most areas both under the current 
Treaties and under the reformed Treaties, as a list in the reformed TFEU 
confirms. According to Art. 2(2) TFEU “the Member States shall exercise their 
competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence”. 
A Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty states that “when the Union has taken action in 
a certain area, the scope of this exercise of competence only covers those 
elements governed by the Union act in question and therefore does not cover 
the whole area” (Protocol on the exercise of shared competence). Member 
States are therefore free to act in the same area, as long as they do not enact 
legislation that conflicts with EU law or principles (see Article 2(2) TFEU). 
Finally, the Union enjoys the so-called supporting competence, which is related 
to specific areas of action. Here the Union has competence to carry out actions 
to support, coordinate or supplement the actions of Member States: action by 
the Union may include adopting incentive measures and making 
recommendations, but it does not supersede the competence of Member States 
to act and must not entail the harmonisation of national laws (Article 2(5) 
TFEU). 
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3.1 The Supremacy doctrine 
 
While an abstract ruling on the interpretation of Community law 
would have given the European Court of Justice a central place in the 
Community legal system – in some respects comparable with the 
position of a federal supreme court – the ECJ has not limited itself to 
ruling on interpretation alone, but has had occasion to deal also with 
the effects of Community law. In so doing, it has developed doctrines 
that can be described as featured by a constitutional character: 
doctrines such as those of the supremacy (or primacy) of Community 
law, of EC implied powers and of direct effect of Community law. 
Unlike some federal constitutions, the European Community Treaty 
does not include a specific supremacy clause304; however, in a series 
of cases starting in 1964 the Court has pronounced an 
uncompromising version of EC law supremacy: in the sphere of 
application of Community law, any Community norm – be it an 
article of the fundamental Treaty or any other lower regulation – is 
hierarchically placed above national law305. Moreover, one of the 
most relevant implications of this theory is the fact that the European 
Court of Justice seems to be the only organ which holds the so-called 
judicial kompetenz-kompetenz, i.e. the competence to declare or to 
determine the limits of the competence of the Community: in other 
                                                
304 See Gerhard Bebr, How supreme is Community law in the National Courts?, 
in C.M.L.Rev, 11, 1974, pp. 3-37. 
305 In this way we can say that the European Union is the organization called to 
state the “higher law of the land”: see J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of 
Europe, p. 22, 1999, Cambridge University Press. 
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words the Court is the body that determines which norms come 
within the sphere of application of Community law306. 
The principle of pre-emption goes along with the supremacy doctrine 
and the kompetenz-kompetenz matter, as long as they preserve the 
homogeneity of Community law in the Member States and provide 
the ECJ with the highest position in the European legal system. 
In order to affirm the idea of supremacy307 the Court has asserted that 
Community law is superior to national law, not only in the 
Community legal order but also in the national legal orders. 
Subsequently, a national judge cannot refuse the application of a 
self-executing rule of Community law, on the ground that either it 
was adopted by a Community organ in violation of the rules of its 
national constitution, concerning the forms and procedure, or that it 
violates the fundamental rights guaranteed by it: he can no longer be 
tempted to give precedence to the law in which he was trained; nor 
he can refuse application of a Community rule and apply subsequent 
national legislation based on the general chronological rule lex 
posterior derogat priori308. 
                                                
306 The individuation of the organ having the final decision as to definition of 
competence spheres (question of Kompetenz-Kompetenz) is crucial. The 
European Court has never answered this issue directly, but implicit in the case-
law is the clear understanding that the Court itself has the ultimate say on the 
reach of Community law. See Case 66/80, Spa International Chemical Corp. v. 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato [1981] ECR 1,191; Case 314/85, 
Firma Foto Frost v. Hauptzollant Lubeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4,199.  
307 Supremacy, or primacy, or primauté. 
308 The principle of supremacy has been defined “[…] not as an absolute rule 
whereby Community (or federal) law trumps Member State law, but instead as a 
principle whereby each law is supreme within its sphere of competence. This 
more accurate characterization of supremacy renders crucial the question of 
defining the spheres of competence” (J.H.H. Weiler, The Transofrmation of 
Europe, 100 Yale Law Journal pp. 2403-2483, 1991). According to part of the 
doctrine, however, such definition is misleading, as it uses the vocabulary of 
dual federalism by referring to mutually distinct spheres of competences: as R. 
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The doctrine of supremacy was gradually elaborated by the European 
Court in the course of its interpretation of the Treaties, through a 
substantial number of cases, some of which became a sort of 
milestone decisions such as Van Gend en Loos309 and Costa v. 
ENEL310. Primacy of Community law was further emphasized in the 
                                                                                                                                          
Schütze points out, in dual federalist systems there is no need for the 
supremacy clause as a conflict resolution mechanism, as each law has its own 
sphere of competence. Therefore, “the construction of separate competence 
spheres under a philosophy of dual federalism serves the very purpose of 
avoiding the supremacy issue. The doctrine of supremacy only makes sense in a 
constitutional setting of co-operative federalism with overlapping spheres of 
competence” (cf. R. Schütze, Dual federalism constitutionalised: the 
emergence of exclusive competences in the EC legal order, European Law 
Review, Vol. 32 No. 1 February 2007, fn. 2). 
309 Case 26/62, in which the Court reasoned that “[t]he purpose of the EEC 
Treaty […] implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement creating only 
mutual obligations between the contracting parties […]. The Community 
constitutes a new legal order in International law, for the benefit of which 
States have restricted their sovereign rights, albeit in limited areas, and the 
subject of which are not only the Member States but also their nationals”. 
310 Case 6/64, [1964] C.M.L.Report 355. Here the European judiciary was asked 
whether national legislation adopted after 1958 would prevail over the EC 
Treaty: the Italian dualist tradition had treated Community law as ordinary 
legislation that could be derogated from by subsequent national legislation (see 
M. Cartabia and J.H.H. Weiler, id. at 129. See also R. Bin and G. Pitruzzella, 
Diritto Pubblico, 5th Edition, Giappichelli Ed. 2007, at 348). In Costa the Court 
drew more far-reaching conclusions from the principle formulated in the Van 
Gend en Loos Case. The reasoning of the Court was based on the legal nature of 
the Community, the spirit and the terms of the Treaty demanding its supremacy: 
“[t]he incorporation into the legal order of each Member State of the provision 
of Community law and the letter and spirit of the Treaty in general, have as a 
corollary the impossibility for states to assert against the legal order accepted 
by them, on a reciprocal basis, a subsequent unilateral measure which could 
not be challenged by it […]”. 
Others significant decisions are Defrenne II (case 43/75 [1976] ECR 455), 
Simmenthal (case 106/77 [1978] ECR 629) and Factortame, (case C-213/89, 
1990). There are plenty of decisions containing a statement on the primacy of 
Community law: see also Politi s.a.s. v Ministero delle Finanze (case 43/71: 
1971 ECR 1039, 1973 CMLR 60); Commission of the EC v Italy (case 48/71, 
1972 ECR 529); Denkavit Italiana (case 61/79); Amministrazione delle 
Finanze dello Stato/San Giorgio (case 199/82); Pfeiffer and Others v. 
Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut Ev (cases C-397/01 to C-403/01 
[2005] 1 CMLReport 44, p. 1123); Germany v. Commission (case C-8/88), 
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Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt case311 arising from the conflict 
between the German Cartel law and art. 87 EC, in which the Court 
drawing arguments from the nature of the Community order upheld 
that “by virtue of the respect of the general finality of the Treaty, the 
parallel application of a national system cannot be admitted, unless 
it does not prejudice the uniform application in the whole of the 
Common Market, of Community rules in case of agreements”. 
The immediate impact of supremacy doctrine can be found in many 
other cases, where the Court did not hesitate in commenting upon 
constitutional issues by adopting a monist approach according to 
which Community law operates within the EC system by integrating 
with national laws and prevailing in case of conflict. Such view was 
clearly expressed in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfhur312: 
here, on the question whether an agricultural EC Regulation did 
violate fundamental rights guaranteed by the German Constitution, 
the Court pointed out the validity of the EC provisions by concluding 
that “[…] no provisions of municipal law, of whatever nature they 
may be, may prevail over Community law […] lest it be deprived of 
its character as Community law and its very legal foundations be 
endangered”. 
According to these assertions, the underlying philosophy of the 
theory of supremacy of Community law seems to be the effectiveness 
and the homogeneity of law in the Community legal order: in the 
silence of the texts and in the absence of a written evident supremacy 
ground-rule, the core device in achieving primacy has been a 
                                                                                                                                          
Kühne & Heintz NV v. Productschap Voor Pluimvee en Eieren (case C-453/00: 
[2006] 2 C.M.L.Report 17, p. 483). 
311 Case 14/68, [1969] ECR 1. 
312 Case 11/70, [1972] CMLReport 255. 
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functional interpretation by the ECJ. Supremacy, therefore, reflects 
the need for separating the European Community from the 
international legal order by giving it a sui generis character. 
Theoretically, the jurisprudential path followed by the Court and the 
clear and univocal provisions of art. 10 EC313 seem to be the most 
suitable instruments to guarantee the supremacy of Community law 
and the respect of the European hierarchical law order by the 
Member States, but several conflicts between Community law and 
national legislations have occurred nonetheless, with particular 
reference to the problem of competences allocation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
313 “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from 
any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this 
Treaty.” 
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3.2 EC Exclusive competences 
 
Within the EC legal system, the division of powers into two mutually 
exclusive spheres embodies the dualist federal principle, as the 
central government and States governments are allowed to operate 
independently within two mutually exclusive spheres of 
competences. As we have seen in Chapter 1, the two dominant 
expressions of the federalist principle have emerged within the 
United States legal system, under the names of dual federalism and 
cooperative federalism314: exclusive competences are the distinctive 
feature of the first model, as their “positive side entitles one 
authority to act, while their negative side excludes anybody else from 
acting” 315 autonomously within the same scope or field. 
Although the original Treaties generally conferred legislative 
prerogatives316 upon the EC on the basis of objectives to be attained 
by the Community legal order, successive revisions of the Treaties 
have replaced this method in certain areas by a precise definition of 
the action to be taken by the Community, in some instances together 
with a specific exclusion of competence (method of substantive 
allocation), but the distinction is still not clear cut317. On one side, in 
certain areas the Union’s legislative competence is defined both in 
                                                
314 See supra, par. 1.3. 
315 R. Schütze, Dual federalism constitutionalised: the emergence of exclusive 
competences in the EC legal order, id. at p. 4. 
316 An accurate account of the EC competences’ evolution throughout decades 
can be found in M. Cartabia and J.H.H. Weiler, id. Chapter 4. 
317 For a critique see A. von Bogdandy & J. Bast, The Vertical Order of 
Competences, in A. von Bogdandy, J. Bast (Eds.), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law, p. 335-372, 2006 Hart, Oxford. 
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terms of objectives (functional method318) and subjects (also called 
area fields319); on the other side there are functional competences 
featured by a cross-sectorial character320, as well as functional 
competences in a special policy field321, and even competences in a 
particular field without a specific reference to functional elements322. 
From a global perspective the allocation of competence based on EC 
objectives is difficult to realize, as the finality driven structure of 
competence seems to broaden the scope of a single field323. 
We cannot find a coherent and undisputed system of competence 
neither in academic writings nor in the ECJ case-law. The EC Treaty 
contains indeed no explicit reference to the concept of exclusivity, as 
                                                
318 The subsidiarity principle typically embodies such approach: cf. M. Cartabia 
& J.H.H. Weiler, id. at 99. See infra, par. 3.3. 
319 In 1992 the Commission tried to define a set of criteria for the individuation 
of EC exclusive competences: according to its view, exclusivity is generally 
featured by a functional element (being the Community the only entity entitled 
to act so as to fulfil specific tasks and objectives) and by a material element 
(being Member States unable to act unilaterally within the same field of 
interest). Such views are expressed in the Communication from the Commission 
to the Council and the European Parliament on the subsidiarity principle of 27 
October 1992 (EC Bulletin 10-1992, p. 116). 
320 See Articles 88, 94, 95, 308 EC, which are also the most problematic ones. 
321 See Art. 37 EC (dedicated to the establishment of a common agricultural 
policy) and Art. 175 EC (dedicated to the adoption of measures for the 
establishment of the environmental Community policy). 
322 Especially in the institutional area: see Articles 194 par. 4 and 255 EC. 
323 See H.D. Jarass, Die Kompetenzverteilung zwischen der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft und den Mitgliedstaaten, in Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 121 
(1996), p. 180. On the contrary I. Pernice holds that the finality structure tends 
somehow to limit the EC field of competence, if compared with the lists of area 
fields (see Kompetenzabgrenzung im Europäischen Verfassungsverbund, in 
Juristenzeitung, 2000, p. 866). A deeper analysis is provided by C. Trüe, who 
clarifies that EC objectives may limit area fields but may also extend competences 
as the objectives stated by Art. 3 EC potentially cover all fields (cf. Das System 
der Rechtsetzungskompetenzen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und der 
Europäischen Union, Baden-Baden, p. 398). According to von Bogdandy and 
Bast, “the derivation of competences from general goals […] does not respect 
the principle of conferral” (id. at 342). 
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the only textual distinction can be inferred from Art. 5 par. 2324 EC, 
which on one side provides a distinction between exclusive and non-
exclusive EC powers325 while on the other side introduces the 
abovementioned functional approach326 by the means of the 
subsidiarity principle327. The indirect recognition of areas “fall[ing] 
within [EC] exclusive competence” can be found also in Article 
43(d) EU, confining the mechanism of enhanced cooperation to those 
                                                
324 “In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community 
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in 
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community”. 
325 The ECJ usually only distinguishes between exclusive and parallel 
competences, where the latter includes all those which are not covered by the 
exclusive competences (see Bogdandy & Bast, Art. 5 EGV, in Grabitz, 
Eberhard/Meinhard Hilf (Eds.), Das Recht der Europäischen Union, 
Kommentar, München 2005). According to M. Horspool and M. Humphreys 
“Article 5 EC implicitly distinguishes between exclusive and concurrent 
competence. […] The EC cannot share the exercise of [exclusive] powers with 
the Member States. But while the powers defined an exclusive competence by the 
Treaty are to be exercised by the EC from their entry into force, the exercise of 
its concurrent powers is postponed and made subject to compliance with certain 
conditions. [Meanwhile,] the Member States will retain the right to legislate, and 
will lose that right only when the EC decides to exercise its power in the area in 
question” (cf. id. at 95) 
326 Art. 43(d) TEU has also impliedly affirmed such distinction by stating that 
the Enhanced Cooperation between Member States “[…] does not concern the 
areas which fall within the exclusive competence of the Community”. 
Furthermore, according to some EC Treaty provisions introduced by the 
Maastricht Treaty or by the Single European Act Member States and the 
Community share the same concurrent competence: Art. 177 states that 
“Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation […] shall be 
complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States”; Art. 164 adopts 
the same approach in connection to the area of Research and Technological 
Development. Additionally, according to Art. 176 “[t]he protective measures 
adopted pursuant to Article 175 [concerning Environmental Protection] shall 
not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent 
protective measures […]”. 
327 This central provision must be placed alongside Article 7(1) EC, which 
requires that each institution must act within the limits of the powers conferred 
upon it by the Treaty. See infra, par. 3.3. 
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policy areas that do “not concern the areas which fall within the 
exclusive competence of the Community”. 
Exclusivity is generally understood as a constitutional exclusivity or 
an “a priori exclusivity”328, including “powers which have been 
definitely and irreversibly forfeited by the Member States by reason 
of their straightforward transfer to the Community. […] Where the 
Community has exclusive competence, this means that any action by 
a Member States in the same field is a priori in conflict with the 
Treaty”329. 
In a large number of cases the European Court of Justice attempted to 
state the core principles governing the competence allocation system 
between Community and Member States, hence the original idea of 
exclusive powers pertaining to the EC was essentially a judicial 
creation. Apart from the spectrum of naturally exclusive implied 
organisational powers typical of an international organisation330, all 
EC competences appeared to be shared with the Member States, 
having the EC Treaty not grouped them into classes of exclusive, 
shared or complementary competences. 
                                                
328 A. Dashwood, The Relationship between the Member States and the 
European Union/European Community, 41 CMLRev. 355 (2004) at p. 369. 
329 K. Lenaerts and P. van Nuffel, Constitutional Law of the European Union 
(Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005), at p. 5-22. A much softer definition of 
exclusivity is provided by P. Koutrakos, claiming that “instead of seeking to 
exclude Member States” the idea of exclusivity only “serves to highlight the 
essential role of the emerging policy for the achievement of the main objectives 
of the EC Treaty” (P. Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law, Haw 2006, 
p. 21). 
330 Such as the power of the EC institutions to determine their internal 
organization under Articles 210 and 283 EC (see case 6/60, Humblet v. Belgian 
State [1960] ECR 559). However, some moderation on the exclusive nature of 
organisational powers occurs, for example in relation to the European 
Parliament, whose election are governed by common principles and each 
Member State still retains the power to decide on the form of these elections in 
its territory. 
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In order to ascribe a specific field of competence to the EC, the 
Court frequently recalled the ideas of source and nature of the 
competence at issue331. For what it concerns the first concept, 
according to the ECJ the allocation of powers within the EC legal 
system is based on a theory of attributed competences, as it is always 
necessary to identify in the Treaty a specific legal base authorizing 
action before Community legislation is constitutionally valid. As 
said, the only textual distinction between different kinds of 
legislative competences can be inferred from art. 5 EC: the absence 
of an adequate legal base in the Treaty means that the Community is 
entirely not competent to act: any act there adopted is therefore 
susceptible to annulment, as an invalid trespass on to areas of 
national competence. This is in theory the competence attributed to 
the Community, but in practice the principles of Community law 
exert a remarkably wide influence332 even in other fields not 
                                                
331 Such concepts were expressly recalled by the Court in Opinion 2/91 of 13 
March 1993, Convention no. 170 of the International Labour Organization 
concerning safety in the use of chemicals at work, 1993 [ECR I-1061]; Opinion 
1/75 of 11 November 1975 (Understanding on a Local Cost Standard) [ECR I-
1355]; Opinion 1/03 of 7 February 2006 [ECR I-01145]. See also joined cases 
3,4,6/76 (Cornelis Kramer and others) of 14 July 1976 [ECR I-1279]. The ECJ 
took the chance to clarify its reasoning on the idea of source in relation to the 
attribution of external action to the EC: cf. Opinion 1/94 (Competence of the 
Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the 
protection of intellectual property), [ECR I-5267]; Opinion 2/92 (Competence 
of the Community or one of its institutions to participate in the Third Revised 
Decision of the OECD on national treatment) of 24 March 1995 [ECR I-521]. 
332 Such influence is embodied by the fact that in many areas the Community is 
able to make Regulations as well as to issue Directives, thus effectively 
defining the allocation of competences (see art. 37(2), 40(1), 83(1) EC) 
between EC and Member States. Secondly, EC institutions are generally 
entitled to adopt all necessary measures to attain Community objectives: 
subsequently EC competences somehow define themselves by the means of 
their effective enforcement. Thirdly, a large number of EC competences is 
construed in a teleological way: art. 308 EC embodies such nature of the EC 
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expressly included into EC competences, remarkably being the areas 
where the Community is arguably without competence few and far 
between. The corollary of the incremental growth in the 
Community’s sphere of influence is that areas where the Member 
States are able to claim that they hold exclusive competence – 
untouched by Community membership – are rather less extensive 
than it might be expected. 
Exclusive powers are those authorizing only the Community – and 
not the Member States – to act333: subsidiarity does not apply here 
and any intervention by the Member States is in principle excluded. 
A first consideration for establishing exclusivity is to induce the 
Community to decide on legislative action rather than the Member 
States: with regard to certain policy matters (see infra) the Member 
States possess no autonomous legislative powers, as the Community 
is the only legitimated legislative entity. A second consideration for 
establishing exclusivity (applying to fields where Member States 
originally had a concurrent power) is the prevention of States’ 
intervention which could affect Community legislation: the so-called 
pre-emption theory requires that whenever the EC has adopted 
                                                                                                                                          
legal order by granting Community institutions the power to take appropriate 
measures in order to attain one of the objectives of the Community. 
333 According to M. Horspool & M. Humphreys, European Union Law, at 95, 
exclusive Community competence may be derived from: 
a. express provisions in the primary legislation (e.g. the common 
agricultural policy and the common commercial policy). 
b. the scope of internal measures adopted by the Community institutions: at 
internal level within the Community this is described as pre-emption (see 
infra Ch. 4); at the external level it leads to exclusive external 
competence for the Community. 
c. express provisions in internal Community measures; and 
d. situations where internal powers can only be effectively exercised at the 
same time as external powers (see case 22/70 Commission v. Council 
(ERTA) [1971] ECR 263, 275: see infra, footnote 398). 
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common rules which are of such a nature to entail a transfer or 
power, modifications of these rules can only be decided by the 
Community itself, being Member States unable to act unilaterally in 
order to modify such rules. 
Nothing in the Treaty provides an explicit list of the areas in which 
the Community is originally and exclusively competent: this mirrors 
the absence of any list of areas in which the Member States are 
exclusively competent. Especially during the 1970’s the Court gave 
express indications of EC exclusive competences by pointing out 
some specific fields, but it has in recent years been clearly more 
reluctant to expand these spheres of competence. 
First of all, the European Community enjoys exclusive competence in 
relation to the common commercial policy334 and common customs 
tariff335 areas: the 1957 Treaty of Rome gave the Community the 
central task of “establishing a common market and [of] 
progressively approximating the economic policies of Member 
States”336, through the “elimination, as between Member States, of 
customs duties” and “the establishment of a common customs tariff 
                                                
334 See Opinion 1/75, Understanding on a Local Costs Standard ([1975] ECR 
1361, 1976, 1 CMLReview 85) where the Court made it clear that the 
Community’s competence is exclusive, and not concurrent, by stating that 
“[t]his conception [in Article 113] is incompatible with the freedom to which 
the Member States could lay claim by invoking a concurrent power, so as to 
ensure that their own interests were separately satisfied in external relations, 
at the risk of compromising the effective defence of the common interests of the 
Community”. See also cases 21-24/72, International Fruit [1972] ECR 1219, 
par. 14-16, where the Court stated that “[t]he Community has assumed the 
functions inherent in the tariff and trade policy, progressively during the 
transitional period and in their entirety on the expiry of that period, by virtue 
of Articles 111 and 113 of the Treaty”. 
335 See case C-125/94, Aprile srl v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, 
[1995] ECR I-2919. 
336 Art. 2 EEC. 
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and of a common commercial policy toward third countries”337. 
According to the current version of art. 131 EC, by establishing a 
customs union between themselves the Member States aim to 
contribute in to the harmonious development of world trade, the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the 
lowering of customs barriers. Article 132 induces the Member States 
to progressively harmonise their national systems of aid for export to 
third countries so as to ensure that competition between undertakings 
in the Community is not distorted. The core provision of the common 
commercial policy, however, is art. 133(1) EC, according to which: 
  
“The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform 
principles, particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, 
the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the 
achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation, 
export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to 
be taken in the event of dumping or subsidies”. 
 
The common commercial policy exclusivity first emerged in relation 
to the customs union with the Social Fonds voor de 
Diamantarbeiders case338, where the ECJ pointed out that 
subsequently to the introduction of the common customs tariff “[…] 
all Member States are prohibited from introducing, on a unilateral 
basis, any new changes or from raising the level of those already in 
                                                
337 Art. 3(a) and (b) EEC. 
338 Joined cases 37 and 38/73, Social Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. NV 
Indiamex et Association de fait De Belder [1973] ECR 1609. 
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force”339. The constitutional justification of exclusive EC 
competences fully emerged in Opinion 1/75340, where the Court took 
the chance to clarify the scope and nature of Community powers 
arising under art. 133 EC and characterised such competences as 
exclusive treaty-making powers, whose exclusiveness was necessary 
as so to ensure the harmonious operation of the institutional 
framework of the EC. Any unilateral action on the part of the 
Member States is thus prohibited in order to eliminate any potential 
distortion or risk of compromising the effective defence of the EC 
common interests. Accordingly, Member States are supposed to fulfil 
the solidarity obligation arising from art. 10341 EC, so as not to put in 
danger the strict uniformity set by the Community. The total 
exclusion of any concurrent power on the part of the Member States 
both in the internal and the external sphere announced the arrival of 
constitutional exclusivity in the EC legal order, and such 
announcement was later supported in Donckerwolcke342, where the 
court held that “full responsibility in the matter of commercial policy 
was transferred to the Community by means of [art. 133(1)]”, with 
the consequence that “measures of commercial policy of a national 
                                                
339 Id. at par. 15-18. 
340 See supra, footnote 331. 
341“Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain from 
any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this 
Treaty”. 
342 Case 41/76, Suzanne Criel, née Donckerwolcke and Henri Schou v. 
Procureur de la République au tribunal de grande instance de Lille and 
Director General of Customs [1976] ECR 1921. 
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character are only permissible after the end of the transitional 
period by virtue of specific authorization by the Community”343. 
Hence the Court tried to define the nature of exclusive competences 
by stating that when the EC takes measures (in whatever form) 
establishing common rules to implement a common policy envisaged 
by the EC Treaty, Member States are no longer entitled to contract 
obligations that affect those rules or alter their scope with non-
Member States: in a series of landmark cases the Court stated that the 
EC enjoys an exclusive external competence to sign international 
agreements when it has acted on the related internal plane344. With a 
series of similar decisions applied to several different context, the 
ECJ stated the so-called implied powers doctrine345, according to 
which the EC is allowed to enjoy all those powers having functional 
utility to the effective attainment of its objectives346, even if such 
powers have not been expressly conferred or mentioned by primary 
legislation. 
                                                
343 Id. at 32. See also case 174/84 Bulk Oil v. Sun International Trading, where 
the Court held that “measures of commercial policy of a national character are 
only permissible after the end of the transitional period by virtue of specific 
authorization by the Community” [1986] ECR 559. See also case 131/73 
Grosoli [1973] ECR 1555. 
344 On the exclusive nature of EC competences see for example Opinion 1/76 of 
26 April 1977 (Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for 
inland waterway vessels), [1977] ECR 741.  
345 Cf. case 22/70 Commission v. Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263, concerning 
the implied powers theory and the external relations field (See infra, par. 3.4). 
346 See for example the so-called Open Skies litigation, which started with a 
series of eight judgments on 5 November 2002 in which the Court found eight 
Member States in violation of Community law for concluding bilateral 
agreements with the US in the field of air transport. The latest case (C-523/04) 
saw the Commission seeking a similar ruling against the Netherlands, alleging 
that it had infringed the EC Treaty by concluding and applying Air Service 
Agreements with the US since the mid-1940s: see infra, par. 3.4. 
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The Court gradually adopted an extensive interpretation of the 
concept of common commercial policy347, by stating that the 
competence of Community is exclusive whether or not it has been 
exercised: accordingly, national action is precluded not because the 
rules of EC law apply and prevail over conflicting national measures, 
but instead because – even though no EC rules have been adopted – 
the national action is simply impermissible. Such phenomenon 
identifies EC pre-emption, which seems thus to logically precede 
supremacy by exerting its exclusionary effect of national powers 
even in the absence of an enforced EC measure in the field 
concerned348. 
Another field featured by exclusive EC competence is the 
conservation of biological resources of the sea and marine fisheries 
area: here the exclusiveness did not flow directly from Treaty 
provisions, as it arose indeed as a consequence of the Act of 
Accession of 1972349. Since the exclusivity in this field was 
independent of prior EC legislative action, it can be considered 
original and of a constitutional nature. 
In order to accommodate the prominent economical interests of 
Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom, art. 102 of the 1972 
Accession Act confirmed Community shared competences and 
obliged EC institutions to exercise their prerogatives in respect of 
marine fisheries before a specific deadline, in order to ensure the 
                                                
347 See for example Opinion 1/78 on Natural Rubber Agreement [1979] ECR 
2871, 2910, 2912-13. 
348 See more specifically infra, Ch. 4, dedicated to a detailed analysis of pre-
emption within the EC context. 
349 Cf. case 804/79, Commission v. United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1072, 1982 
CMLReview 543. See also J. Temple Lang, The ERTA judgment and the 
Court’s case-law on competence and conflict, Yearbook of European Law 
(1986) 6, p. 183-218; G. Gaja, Introduzione al diritto comunitario, id. at 94. 
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protection of the fishing ground and conservation of the biological 
resources of the sea. In other words, by the means of a transitional 
provision EC institutions were supposed to exercise their 
competences before a specific deadline, after which fishing 
conservation measures were supposed to be part of the common 
agricultural policy, within the sphere of shared powers. The striking 
change from shared to exclusive EC powers started with Kramer350, 
where the Court developed the doctrine of parallel external powers 
and found an implied external power of the Community to enter into 
the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention: according to the Court 
reasoning, the Member States’ authority in the area at issue was only 
of a transitional nature, therefore expiring at the end of the 
transitional period set by art. 102 of the 1972 Act of Accession. The 
Court did not refer to the idea of exclusive powers, neither in the 
external nor in the internal sphere: it only recalled the transitional 
nature of Member States’ authority in engaging international 
agreements in the concerned field. The reason for the exclusion of 
Member States was thus the future legislative pre-emption of the 
Member States “since the Council must by then have adopted, in 
accordance with the obligation imposed on it by Article 102 of the 
Act of Accession, measures for the conservation of the resources of 
the sea”351. In a series of subsequent cases against the United 
Kingdom, the Court confirmed that since the expiration of the 
transitional period laid down by the Act of Accession, power to adopt 
– as part of the common fisheries policy – measures relating to the 
conservation of the resources of the sea belonged fully and 
                                                
350 Joined cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Cornelis Kramer [1976] ECR 1279. 
351 Id. at 41. 
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definitively to the Community: because uniform rules were needed, 
the power at issue could not be concurrent or shared, and the transfer 
of powers to the Community could not in any case restore to the 
Member States the freedom to act unilaterally in this field352. 
As a matter of fact the deadline set by art. 102 elapsed, and the 
Community legislature had been inoperative because of British 
obstinacy: the United Kingdom had vetoed all EC legislative 
measures, and the Commission brought the State before the Court353. 
Here the ECJ formally declared the constitutional exclusivity of this 
policy area by pointing out to the expiry if the deadline and held that 
“Member States are therefore no longer entitled to exercise any 
power of their own in the matter of conservation measures in the 
waters under their jurisdiction. The adoption of such measures, with 
the restriction which they imply as regards fishing activities, is a 
matter, as from that date, of Community law”354. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
352 See case 801/79, Commission v. United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045. 
353 Id. 
354 Id. at 18. 
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3.3 EC non-exclusive competences and the subsidiarity principle 
 
According to the largest number of commentators, EC competences 
can be generally divided into two categories: exclusive and non-
exclusive competences355. The latter category is widely identified 
also as concurrent, i.e. inclusive of legislative fields on which both 
Community and Member States are entitled to enact legal provisions 
on the basis of the application of the so-called subsidiarity principle. 
Within the power-sharing context, the relationship between the 
different levels of government is subject to a number of 
constitutional principles aimed at coordinating the co-existence of 
two sources of autonomous legislative powers: here “Member States 
retain a concurrent power to regulate matters falling within the 
                                                
355 Within the field of non-exclusive competences, several sub-categories have 
been identified: there are concurrent competences (occurring where “Member 
States may legislate until such time and insofar as the Union has not 
legislated”); parallel competences (where “the Union and the Member States 
may both exercise their competences alongside one another”: for example, this 
situation occurs where “the Union is allowed to set minimum standards”); 
complementary competences (where the Union is allowed “to act in areas 
where [it] confines itself to supplementing or supporting the action of the 
Member States, or to adopting measures of encouragement or coordination”), 
and negative competences (where “the Treaties expressly exclude Union 
competence or expressly recognise the competence of Member States, [or] 
where the Treaty forbids the Union/Community to legislate, or, lastly, areas not 
referred to in the Treaty and therefore, as a result of the principle of allocation 
of powers, not within the competence of EU/EC”): cf. A. van Aaken, Political 
Economy of Federal Pre-emption: A View from Europe, in R.A. Epstein, M.S. 
Greve (ed.), Federal Preemption: States’ Powers, National Interests, AEI 
Press, 2007. See also A. von Bogdandy, J. Bast, I poteri dell’Unione: una 
questione di competenza. L’ordine verticale delle competenze e proposte per la 
sua riforma, in Rivista Italiana di Diritto Pubblico Comparato, 2002, p. 303. 
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reach of the Community’s power, as long as in so doing they do not 
create a conflict with the rules adopted by the Community”356. 
While the abovementioned categorization does not clearly define the 
allocation of competences between the Community and its Member 
States, it postulates that the EC, in addition to its exclusive set of 
powers, maintains an additional area of powers which rests within 
the broad frame of Community goals: the subsidiarity principle 
clarifies thus the limitation of existing non-exclusive powers, being it 
“aimed at stopping the flow of centralisation the dynamic of 
integration had imposed on the material division of powers between 
the Community and the Member States”357. 
The inspiring ratio of the subdiarity principle generally lies in the 
protection of primary values such as self-determination and 
individual freedom: in the EC context, it represents a defensive 
device aimed at protecting Member States from the uncontrolled 
concentration of competences within the EC system. On one hand, 
the positive implications arising from the subsidiarity principle lead 
to an effective obligation for the EC so as to pursue and realize its 
objectives; on the other hand, we must keep clear in mind that the 
fulfilment of Community objectives generally prevails over 
subsidiarity aims: according to this cohesive/unitary view the 
Community shall adopt all the appropriate and necessary measures to 
attain its objectives, and subsequently an exclusive set of 
competences is granted to the Community in order to ensure the 
                                                
356 Cf. M. Waelbroeck, The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption – 
Consent and Re-delegation, in Sandalow and Stain (eds.), Courts and Free 
Markets, Vol. II, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982. 
357 See A.G. Soares, Pre-emption, Conflicts of Powers and Subsidiarity, 
European Law Review 1998, 23(2), p. 132-145. 
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observance of such principle within the EC legal system; 
furthermore, the subsidiarity principle does not apply to exclusive 
competences, hence being subordinated to the abovementioned 
cohesive approach frequently expressed by pre-emption of Member 
States’ law or, within harmonisation processes, by the imposition of 
minimum standards358. 
In other words, the application of the subsidiarity principle somehow 
counterbalances the pursuit of the common EC interest, realized by 
the full attainment of the objectives described by the Treaties. Such 
objectives represent a sort of common good shared by all the EC 
Members, and their attainment is concretely realized by the means of 
the actions carried out by Community institutions. In consideration 
of the predominant relevance of common EC interests, Member 
States’ room for manoeuvre obviously concerns all those actions not 
involving such interests, as well as those situations where their 
attainment can be obtained through State action. In case of conflict 
between EC interests and Member State interests the formers prevail, 
even if in some cases a State action apparently clashing with the 
attainment of EC interests has been upheld by the ECJ359. 
In EC law, pre-emption and subsidiarity are two concepts mutually 
linked as they both refer to the question on the division of powers 
between the Community and the Member States. Within the EC legal 
system pre-emption is a legal device generally employed in areas of 
                                                
358 See infra, par.  4.3. 
359 See case 302/86, Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, where the Court 
upheld a Danish measure aimed at ensuring a commercial standard actually 
higher than the one uniformly imposed by the EC. According to such principle 
of ‘inverse subsidiarity’, being the Community unable to impose and enforce 
the attainment of a certain objective, it prefers to let Member States aim for it 
when they can assure higher level of quality and attainment. Such 
circumstances may occur in the context of legislative harmonization. 
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concurrent powers, generally producing two ‘reciprocated’ effects: 
on one hand it precludes States’ regulatory powers by expropriating 
national powers, whilst on the other hand it transfers such regulatory 
prerogatives from peripheries to the centre of the Community, 
producing an irreversible damage to Member States’ regulatory 
spheres. 
Historically, the subsidiarity rule finds its roots in the Roman 
Catholic doctrine360, and it is also present in the Constitutions of 
federal States such as the German Grundgesetz, which went so far as 
to distinguish between powers that were permanently concurrent and 
others that were concurrent only until the federal government took 
action of some kind, at which time the matter passed into that 
government’s exclusive domain361. Basically it expresses a 
preference for governance at the most local level, consistent with 
achieving government’s stated purposes. Within the EC legal 
experience, the principle of subsidiarity is not entirely new, as it was 
first expressly introduced in the Treaties through the 1986 Single 
European Act, which modified article 130R362 of the Treaty 
                                                
360 The idea of subsidiarity was first introduced in the Catholic doctrine of 
social philosophy by the encyclical letters of Pope Leo XIII, Immortale Dei of 1 
November 1885 (available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/ 
encyclicals/documents/ ff_e-xiii_enc-0111185_immortale-dei_en.html) and 
Rerum Novarum of 15 May 1891 (St. Paul ed., Boston). The principle of 
subsidiarity was however most distinctly enunciated by Pope Pius XI in his 
encyclical letter Quadragesimo Anno, of 15 May 1931 (St. Paul ed., Boston) 
which states that “[i]t is an injustice, grave evil and disturbance of right order 
for a larger and higher association to arrogate to itself functions which can be 
performed efficiently by smaller and lower societies”. 
However, the differing reach of the Catholic and European principles of 
subsidiarity is underlined in N.W. Barber, The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity, 
European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 3, May 2005, pp. 308-325. 
361 See art. 72 of German Constitution. 
362 Art. 130R was introduced in the EC Treaty by art. 25 of the Single European 
Act. The specific reference to the subsidiarity principle in the environmental 
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Establishing the European Economic Community363; however, the 
interpretation and meaning of such article remained controversial 
among the Member States364. In 1992 the Maastricht Treaty provided 
the explicit adoption of the principle as a general rule of Community 
law365: according to art. 5 EC it only applies to the so-called 
concurrent competences, where the Member States and Community 
share their legislative powers. Here the States retain their right to 
legislate until the Community has acted; once the Community as 
adopted legislative acts in a given area the supremacy rule applies, 
and Member States are subsequently no longer entitled to act: the 
concurrent field of competence dynamically evolves into an 
exclusive field of competence, becoming entirely occupied by the 
EC366. 
                                                                                                                                          
field was then removed by the Maastricht Treaty, which introduced the general 
provision of art. 3B (now art. 5). The subsidiarity principle was also recalled by 
art. 130T and 118A EC Treaty. 
363 In relation to Community actions in the environmental field, the Treaty 
stated that “the Community shall take action […] to the extent to which the 
objectives referred to […] can be attained better at Community level than at the 
level of the individual Member States” (see the EEC Treaty, art. 130R(4), 298 
U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by the Single European Act, 25 I.L.M. 506, 515 
(1986)). 
364 See, e.g., Manfred Zuleeg, Vorbehaltene Kompetenzen der Mitgliedstaated 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebeit des Umweltschutzes, in Neue 
Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrhect, 280 (1987). 
365 With the amendment of the Community Treaties through the Maastricht 
Treaty, art. 130r(4) was abolished, and art. 130r reworded. As a result of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, art 130r was renumbered, becoming art. 174 EC. The 
subsidiarity principle is now expressly recalled by the art. 5, par. 2 EC: “In 
areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so 
far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by 
the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community”. 
366 On the concept of European field pre-emption see infra, par. 4.2.1. 
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Before 1997 the application of the principle was dependant on 
political and thus largely non-binding tendencies367, but after the 
adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty its application found a proper 
juridical basis in the binding Protocol No. 30 on the application of 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality368, which forces the 
Commission to “consult widely before proposing legislation and, 
wherever appropriate, publish consultation documents”369, as well as 
to justify its legislative proposals in the light of the subsidiarity 
ratio. 
Basically, subsidiarity implies a significant degree of autonomy to 
the levels of government closer to the problems involved, and in 
better position to formulate responsive solutions: it “requires that 
the Community refrain from action where the goals of that action 
could be better achieved by the Member States”370, aiming thus at the 
protection of Member States’ prerogatives against undue Community 
interference. In order to evaluate the suitability of EC legislative acts 
two specific tests must be complied with. On one side a negative test 
(also called comparative efficiency test) has to demonstrate whether 
“the objectives of the proposed action” can be “sufficiently achieved 
by the Member States”371; secondly, the Community must evaluate 
whether “by reason of the scale or the effect of the proposed action,” 
its objectives can be “better achieved by the Community”372 (better 
                                                
367 See for example the Interinstitutional Declaration on democracy, 
transparency and subsidiarity of 25 October 1993, (Bulletin of the European 
Communities, No. 10/93. pp. 118-120). 
368 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/. 
369 See art. 9. 
370 See G. Davies, Subsidiarity: the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at the 
wrong time, in CMLReview 43, p. 63-84, 2006. 
371 See art. 5 EC Treaty. 
372 Id. 
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attainment test), so as to demonstrate that Community action should 
be only preferred to Member States action if this will bring proven 
advantages. According to its formulation, the subsidiarity clause is 
only important in relation to powers that are shared between the 
Community and Member States: it does not raise any presumption of 
competence in favour of the Community or the Member States, as it 
only constitutes a general means to distribute or allocate powers 
similar to that of proper federal entities, in which State authority is 
the rule and federal rule the exception373. 
The interpretative function of this rule contributes to the proper 
definition and allocation of competences, even if it is important to 
realize that as a matter of fact the subsidiarity clause’s wording 
neither provides any particular guideline for its application nor gives 
any indication toward its justiciability. 
In order to define the effective application of this rule in 1992 the 
European Council set for itself the task of clarifying how subsidiarity 
would be effectively applied within the European Community 
system: in the Birmingham Declaration of October374 16, 1992, the 
European Council focused on the necessary support of the 
Community by its citizens, and the Member States reaffirmed that 
“decision must be taken as closely as possible to the citizens” and 
stressed that “great unity can be achieved without excessive 
centralization”375. Moreover, the European Council evoked 
subsidiarity legislative function by affirming that the principle was 
                                                
373 See, e.g., U.S. Constitution, art. 1, § 8(3) and Tenth Amendment (see supra, 
footnote 25); see also art. 30 of German Grundgesetz: “Except as otherwise 
provided or permitted by this Basic Law, the exercise of governmental powers 
and the discharge of governmental functions is a matter for the Länder”. 
374 Bulletin of European Communities, No. 10-1992, p. 9. 
375 Id. 
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binding on all of the Community political institutions: it expressed 
more explicit guidelines in its Conclusions of the Edinburgh meeting 
on December 1992376 and made the principle subject to judicial 
review by stating that “[the] interpretation of this principle, as well 
as review of compliance with it by the Community institutions, are 
subject to control by the Court of Justice, as far as matters falling 
within the Treaty establishing the European Community are 
concerned”377. 
Since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty the ECJ was faced 
with a large number of cases involving the enforcement of the 
subsidiarity rule378, even if as a matter of fact there are only few 
cases dealing directly with the annulment of Union law due to art. 5 
EC. Two remarkable cases, in particular, involved the question 
related to the justicial enforcement of the core principle at issue, and 
here the Court took the opportunity to define the extent of such core 
rule: in United Kingdom v. Council379 the UK sought annulment of 
part of directive 93/104 containing minimum requirements for 
                                                
376 Conclusions of the Edinburgh European Council on Transparency 
Declaration (Bulletin of European Communities, No. 12-1992, p.19-21). 
377 Id. 
378 See, e.g. case T-29/92, Vereniging van Samenwerkende Prijsregelende 
Organisaties in de Bouwnijverheid and others v Commission; case C-11/95, 
Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium; case C-89/94, United Kingdom v. Council 
of the European Union; joined cases C-36/97 and C-37/97, Hilmar 
Kellinghusen v. Amt für Land- und Wasserwirtschaft Kiel and Ernst-Detlef 
Ketelsen v. Amt für Land- und Wasserwirtschaft Husum; case C-242/99, J. 
Vogler v. Landwirtschaftliche Alterskasse Schwaben; case C-377/98, Kingdom 
of the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council of the European Union; 
case 91/95P, Roger Tremblay & Others v. Commission; case T-5/93, Roger 
Tremblay & Others v. Commission; case 11/95, Commission v. Kingdom of 
Belgium; case 415/93, Union Royale Belge Des Societes De Football 
Association (ASBL) and Others v. J.M. Bosman. 
379 Case 84/94, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. 
Council, [1996] ECR I-5755. 
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working time, based on art. 137 which allowed for minimum 
harmonization measures, based inter alia on the argument that 
minimum harmonization needs to be interpreted in the light of the 
subsidiarity principle. Here the ECJ clearly stated the scope of its 
review, by pointing out that “[…] it is not the function of the Court 
to review the expediency of measures adopted by the legislature. The 
review exercised must be […] limited to the legality of the disputed 
measure”380: the ECJ thereby narrowed down the practical 
significance of the principle to obvious violations and manifest 
error381. 
Case C-233/94382 was the first case that addressed the question of 
whether EC legislation should be annulled due to an alleged violation 
of the principle of subsidiarity: the case dealt with minimum 
harmonization measures concerning deposit guarantee-scheme, as 
German challenged Community directive 94/19 (on the establishment 
of a European wide market on financial services) arguing that there 
had been a breach of the obligation to show sufficient grounds under 
art. 235383 (ex art. 190) EC. The German government asserted that the 
Community institutions must give detailed reasons to explain why 
only the Community, to the exclusion of the Member States, is 
empowered to act in the concerned field. Moreover, it held that the 
                                                
380 Id. at par. 23. 
381 The subsidiarity principle is also recalled in case 114/01, AvestaPolarit 
Chrome Oy; case 202/01, Commission v. Republic of France; case 229/00, 
Commission v. Republic of Finland. 
382 Federal Republic of Germany v. EP and Council, [1997] ECR I-2405. 
383 “Regulations, directives and decisions adopted jointly by the European 
Parliament and the Council, and such acts adopted by the Council or the 
Commission, shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to 
any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant to this 
Treaty”. 
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concerned directive neither indicated in what respect the objectives 
could not have been effectively met by action at Member State level, 
nor showed grounds justifying the need for Community action. The 
ECJ rejected all arguments made by the German government, by 
ruling that although Community institutions do not expressly refer to 
the principle of subsidiarity, they comply with the general obligation 
to give reasons if they duly explain in the legislative act at issue why 
they consider that their action is in conformity with that principle, by 
stating that, because of its dimensions, their action can be best 
achieved at Community level and cannot be achieved sufficiently by 
the Member States384. 
At present, the enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon – signed by the 
EU countries on 13 December 2007 – could entail a significant 
changes for the application of the subsidiarity principle within the 
European legal system: according to Article 5 of the amended TEU 
“in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either 
                                                
384 The general restraint in interpreting the principle of subsidiarity or in 
establishing additional justiciable standards clearly emerges from the Court’s 
ruling: on one hand the Court has refused to set measures allowing a more 
specific interpretation of the requirement to show sufficient ground with regard 
to the principle itself, on the other hand it clearly has not determined the legal 
value of the Conclusions expressed by the European Council in Edinburgh, by 
keeping on interpreting the subsidiarity principle in a rather formal and 
cautious way. Obviously, the debate over the justiciability of the rule at issue 
involves the capacity of a jurisdictional organ to decide on the legitimacy of 
Community acts: in 1990 the ECJ somehow favoured the express justiciability 
of the principle at issue by confirming that even if its effective content is 
frequently defined and influenced by political factors arising from the wide 
freedom of action granted to EC institutions, it is however entitled to defend its 
application by ruling on those cases where manifest violations of the principle 
have occurred (See the Communication of 20 December 1990 to the 
Intergovernative Conference on European Union). 
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at central level or at regional and local level”. Furthermore, “Union 
action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of 
the Treaties”: in other words, the Reform Treaty tries to re-formulate 
both the subsidiarity and proportionality principles; moreover, a 
detailed description of their application is provided by a Protocol to 
be annexed to the Treaties. 
According to the 2007 Reform Treaty the subsidiarity principle keeps 
its central relevance in the EC system385. The Lisbon Treaty clearly 
tries to emulate somehow the cooperative mechanism already set by 
the 2004 Constitutional Treaty386 by granting national parliaments the 
                                                
385 For the first time sub-state governance levels are directly recalled by the new 
wording of the Treaty: “in areas which do not fall within its exclusive 
competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at 
central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level” (see 
art. 5 TEU). Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty recalls the proportionality 
principle by stating that “the content and form of Union action shall not exceed 
what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties”. The new 
formulations expand thus on such principles, setting out in considerable detail 
what effects arise from their enforcement (see infra); the Reform Treaty also 
sets guidelines for judging whether they have been observed, laying down 
procedural requirements. Basically The Lisbon Treaty rewrites TEC Protocol 
no. 30, dedicated to the application of such principles, and deletes everything 
except the procedural requirements that however are considerably extended. 
Commission consultation is to “take into account the regional and local 
dimension”, and justification is to cover proportionality as well as subsidiarity, 
and is to include financial and regulatory impact assessment. Cf. the reports on 
the enforcement of subsidiarity within the Lisbon Reform Treaty, provided by 
the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments 
of the European Union (COSAC) in November 2007 (Testing the subsidiarity 
check mechanism of the Lisbon Treaty: The Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism) and July 2008 (Aide-mémoire for the subsidiarity check under the 
Treaty of Lisbon on the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on 
Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of 
Religion or Belief, Disability, Age or Sexual Orientation), both available at 
http://www.cosac.eu. 
386 See the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality annexed to the Draft Treaty, stating that every legislative 
proposal had to be evaluated by national parliaments through a reasoned 
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power to police the principle of subsidiarity: national assemblies are 
supposed to “ensure compliance with the principle of subsidiarity” 
in accordance with the Protocol on the application of the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality (new art. 5 TEU). Accordingly, 
“national Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of 
the Union” in certain specified ways (new art. 12 TEU). Basically 
the Lisbon Treaty rewrites the current TEC Protocol No. 30 on the 
application of the abovementioned principles, setting out in 
considerable detail what effect they do and do not have, and also 
giving guidelines for judging whether they have been observed387. 
                                                                                                                                          
opinion (art. 6), potentially leading to a general reconsideration of the proposal 
at issue. On the basis of the evaluation provided by its Parliament, every 
Member States was then able to start an early warning mechanism by directly 
invoking the ECJ. 
387 A remarkable change is provided by the introduction of two new procedures, 
known as the “yellow and orange cards”, two procedures which could actually 
embody a significant step forward for the democratic life of the EU, by 
favouring the capacity of national parliaments to co-operate with one another: 
national parliaments would thus be granted the right to express concerns on 
subsidiarity directly to the institution which initiated the proposed legislation. 
The first procedure (yellow card mechanism) covers proposal not just from the 
Commission, but also from other EU institution with powers of initiative: 
within eight weeks from “the date of transmission of a draft legislative act in 
the official languages of the Union”, any parliament or chamber may submit “a 
reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question does not 
comply with the principle of subsidiarity”. A voting system then applies, with 
two votes for each national parliament (in a bicameral parliament each chamber 
has one vote, and they may be operated independently). If at least one third of 
available votes are cast against a proposal in this way, the institution which 
made it must review it (For proposals on judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters and police cooperation, the threshold is one quarter of votes); following 
review, the institution which proposed the draft legislative act may maintain, 
amend or withdraw it, by giving reasons for its decision. The “orange card” 
mechanism applies only to the ordinary legislative initiative carried out by the 
Commission: it involves a higher threshold and more stringent consequences. If 
a majority of available votes are cast against a proposal, the Commission must 
review it: if the proposal is maintained, reasons must be given. Before the end 
of first reading, the European Parliament and the Council must consider the 
proposal against the subsidiarity principle, in the light of the reasoning offered 
by national parliaments and by the Commission. If the Council, by a majority of 
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3.4 The implied powers doctrine 
 
Where competences are distributed over different entities, it is 
always necessary to set up a framework of rules clearly showing 
which institution has the competence to do what. As we have seen, in 
federal countries the horizontal distribution of prerogatives is based 
on a system of checks and balance where no level of government is 
allowed to determine competences of other levels on a unilateral 
basis: constitutional rules are thus set in order to define the precise 
allocation of competences and to describe the abovementioned 
system of checks and balances. A proper and express enumeration of 
powers does exist also in the quasi-federal system of the European 
Community even if obviously an international organization cannot 
function properly if its institutions have to adhere to the principle of 
attributed powers very strictly. Being the European integration a 
                                                                                                                                          
55%, or the Parliament, by majority of the votes cast, find against the proposal, 
it falls. The effective employ of such “subsidiarity objection” could surely 
improve the enforcement of such EC law principle, as the current general 
restraint in interpreting the principle of subsidiarity or in establishing 
additional justiciable standards clearly emerges from the Court’s interpretative 
point of view: the Court has generally refused to set measures allowing a more 
specific interpretation of the requirement to show sufficient ground with regard 
to the principle itself, by keeping on interpreting the subsidiarity principle in a 
rather formal and cautious way. Obviously, the debate over the justiciability of 
the rule at issue involves the capacity of a jurisdictional organ to decide on the 
legitimacy of Community acts: throughout the 1990’s the ECJ somehow 
favoured the express justiciability of the principle at issue by confirming that 
even if its effective content is frequently defined and influenced by political 
factors arising from the wide freedom of action granted to EC institutions, it is 
however entitled to defend its application by ruling on those cases where 
manifest violations of the principle have occurred. Granting national 
parliaments a direct role in the assessment of whether the objectives of a 
particular measures can be sufficiently achieved by Member States or by the EC 
either at central level or local level would be particularly important, as such 
mechanism could ensure a better compliance with the effective enforcement of 
the principle at issue in legislative procedures, on the same basis as other 
general principles of EU law. 
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dynamic process, any attempt to crystallize powers and competences 
would lead to the complete paralysis of the system, which would be 
thus unable to provide for all possible future contingencies. Under 
such circumstances, implied powers have thus the function of 
providing the required flexibility, behaving as “dynamic and living 
creatures, in constant development, whose founding fathers can 
never completely envisage the future”388. Any attempt to ‘solidify’ 
powers and competences in a fixed and immutable manner would 
lead to a stifling of the process of European integration, which would 
thus be deprived of the suitable degree of dynamism, and unable to 
deal with the issues of an ever-changing society. Subsequently, the 
drafters of the Treaty tried on one hand outline the general principles 
governing the division of powers between EC institutions and 
between the Community and its Member States, and on the other 
hand to set up a specific procedure aimed at solving possible future 
competence conflicts389. 
According to the general framework set up by the Treaties, the 
European Community enjoys the enumerated specifically conferred 
by the Treaties, as art. 3 EC provides a concise summary of the 
powers granted under the Treaty – while all residual powers are left 
with the Member States – and art. 2 describes the general purposes of 
the Community for which those powers are given, while the ultimate 
goals are stated in the Preamble. According to art. 5 (ex art. 3b) EC 
                                                
388 J. Klabbers, An introduction to International Institutional Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, p. 66. 
389 See art. 230, 232, 300 EC Treaty, which allow EC institutions and Member 
States to bring action before the ECJ “on grounds of lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this 
Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers” 
(art. 230). 
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the Community is supposed to act only within the limits of the 
powers and of the objectives identified by the Treaty: the Community 
only possesses the powers expressly conferred on it, which are 
limited in scope; according to this general assertion, the Court has 
interpreted the requirements stated by art. 253 EC by pointing out 
that every regulatory/legislative act enacted by the Community “[…] 
shall state the reasons on which [it is] based”, implying that 
Community institutions are always supposed to state the legal basis 
of the act at issue390. Just like in the U.S. federal system central 
authorities have been granted limited powers, and the judicial system 
has played an important role in defining them: within the EC the 
European Court of Justice has extensively recognised and developed 
a proper theory of implied powers, which can be compared and 
linked to the active interpretation and enforcement of the Necessary 
and Proper clause of the U.S. Constitution391, according to which the 
American Government not only has the powers that are expressly 
conferred on it by the Constitution, but also the necessary powers to 
exercise these ones and the powers necessary to reach the objectives 
of the federal government. 
Even where the required specific legal base for legislative action is 
lacking, the Court has been employing of the idea of implied powers 
so as to extend the reach of EC competence. The Court delivered one 
of the clearest formulations of the implied powers doctrine was in 
joined cases 281/85, 283-285/85 and 287/85392, where the ruling 
                                                
390 See case 158/80, Rewe Handelsgesellschaft Nord Mbh v. hauptzollamt Kiel, 
[1981] ECR 1805. 
391 See supra, Ch. 1. 
392 Germany, France, Netherlands, Denmark and United Kingdom v. 
Commission, [1987] ECR 3203. Cf. also D. Chalmers, European Union Law, 
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concerned the implications of extensive implied powers granted to 
the Commission, rather than the European Community in general. 
Art. 118 of the Treaty of Rome gave the Commission the task of 
promoting close co-operation between Member States in the social 
field, but omitted any reference to the relevant legislative power: in 
the cases at issue the Court pointed out that the conferral of a 
specific task carried with it an implication of conferral of powers 
regarded as indispensable in order to carry out that task. Here the 
ECJ employed a language clearly resembling the wording chosen by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland393: this kind of 
approach embodies the so-called wide formulation of the implied 
powers theory, according to which the powers at issue may flow from 
the interpretation of a legal basis expressly provided for in relation to 
its objectives. In this case, the recognition of implied powers stems 
from a teleological approach, being the powers at issue related to a 
given objective or function implying the existence of any necessary 
power to attain it. This approach was originally developed in 
Kramer394 and in Opinion 1/76, where the Court held that “whenever 
Community law has created for the institutions of the Community 
powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a 
specific objective, the Community has authority to enter into the 
international commitments necessary for the attainment of that 
objective even in the absence of an express provision in that 
                                                                                                                                          
Vol. 1 – Law and EU Government, Biddles Ltd. Dartmouth Ashgate Great 
Britain 1998, at 208. 
393 The ECJ stated that “[…] it must be accepted that if that provision [art. 
118] is not to be rendered wholly ineffective it confers on the Commission 
necessarily and per se the powers which are indispensable in order to carry out 
that task” (see cases 281 and 283-285, 287/85, Germany, France, Netherlands, 
Denmark and United Kingdom v. Commission [1987] ECR 3203). 
394 See supra, note 349. 
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connexion”395. On the contrary, the so-called narrow formulation is a 
bit more flexible, as it assumes that implied powers are powers 
without which the expressly attributed powers would be rendered 
useless, or “without which they could not be reasonably and 
effectively applied”396. 
The field of EC external relation has been an especially remarkable 
area for the Court’s assertion of the abovementioned wide approach. 
Being the Community based on a principle of attributed powers, any 
external Community legal activity needs a specific legal basis 
granting the power at issue397: such attribution can be made expressly 
by Treaty provisions, or it can be implied from these provisions or 
from secondary internal legislation adopted pursuant to these 
provisions. For what it concerns the source of an implied external 
power, the Court has constantly held that whenever Community law 
has granted to EC institutions internal power aimed at attaining a 
certain objective, the Community has the authority to enter into 
international agreements necessary for the attainment of that 
objective. One of the most relevant statement in this field results 
from case 22/70 Commission v. Council, concerning the European 
Road Transport Agreement (ERTA)398. Prior to the effective 
                                                
395 Opinion 1/76, Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for 
inland waterway vessels, [1977] ECR 741, par. 3. See also infra, footnote 403. 
396 See case 8/55 of 29 November 1956: Fédération Charbonnière de Belgique 
v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. 
397 See Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Communities to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom [1996] ECR I-1759. 
398 Cf. J.A. Winter, Annotation on Case 22/70, Re ERTA, in CMLRev. 1971, p. 
550-556; N.A. Neuwahl, Joint Partecipation in International Treaties and the 
exercise of Powers by the EEC and its Member States: Mixed Agreements, in 
CMLRev. 28, p. 717-740, 1991; D.S. Collinson, The Foreign Relations Powers 
of the European Communities: A Comment on Commission v. Council, in 
Stanford Law Review, 23 (1971) pp. 956-972. 
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conclusion of the treaty between Member States and third countries, 
the Commission asked for its annulment arguing that the Community 
had to have the exclusive competence to conclude treaties with third 
countries where it had already legislated extensively internally; the 
Court was thus asked by the Commission to rule that the Community 
alone had the power to negotiate the agreement at issue. 
In its judgment the Court somehow toned down the principle of 
attributed powers by establishing that the power of the EC to enter 
into agreements with third countries and international organizations 
was not confined to the cases specifically provided for in the Treaty 
(i.e. tariff and trade agreements ex art. 133 EC and association 
agreement ex art. 310 EC): indeed the Court held that even if the 
Treaty did not expressly confer such power on the EC, its internal 
authority to set a common policy in the field of transport carried with 
it treaty power in that field, and that a regulation previously adopted 
by the Council on the same subject covering internal transport 
“necessarily vested in the Community power to enter into any 
agreement with third countries relating to the subject-matter 
governed by that regulation to the exclusion of any concurrent 
powers of the Member States”399. 
According to the ECJ’s teleological view, implied powers may thus 
stem from the overall Community system, as a narrow enumerated 
powers approach could be inappropriate. In its view “regard must be 
had to the whole scheme of the Treaty no less than to its substantive 
provisions”: the existence of Community external affairs competence 
arose “[…] not only from an express conferment by the Treaty […] 
but may equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from 
                                                
399 Case 22/70, ERTA, [1971] ECR 263, 275, 276. 
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measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, by the 
Community institutions”400. The ERTA case set thus the foundations 
for potentially very broad external competences of the EC, as the 
Court deduced from the international legal personality of the 
Community – as laid down in art. 281 EC – that it enjoys the 
capacity to establish contractual links with third countries over the 
whole filed of objectives defined in Part One of the Treaty. The 
Court stressed that granting the Community implied external powers 
in the same area where common rules have been internally adopted 
aims at ensuring the uniform and consistent application of the 
Community rules and the proper functioning of the system which 
they establish in order to preserve the full effectiveness of 
Community law. 
The analysis provided by the Court highlights thus two different 
aspects of the implied external EC powers matter: first of all the 
Court has dealt with the proper implied powers question raised by the 
Commission, trying to justify such constitutional doctrine by 
describing implied powers as additional devices aimed at ensuring 
the uniform application of Community rules401 and thus at effectively 
developing the activities listed in art. 3 EC. On the other hand – and 
that is why such theory seems to be closely connected to the pre-
emption issue – the Court has taken the opportunity to introduce the 
question of exclusivity of implied external powers, i.e. whether this 
competence excludes any autonomous legislative intervention by 
Member States in the external field. According to the largest part of 
                                                
400 Id., par. 15 and 16. 
401 See S. Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1995, at 55. 
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the doctrine402, implied external powers can be exclusive in two 
different ways: 
a) an unconditional and a priori  exclusivity may arise in situations 
where no prior EC internal legislation exists. According to Opinion 
1/76, whenever EC institutions are empowered to take internal 
measures, they also enjoy the relative exclusive external competence: 
it does not depend on the effective prior adoption of internal 
measures, but exists whenever the internal power exists. The EC 
power to enter into an international agreement flows by implication 
from the provisions of the Treaty creating the internal power, 
“insofar as the participation of the Community in the international 
agreement is […] necessary for the attainment of one of the 
objectives of the Community”403: here the attribution of concurrent 
competence Member States this might create distortions within the 
EC system404;  
b) a second type of exclusivity arises only where internal measures 
have been adopted by the Community, as in the ERTA case: such 
                                                
402 Cf. M. Waelbroeck, id. at 568; R. Holdgaard, The European Community’s 
Implied External Powers after the Open Skies Cases, in European Foreign 
Affairs Review 8, p. 365-394, 2003. 
403 Opinion 1/76, id. par. 4. As the Court stressed in Opinion 1/03 of 7 february 
2006 (Competence of the Community to conclude the new Lugano Convention 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, [2006] ECR I-01145), when such an implied competence 
exists in relation to the conclusion of an international agreement, the 
Community may act alone, without the intervention of Member States, as it 
does when it adopts internal measures on the basis of concurrent competence. 
See infra. 
404 Such exclusivity would be necessary in order to defend the Community 
interests on the internal level. According to Opinion 1/75 (see supra, footnote 
331) in the common commercial policy field the EC exclusive competence is 
necessary because “any unilateral action on the part of the Member States 
would lead to disparities in the conditions for the grant of export credits, 
calculated to distort competition between undertakings of the various Member 
States in external markets”. 
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rules could be affected by autonomous external Member States 
actions405, therefore exclusive implied external powers arise and such 
exclusivity aims at preserving the effectiveness of the existing 
Community acquis406, being the Community alone capable to 
“assume and carry out contractual obligations toward third 
countries affecting the whole sphere of application of the Community 
legal system”407. 
The principle on implied external competences were later confirmed 
by the Court in the so-called Open Skies cases, which started with a 
series of eight judgments on 5 November 2002 – in which the Court 
found eight Member States in violation of Community law for 
concluding bilateral agreements with the US in the field of air 
transport408 – and came to an end with case C-523/04 of 24 April 
                                                
405 Under such circumstances the existence of a Community competence 
“excludes the possibility of a concurrent competence of the Member States, 
since any initiative outside of the framework of the common institutions would 
be incompatible with the unity of the Common Market and the uniform 
application of Community law” (case 22/70 ERTA at 76). In Opinion 2/91 
(Convention No 170 of the International Labour Convention concerning the 
Safety in the Use of Chemicals at Work, [1993] ECR I-1061, at par. 11) the 
Court explained that this kind of exclusivity applies in all areas corresponding 
to EC objectives, since “the objectives of the Treaty would also be 
compromised if Member States were able to enter into international 
commitments containing rules capable of affecting rules already adopted in 
areas falling outside common policies or of altering their scope”. 
406 In connection to this second type of exclusivity the ECJ referred also to the 
obligation of loyal cooperation arising from art. 10 EC (see case 22/70 at par. 
21-22). 
407 Cf. case 22/70, par. 17-18. 
408 The 2002 judgments (C-466/98, C-467/98, C-468/98, C-469/98, C-471/98, 
C-472/98, C-475/98 and C-476/98) saw the UK, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Germany censured by the Court for 
negotiating, applying and/or keeping in force certain international air transport 
commitments with the US (a ‘third country’), thereby failing to fulfil 
obligations under Article 10 and 43 EC and under Council Regulations 2409/92 
and 2299/89, on fares and rates on air services and on a code of conduct for 
computerised reservation systems. 
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2007409. The key feature of the Open Skies judgments was the Court’s 
acceptance of the Commission’s argument that aviation Agreements 
concluded between the Member States and the US were incompatible 
with the Community’s exclusive competence in the area, in light of 
Community legislation on airport services and transport adopted in 
1991 and the internal market it established. Before the ECJ, the 
Commission claimed that the Community legislation adopted had 
established an internal market in the sector at issue, and thus the 
agreements concluded between these Member States and the U.S. 
were incompatible with the Community’s exclusive competence in 
the area. The judgments definitively confirmed the pre-emptive 
assumption under which the EC has exclusive external competence 
where it has already adopted internal provisions laying down 
common rules, whatever form these might take. By impliedly 
referring to the concept of field pre-emption, the Court recalled all 
those situations where the Community has complete and exclusive 
policy-making competence and the Member States are not only 
precluded from doing any act contrary to Community law (in light of 
the doctrine of supremacy), but are pre-empted from taking any 
action at all: in this sense, Member States are prevented from 
introducing measures even in the absence of (or before the adoption 
of) a specific Community rule. It means that the Court does not even 
investigate any eventual material normative conflict, but simply 
excludes Member States’ action in the fields embraced by the EC’s 
                                                
409 The latest case saw the Commission seeking a similar ruling against the 
Netherlands, alleging that it had infringed the EC Treaty by concluding and 
applying Air Service Agreements – also known as ‘Bermuda’ Agreements – 
with the U.S. since the mid-1940s (cf. D. Borghetti, Il Caso Open Skies, in 
Quaderni Costituzionali 3/2007 at p. 659). 
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exclusive competence: once a Community common policy has been 
initiated, the Community competence pre-empts Member States’ 
competence410. 
The question concerning the division between the Community and 
the Member States of the competence to conclude a given agreement 
with non-Member States was further examined by the European 
Court of Justice in Opinion 1/03411: the request for an Opinion was 
made by the Council who asked whether the conclusion of the 
Convention at issue fell entirely within the sphere of exclusive 
competence of the Community or within the sphere of shared 
competence of the Community and the Member States412. 
                                                
410 Remarkably, the Open Skies judgements provided also a fresh interpretation 
of the principles governing exclusivity, somehow moving away from the rigid 
demarcation described in the ERTA case. For instance, in case C-467/98, 
Commission v. Denmark, (see par. 79 and 111) the Court explained the purpose 
of ERTA exclusivity arguing that it arises if an international commitment falls 
within the scope of Community rules or at least within an area largely covered 
by EC rules. Such flexible test allows comparing the scope and intensity of the 
EC regulatory system, on one hand, with the scope and intensity of the 
international commitment at issue, on the other hand. 
411 Opinion 1/03 of 7 February 2006, Competence of the Community to 
Conclude the New Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (see supra, 
footnote 403). 
412 According to art. 293 EC (ex art. 220) Member States shall enter into 
negotiations with each other in order to secure the simplification of formalities 
governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or 
tribunals and of arbitration awards. Pursuant to this, in 1968 Member States 
concluded a Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (the so-called Brussels Convention). In 1988 the 
EFTA countries and the EC concluded the Lugano Convention, which instituted 
a system similar to that of the Brussels Convention between the parties of that 
Convention and the EFTA countries. In 1997 the Council started a revision 
process of both the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, and adopted Regulation 
44/2001: this act replaced the Brussels Convention and applies between the 
Member States. With regard to the Lugano Convention, in 2002 the Council 
authorised the Commission to begin negotiations aimed at establishing a new 
agreement which would align its substantive provisions with the provisions of 
Regulation 44/2001. 
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According to the reasoning of the Court, the purpose of the internal 
legislative act enacted by the Community (Regulation No. 44/2001) 
was to establish a general scheme for jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments applicable in the Community in civil 
and commercial matters, in order to remove obstacle to the 
functioning of the internal market which may stem from disparities 
between national legislation on the subject: given the unified and 
coherent system on rules of jurisdiction which Regulation 44/2001 
provided for, any international agreement also establishing a unified 
system of rules on conflict of jurisdiction was potentially capable of 
affecting Community law413.  
In its reasoning the Court recalled and upheld the principles 
previously expressed in the ERTA case and in Opinion 1/76, by 
stating that “the competence of the Community to conclude 
international agreements may arise not only from an express 
conferment by the Treaty but may equally flow implicitly from other 
provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the 
framework of those provisions, by the Community institutions”414, 
and that “whenever Community law created for those institutions 
powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a 
specific objective, the Community had authority to undertake 
international commitments necessary for the attainment of that 
objective even in the absence of an express provision to that 
effect”415. Moreover, the Court recalled Opinion 2/91 by stating that 
that principle also applies where rules have been adopted in areas 
                                                
413 See also case C-281/02, Owusu of 1 March 2005. 
414 See the ERTA case, par. 16. 
415 See Opinion 1/76, par. 3, and Opinion 2/91, par. 7. 
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falling outside common policies and, in particular, in areas where 
there are harmonising measures; additionally, an explicit reference 
was made to art. 10 EC, requiring Member States to facilitate the 
achievement of the Community’s tasks and to abstain from any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of 
the Treaty416. 
According to the Court, it is not necessary that the areas covered by 
the agreements and the internal Community legislation “coincide 
fully”: where the quantitative test417 is to be applied, “the assessment 
must be based not only on the scope of the rules in question but also 
on their nature and content.  It is also necessary to take into account 
not only the current state of Community law […] but also its future 
development”418. This comprehensive and detailed analysis must be 
carried out in order to ensure that the “agreement is not capable of 
undermining the uniform and consistent application of the 
Community rules and the proper functioning of the system which they 
establish”419. Being the purpose of the new Lugano Convention the 
same of Regulation 44/2001, in the view of the Court its provisions 
implement the same system as that of the internal EC act at issue, in 
particular by using the same rules of jurisdiction which ensures 
consistency between the two legal instruments and thus ensures that 
the Convention does not affect the Community rules. The Court 
found thus that the new Lugano Convention “would affect the 
uniform and consistent application of Community rules”420 
                                                
416 See Opinion 1/03, par. 119, and Opinion 2/91, par. 10. 
417 See Opinion 2/91, par. 25 and 26. 
418 See Opinion 1/03, par. 126. 
419 See Opinion 1/03, par. 133. 
420 See Opinion 1/03, par. 172. 
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concluding that it fell entirely within the sphere of the exclusive 
competence of the Community. In other words, according to the ECJ 
Member States lose competence to adopt national measures or to 
enter into international agreements when such acts are liable to affect 
or somehow alter the scope of existing Community rules: in theory, 
Member States could thus be allowed to adopt measures in an area 
regulated by the EC, provided that those national measures do not 
interfere with Community rules. Hence, the issue is not so much 
about whether there occurs an effective conflict between a national 
measures and Community rules, but rather whether such national acts 
are liable to interfere in any way with the attainment of the 
objectives pursued by the EC. 
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3.5 Article 308 EC: the Necessary and Proper clause of Europe 
 
The basic consequence arising from an extensive use of the implied 
powers doctrine is generally represented by the fact that, pursuant to 
this interpretative device, the EC enjoys an enlargement of its 
legislative powers. However, it must be stressed that such implied 
growth should not be identified with a proper extension of 
prerogatives or competences, as long as implied powers relate only to 
those areas where – on the basis of an express conferral granted by 
the fundamental Treaties – the Community is already entitled and 
legitimated to act421. On the contrary, a proper expansion of EC 
legislative competences may be based on art. 308 (formerly art. 235) 
EC, whose formulation clearly resembles the necessary and proper 
clause included in art. 1, section 8, of the U.S. Constitution422. 
According to the EC flexibility clause, 
 
“If action by the Community should prove necessary to 
attain, in the course of the operation of the common market, 
one of the objectives of the Community, and this Treaty has 
not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, 
acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament, take the 
appropriate measures”. 
                                                
421 From this point of view, implied powers can be seen as additional devices 
aimed at ensuring the EC the effective attainment of its objectives: cf. M. 
Cartabia and J.H.H. Weiler, L’Italia in Europa, id. at 112. 
422 According to the last paragraph of section 8, “[the Congress shall have 
Power to] make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof” (see supra, Chapter 1, footnote 31). 
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At first sight, art. 308 EC only seems to be a codification of the 
implied powers theory, but its effective application through decades 
proved this restrictive viewing to be wrong. As already pointed out, 
while implied powers are to be referred to existing EC prerogatives 
(leading thus to a simple enlargement of existing competences), 
actions adopted ex art. 308 EC are to be referred to areas where no 
other powers are available to Community institutions (leading to a 
proper expansion of EC competences). Even if recourse to the 
flexibility clause should be conceived as residual423, it must be kept 
clear in mind that in order to promote an action pursuant to art. 308 
Community institutions have to deem the action at issue necessary 
for the attainment of one of the Community’s objectives. Here, the 
concept of ‘necessity’ has generally relied on a high degree of 
legislative and administrative discretion granted to the decision-
making organs, given the circumstances under which the wording of 
art. 308 does not provide any further indication on the nature of such 
‘necessity’424. As a matter of fact, the only textual limit to the 
application of art. 308 EC is embodied by the required unanimity 
vote within the Council. 
                                                
423 And subsequently legitimated only a) in presence of EC legal order’s gaps 
which need to be filled; b) in the absence of EC necessary powers and more 
specific Treaty’s provisions. 
424 The ‘subsidiarity’ nature of art. 308 EC is embodied by the fact that EC 
actions adopted under its invocation must however comply with the 
proportionality principle: cf. R. Schütze, Organized Change towards an ‘Even 
Closer Union’: Article 308 EC and the Limits to the Community’s Legislative 
Competence, id. at p. 95 et seq. Some commentators tried to define the effective 
limits of this provision, through an extensive analysis of its pre-required 
conditions: see P. Mengozzi, Il diritto della Comunità europea, Cedam, Padova 
1990, p. 69; Istituzioni di diritto comunitario e dell’Unione europea, Cedam, 
Padova 2003, p. 96-97. 
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For what it concerns the use of art. 308 EC, in accordance with the 
conferral principle425 it cannot be employed to expand EC 
competences beyond the Treaties’ explicit limits (arising on one hand 
from the explicit enumeration of EC institutions’ competences; on 
the other hand from the generic list of EC objectives which gives 
birth to the functional definition of competences) through the 
identification of new objectives. The general uncertainty and 
inexactness of meaning of the chosen wording, together with the 
ambiguous nature of the objectives pursued by the Community, 
rendered art. 308’s operating criteria indeterminate, and without any 
univocal conceptual limit. 
Until the 1972 Paris Summit, art. 308 EC was rarely used being thus 
the residual legislative power restrictively interpreted by the 
Community organs426. After 1973 the picture changed dramatically, 
as EC institutions started adopting a creative interpretation of the 
provision at issue relying on its open wording. Until the adoption of 
the 1986 Single European Act, art. 308 became one of the most 
employed legal bases in the Community system of competences: 
basically, art. 308 operative criteria allowed deriving new 
competences from existing EC objectives, leading to a violation of 
the enumeration principle on which the whole Community system of 
competences was supposed to be founded. The creative and 
expansive interpretation of art. 308 led to its almost unconditional 
                                                
425 Art. 5, par. 1, EC. 
426 Cf. M. Cartabia and J.H.H. Weiler, L’Italia in Europa, id.; R. Schütze, 
Organized Change towards an ‘Even Closer Union’: Article 308 EC and the 
Limits to the Community’s Legislative Competence, Yearbook of European 
Law, 2003, at footnote 24. 
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invocation in a large number of sectors427, confirming the assumption 
under which, potentially, every material field of action could have 
been included in Community competences or intertwined to EC core 
objectives. 
After that period, the number of measures adopted ex art. 308 
decreased remarkably and its effective extent became more and more 
related to the subsidiarity principle. A large number of EC 
competences which, up to that moment, had been based on the 
flexibility clause, were later provided with a proper legal basis 
specifically included in the Treaty; moreover, the adoption of the 
qualified majority vote in a large number of sectors – coupled with 
the adoption of art. 100A (now art. 95) EC dedicated to harmonizing 
measures – further smoothed the way for European integration, 
providing a valid alternative to the burdensome unanimity vote 
procedure required by art. 308 EC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
427 Id. 
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Chapter 4: Pre-emption in Europe 
 
Within the exercise of its constitutional and integrative function the 
European Court of Justice has been trying to formulate and develop a 
doctrine aimed at clarifying and defining under which circumstances 
“Member State law will be invalidated on the basis of its conflict 
with the legislation of the Community institution”428. Such attempt, 
however, has always been made impliedly by avoiding any direct 
reference to the express notion of pre-emption or to the taxonomic 
classification provided by the U.S. Supreme Court429. 
As I have already pointed out, apart from one pioneering study430 and 
from a small number of essays and papers actually trying to apply the 
U.S. pre-emption classification to the EC legal experience, such topic 
still remains “one of the most obscure areas of Community law”431 
even if it embodies the core essence of European federalism, together 
with the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect. Pre-emption plays 
a crucial role in shaping the EC competences asset and in defining 
the relationships occurring between the EC legal system and national 
legal orders, as it determines the way in which EC law and national 
provisions are connected within the same policy area. Being 
legislation an embodiment of political choices expressing 
                                                
428 See E.D. Cross, Pre-emption of Member State law in the European Economic 
Community: a Framework for Analysis, 29 CMLRew 1992, at 447. 
429 Cf. R. Schütze, Supremacy without Pre-emption? The Very Slowly Emergent 
Doctrine of Community Pre-emption, 43 CMLRev 2006, at footnote 41. 
430 M. Waelbroeck, The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption – 
Consent and Re-delegation, in Sandalow and Stain (eds.), Courts and Free 
Markets, Vol. II, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982 
431 Cf. M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe and J.H.H. Weiler (Eds.), Integration 
Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience – A General 
Introduction, in Cappelletti et al. (op. cit.), Vol. 1, Book 1, 1986, at 32. 
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compromises between various diverging values, in a quasi-federal 
order such as the European one pre-emption features the constant 
tension occurring between the different levels of government. As we 
have seen in Chapter 3, the EC legal system is featured by the 
presence of a large number of elements which play a relevant role in 
the allocation of competences matter: Member States’ and 
Community’s competences often overlap in many policy fields, being 
thus powers divided and mixed in a dynamic manner. 
In the framework of relations between national legal orders and the 
European one, pre-emption covers situations where the application of 
laws enacted by the by the EC precludes the corresponding 
regulatory powers of Member States. Apart from the general 
reluctance adopted by the ECJ in explicitly using the word ‘pre-
emption’ and in referring to a proper taxonomy, the abovementioned 
under-theorisation of pre-emption ought to be related to the fact that 
such mechanism has often been envisaged as a device concerning 
exclusively the analysis of conflict between Member States law and 
Treaty provisions, rather than including all instances of actual and 
potential conflict between Member States law and Community 
legislation. 
As a matter of fact, pre-emption matters have generally been 
associated with the supremacy principle, i.e. an all-embracing 
formula judicially established by the ECJ in a purposely-
comprehensive manner with a view to provide a foundation to the 
European constitutionalization process. As we have seen in Chapter 
3, such core rule states the general superior hierarchical status of EC 
legal order over national ones. Contrariwise, in my opinion pre-
emption deals with the actual degree to which national law is 
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displaced by EC legislation whereas conflicts between EC legislation 
and Member State law occur. Therefore, within the European context 
the notion of pre-emption should thus be linked to the resolution of 
conflicts of powers: in other words it should be given a proper 
conceptual autonomy, and be conceived as an analysis of competing 
legislation aimed at providing the exact location of the delicate 
demarcation line of material powers between EC and Member States. 
The formal identification of pre-emption standards and a proper 
analysis of such phenomenon would thus allow a clear identification 
of the effective exercise to which States may submit matters when 
they retain overlapping powers with the Community. 
Within the European quasi-federal experience, the general tendency 
to assimilate pre-emption to the supremacy principle has led to the 
gradual disappearance of the distinction between conflicts of rules 
and conflicts of powers432; moreover, an unconditional application of 
primacy to the resolution of conflicts of power has bent out of all 
recognitions the conceptual independence of the pre-emption 
phenomenon, by favouring the swift of national powers over to the 
Community. The needs for a clearer analytical distinction between 
the two doctrines and for the subsequent introduction of a proper pre-
emption framework were explicitly expressed in 1977 by Baumann: 
once stated the primacy of Community law over national legislations, 
the matter is “determining the scope of application of disposition of 
                                                
432 Cf. A.G. Soares, Pre-emption, Conflicts of Powers and Subsidiarity, 23(2) 
European Law Review 1998, at 133.  
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Community law with a view to deciding if in a given situation a 
conflict between Community law and national law has arisen”433. 
In other words, in order to provide a suitable analysis of the 
European pre-emption phenomenon it would be necessary to set up a 
proper and autonomous framework able to define the circumstances 
in which Member State law are invalidated on the basis of the 
conflict with the legislation of the Community institutions, so as to 
define in advance which areas are pre-empted and under what 
conditions, and also whether powers in such areas are concurrent or 
exclusive434. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
433 Cf. P. Baumann, Common organizations of the market and national laws, in 
C.M.L.Review, 14, 1977, at p 303. See also M. Waelbroeck: “The problem of 
pre-emption consists in determining whether there exists a conflict between a 
national measure and a rule of Community law. The problem of primacy 
concerns the manner in which such conflict, if it is found to exist, will be 
resolved” (in The Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption – Consent and 
Re-delegation, in Sandalow and Stain (eds.), Courts and Free Markets, Vol. II, 
at 551). 
434 A clear example of the conceptual haziness covering the pre-emption 
doctrine is provided by A. van Aaken: according to the Author, “[…] within the 
primary exclusive competences of the Union, pre-emption problems do not 
occur as the Member States are explicitly and ex ante excluded from legislating 
in the field”. According to the view expressed above, in the primary law field 
there is no need and no chance for pre-emption to occur, being the supremacy 
principle the legal basis granting EC laws the higher hierarchic position in the 
European legal system (see Political Economy of Federal Pre-emption: A View 
from Europe, at footnote 164). 
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4.1 Express pre-emption 
 
According to a coherent pre-emption paradigm, clearly separated 
from supremacy issues and from the exclusive nature of EC 
competences, such mechanism should be understood as an analysis 
aimed at defining the effects that the coverage of a certain legal 
space by the Community will have on related Member States’ 
legislation. 
Within the context of U.S. American federalism, Congress is 
generally required to “manifest its intention clearly”435. However, 
Congress does not always manifest its intention by explicitly by the 
means of a specific pre-emption clause: rather, the Supreme Court 
may seek to find its intent by referring to the pervasiveness of the 
federal scheme436, the need for uniformity437 or the danger of conflict 
between the enforcement of State laws and the administration of 
                                                
435 See New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublin, 413 U.S. 405, 413 
(1973), quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-03 (1952). See also 
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978): “This Court 
is generally reluctant to infer pre-emption […]”; Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 
U.S. 572, 581 (1979), where the Supreme Court showed reluctance in finding 
that a State law dealing with family and family property law was pre-empted, 
unless it caused “major damage” to “clear and substantial” federal interests. 
According to the Supreme Court, mere conflict in the words of two statutes 
does not imply federal pre-emption. 
436 See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980), where 
State taxes as applied to commerce by non-Indians on an Indian reservation pre-
empted by pervasive federal regulation. 
437 See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977), where the Supreme 
Court held that States may not enact food labelling requirements which do not 
permit “reasonable weight variations” when the federal law allows such 
reasonable variations in accuracy due to moisture loss during distribution 
because the State law conflicts with the goal of the federal law to facilitate 
value compensation (cf. supra, footnote 235). 
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federal programmes438. As we have seen, express pre-emption would 
occur where Congress has clearly and unambiguously declared its 
intention to preclude State regulations of a described sort in a given 
area, although in a large number of cases Congress omitted to 
expressly articulate its pre-emptive intent towards State laws by 
employing instead forms of implied pre-emption. 
In the same way, express pre-emption represents the simplest form of 
national law displacement stemming from the adoption of 
Community measures. According to a thorough article dedicated to 
the taxonomy of European pre-emption439, express pre-emption 
would occur where Community legislation includes explicit 
prohibitions on the Member States to enact in a particular field, or 
where it expressly requires that Community regulation of an area is 
exclusive or exhaustive. Generally though, EC secondary legislation 
is not very direct on the issue of its pre-emptive effect: rather, it may 
contain provisions framed in terms of affirmative obligations for the 
Member States. 
In order to enforce a legislative act with a view to impose a common 
standard throughout the whole Community territory, the European 
legislator frequently employs pre-emption clauses, which facilitate 
the explicit and univocal expression of the act’s pre-emptive extent 
toward national legislations440. Such clauses assist the Court of 
                                                
438 See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505-510 (1956), where the 
Supreme Court held that the enforcement of State sedition acts presented 
serious danger of conflict with administration of the federal program because 
sporadic local prosecutions could obstruct federal undercover operations and 
enforcement plans. 
439 Cf. E.D. Cross, Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European 
Economic Community: a Framework for Analysis, 29 CMLRev 1992, at p. 458. 
440 According to Cross, pre-emption clauses are generally “[…] framed in terms 
of affirmative obligations to the Member States”. Furthermore, “[…] the lack of 
 181 
Justice in resolving pre-emption issues by often taking the form of 
free movement clauses, expressly preventing Member States from 
taking more restrictive measure on a matter, if that matter fulfils the 
requirements stated by the EC act at issue441. 
Remarkably, in the Ratti landmark case442 the ECJ evaluated free 
movement clauses’ extent by pointing out that such propositions do 
not have any independent value, being “no more than the necessary 
complement of the substantive provisions [of the EC legislative act at 
issue]”443. Hence, such provisions should be simply regarded as 
confirming and supporting the pre-emptive effect of the considered 
act, since their application is entirely dependent on the latter’s 
substantive scope. Similar conclusions may be drawn from case 
                                                                                                                                          
clearly expressed pre-emption clauses in Community legislation may be due to 
the politically sensitive nature of the pre-emption issue. Since an express 
limitation or restriction on the legislative competence of the Member States can 
be perceived as a further infringement on “national sovereignty”, Community 
legislation is probably much easier to adopt if it simply focuses on the goals 
being sought rather than the reallocation of legislative competence to the 
Community away from the Member States” (id. at footnote 28). 
441 A clear example of free movement clause can be found in Council Directive 
91/157/EEC on batteries and accumulators containing certain dangerous 
substances, as amended by Commission Directive 98/101/EC adapting to 
technical progress Directive 91/157/EEC (Battery Directive): according to art. 
9, “Member States may not impede, prohibit or restrict the marketing of 
batteries and accumulators covered by this Directive and conforming to the 
provisions laid down herein”; another example can be found in Directive 
89/622, harmonising national laws governing the size of health warning labels 
which must be printed on cigarette packets: according to art. 8(1), “Member 
States may not, for reason of labelling, prohibit or restrict the sale of products 
which comply with this Directive”. See also Community Regulation No. 
2771/75, providing that eggs and egg packaging shall not bear any indications 
other than those provided for in the regulation (cf. case 130/85, Wulro, [1986] 
ECR 2035. 
442 Case 148/78 (Criminal Proceedings against Tullio Ratti, [1979] ECR 1629). 
This case is generally linked to the occupation of the field pre-emption 
standard: see infra, footnote 465. 
443 Id. at par. 13. 
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60/86, Commission v. United Kingdom (Dim-Dip)444, where the 
Commission maintained that by virtue of the free movement clause 
included in the debated Directive “[…] it is not possible to prohibit 
the use of a motor vehicle on grounds connected with the installation 
of lighting and light-signalling devices if such devices are installed 
in the vehicle in question in accordance with the requirements set out 
in Annex I to the directive”445. 
Therefore, free movement clauses do not constitute an actual 
prerequisite for express pre-emption, being on the contrary 
legislative devices just facilitating its application446 by the means of 
their univocal formulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
444 Case 60/86, Commission v. United Kingdom, [1988] ECR 3921 (see infra, 
par. 4.2.2). 
445 Par. 6 of the judgment. 
446 According to the Court’s reasoning in the Ratti case, “[…] it is a 
consequence of the system introduced by Directive No. 73/173 that a Member 
State may not introduce into its national legislation conditions which are more 
restrictive than those laid down in the directive in question, or which are even 
more detailed or in any event different […]” (id. at par. 27). 
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4.2 Implied pre-emption 
 
If we try to analyse the European Court’s jurisprudence on pre-
emption through the lens of the U.S. American constitutionalism, we 
are immediately faced with the main difference occurring between 
American pre-emption and its European corresponding phenomenon. 
Such dissimilarity lies in the fact that whilst the former legal system 
may include actual instances of express preclusion of State 
regulatory powers447, the European legislator is generally reluctant to 
clearly define the pre-emptive extent of EC laws. 
Subsequently, while American pre-emption may be either express 
(thus featured by a proper pre-emption clause defining the extent of 
the federal act, by stating that no State or other regulatory authorities 
may impose any additional requirements or prohibition) and implied 
(in the forms of occupation of the field and obstacle pre-emption448), 
when we speak about European pre-emption we mainly refer to the 
second form of pre-emption, i.e. the preclusion of national regulatory 
powers resulting from a decision adopted by the European Court of 
Justice, concerning the interpretation of an EC secondary act and its 
extent or influence on the corresponding area of competence (being it 
an exclusive or concurrent/shared field). 
In its case-law the ECJ has frequently been faced with questions 
concerning the interpretation of provisions lacking explicit guidance 
on the pre-emption issue. From this point of view, European implied 
                                                
447 Arising from the fact that on some occasions the U.S. legislator adopts 
specific and unambiguous pre-emption clauses: cf. supra, par. 2.1.1. 
448 See supra, par. 2.1.2. 
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pre-emption might be analysed by referring to the classificatory 
taxonomy developed by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
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4.2.1 Field pre-emption 
 
Apart from the abovementioned assimilation with supremacy 
questions, the conceptual independence of European pre-emption has 
long been threatened by the nature of the involved competence field, 
having the ECJ frequently supported a rigid conceptualist-federalist 
approach449. Under such view, the concept of European pre-emption 
refers uniquely to those areas involving an exclusive EC 
competence450. Hence, the idea of pre-emption has frequently been 
identified only with the most comprehensive type of pre-emption, 
namely occupation of field pre-emption451. 
According to this paradigm, the exercise of Community powers 
through the adoption of exhaustive secondary legislation causes the 
total removal of State regulatory jurisdiction in the concerned fields. 
Field pre-emption refers thus to all those sectors where “[t]he 
Community [acquired] exclusive competence”, to the effect that 
“State powers are ‘pre-empted’ and the Community has ‘occupied 
the field’”452. Therefore, pre-emption merely becomes “[…] a 
question of determining competence. National action is precluded not 
                                                
449 M. Waelbroeck was the first author introducing such approach (cf. The 
Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption – Consent and Re-delegation, id. 
at p. 551). The author in question also described the opposite pragmatic 
approach, according to which “[…] Member States retain a concurrent power 
to regulate matters falling within the reach of the Community’s power, as long 
as in so doing they do not create conflict with the rules adopted by the 
Community”. 
450 The various criteria and approaches adopted by the ECJ in its case law 
dealing with pre-emption issues will be describe in detail infra. 
451 On the concept of field pre-emption see supra, par. 2.1.2.1.  
452 S. Weatherill, Law and Integration in the European Union (Clarendon Press, 
1995), at p. 136-137; Beyond Preemption? Shared Competence and 
Constitutional Change in the European Community, in O’Keeffe and Twomey 
(Eds.), Legal Issues of the Maastricht Treaty, (Wiley Chancery Law, 1994), at 
p. 14. 
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because the rules of Community law apply in the field and prevail in 
the event of conflict with national provisions, but instead where, even 
though there are no Community rules with which national rules can 
come into conflict, the national action is impermissible. Pre-emption 
in this sense logically precedes supremacy”453. 
In my opinion, if we assimilate the idea of pre-emption with the sole 
occupation of the field standard, it would only occur where the whole 
policy area has become fully occupied by the EC, even if no specific 
Community measure has been enacted. Pre-emption would feature all 
those situations where Member State law is excluded in principle, 
being thus inapplicable in a large number if cases, namely those 
where the policy field at issue is subject to dual regulation by both 
the Member States and the Community. Under this view pre-emption 
relates only to the cases where there occurs a conflict between 
Member State law and Treaty provisions establishing exclusive EC 
competence, even if it should be conceived as a means to analyse the 
Member State law in light of the relevant Community legislation 
field454. 
                                                
453 Id. To the same extent, J.H.H Weiler expressly associated the doctrine of 
pre-emption with a form of exclusive competence (see Il sistema comunitario 
europeo: struttura giuridica e processo politico, il Mulino 1985, at p. 61). See 
also F. Jacobs and K. Karst: “[…] the idea [of pre-emption] will be treated as 
going beyond the principle of the primacy of Community law over Member State 
law; it will be taken to refer to cases where the Member States are precluded 
from legislating, not because legislation would conflict with Community law, 
but because the competence in question is an exclusively Community 
competence” (The ‘Federal’ Legal Order: The U.S.A. and Europe Compared – 
A Judicial Perspective, in Integration Through Law, Book 1, p. 237). 
454 According to E.D. Cross, a proper pre-emption framework would exclude 
conflicts between Member States law and Treaty provisions, so as to avoid 
decisions of a constitutional nature: “[t]he explanation for this preference is 
that a judicial decision based upon an interpretation of Community legislation 
is safer than basing it upon an interpretation of a Treaty rule because mistakes 
in the latter case are more encompassing and more difficult to repair” (see 
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A comparison between the U.S. federal experience and the European 
legal scenario can easily show how the programmatic nature of the 
EC fundamental Treaty generated a legal framework slightly 
different from the one determined by the U.S. Constitution. As we 
have seen in Chapter 2, according to the general rule the federal 
Congress is enabled to pre-empt State powers only in specific cases, 
featured by an express intent statement delivered in legislative and 
regulatory acts455. Apart from those peculiar situations where the 
federal Government is granted with exclusive powers456, this view is 
coherent with the interstitial nature of federal law457, which leads to 
the presumption that the constitutional enumeration of powers 
granted to the federal Government does not in general prevent States 
from legislating in the same areas concurrently, as long as they do 
not use such powers in contravention of some others specific federal 
law or policy. On the contrary, pre-emption in the European sense 
frequently involves a much more drastic line-drawing activity, with 
central powers clearly isolated from those retained by the Member 
States, and with Member State activities in the forbidden areas 
totally pre-empted. 
                                                                                                                                          
Pre-emption of Member State Law in the European Economic Community: A 
Framework for Analysis, 29 CMLRev 1992, at p. 454). 
455 See supra, footnote 153. 
456 Such as the postal power, the power to conclude international agreements, 
the power to coin money, or the power to regulate commerce with foreign 
Nations, among the several States and with the Indian Tribes (see supra, par. 
1.4.1). As we have seen in Chapter 1, even in presence of Federal 
Government’s exclusive powers pre-emption cases may arise because of the 
presence of vague overlapping areas lying between the federal power to 
regulate commerce and the States’ powers to regulate their intrastate 
economies. 
457 See supra, par. 1.3. 
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In this respect, both the programmatic nature of the Treaties and the 
overall institutional weakness of the Community have led to the 
articulation of the abovementioned conceptualist-federalist 
approach, followed by the European Court of Justice especially in 
early cases by simply defining the extent of EC competences and 
declaring such competences to be exclusive458. Obviously, identifying 
pre-emption uniquely with this model restricts its relevance as it 
simply becomes a sort of defensive device employed by the Court 
with a view to restrict national prerogatives. 
The Court followed such rigid approach in all those cases where it 
deemed necessary to affirm EC competence’s exclusiveness – as it 
happened in the field of foreign commerce459 – by stating that under 
particular circumstances Member States are deprived of the right to 
exercise a power concurrent with that of Community because of the 
risk of adopting positions potentially different from those the EC 
intended to adopt. For that reason, Member States retain the right to 
exercise such powers only where Community provisions expressly 
allow them to do so460, or in case of emergency, even if the 
                                                
458 Cf. case 22/70, ERTA (see supra, footnote 397), where the ECJ held that 
“[E]ach time the Community, with a view to implementing a common policy 
envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, 
whatever form these may take, the Member States no longer have the powers to 
adopt legislative provisions in the field” (id. at 274). 
459 See for example Opinion 1/75, concerning the common commercial policy 
(see supra, footnote 331); case 41/76, Donckerwolcke; case 131/73, Grosoli; 
joined cases 37 and 38/73, Indiamex v. Sociaal Fonds voor Diamantarbeiders. 
460 See case 16/83, Criminal proceeding against Karl Prantl, [1984] ECR 1299, 
at par. 13: “[…] once rules on the common organization of the market may be 
regarded as forming a complete system, the Member States no longer have 
competence in that field unless Community law expressly provides otherwise”. 
See infra, par. 4.3 dedicated to derogations from pre-emption and saving 
clauses. 
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Community remains inactive461. In order to establish the absolute 
predominance of EC law, the Court has also recalled the general 
obligation of cooperation arising from art. 10 (ex art. 5) EC, under 
which Member States shall abstain from all those measures that 
could endanger the attainment of the objectives of the EC Treaty. It 
held that “once the Community has […] legislated for the 
establishment of the common organisation of the market in a given 
sector, Member States are under an obligation to refrain from taking 
any measure which might undermine or create exceptions to it”462. 
The a priori exclusion of Member States’ action stems from the fact 
that where field pre-emption occurs, the ECJ does not investigate 
about any (potential or effective) normative conflict between EC 
laws and national provisions. 
As it emerges from consistent case-law, the field pre-emption 
analysis carried out by the ECJ includes element clearly resembling 
the field pre-emption ‘comprehensiveness test’ employed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court since Hines v. Davidowitz463. The criterion applied by 
the European Court of Justice for determining the circumstances for 
the pre-emptive effect of secondary EC legislation lies in the 
existence of a complete, coherent and exhaustive system of 
                                                
461 In the past, the establishment of an exclusive EC competence frequently 
caused the emergence of regulatory gaps, being States precluded from 
regulating the concerned area whilst still no EC legislative act was enabled. To 
prevent this, in all those fields where the Community had exclusive powers 
national measures were permitted, provided prior authorisation had been given 
for these measures (see case 804/79, Commission v. United Kingdom, at par. 31 
et seq.; case 70/77, Simmenthal v. Italian Finance Administration). 
462 Case 83/78, Redmond, at par. 56. See also case 51/74, Van der Hulst. 
463 See supra, footnotes 208 and 211. However, within the European legal 
context a relevant portion of field pre-emption cases arise in connection with 
the minimum harmonization legislative technique, which relies on the idea of 
relative exhaustiveness (cf. infra, par. 4.3 b)). 
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Community measures in the field at issue. The ECJ has argued that 
secondary EC legislation can form a comprehensive and exhaustive 
system of law in which a national legislature has no room left to 
enact its own legislative aim464. Therefore, field pre-emption may 
occur where Member States are totally excluded from the adoption of 
legislative acts on the ground that the EC legislator has exhaustively 
legislated for the field at issue465. Field pre-emption is manifestly the 
most damaging form of pre-emption, being the reason for the total 
exclusion of Member States measures the perceived fear that any 
                                                
464 See A. Furrer, The Principle of Pre-emption in European Union Law, in 
Gerd Winter (Ed.), Sources and Categories of European Union Law, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 1996. 
One of the most recent field pre-emption formulation may be retrieved in case 
C-523/04, Commission v. the Netherlands (Open skies), of 24 April 2007: on 
that occasion the ECJ clearly employed the occupation of the field rationale by 
arguing that where the Community has complete and exclusive policy-making 
competence Member States are not only precluded from doing any act contrary 
to Community law (in light of the doctrine of supremacy), but are prevented 
from taking any action at all: in this sense, Member States are prevented from 
introducing measures even in the absence of (or before the adoption of) a 
specific Community rule. It means that the Court does not even investigate any 
eventual material normative conflict, but simply excludes Member States’ 
action in the fields embraced by the EC’s exclusive competence: once a 
Community common policy has been initiated, the Community competence pre-
empts Member States’ competence (see supra, footnotes 409 and 410). 
465 Cf. case 148/78, Criminal proceeding against Tullio Ratti, [1979] ECR 
1629, where in the context of a total harmonization measure adopted pursuant 
to art. 94 EC the ECJ found all national measures pre-empted. According to the 
Court’s reasoning, “[…] it is a consequence of the system introduced by 
Directive no. 73/173 that a Member State may not introduce into its national 
legislation conditions which are more restrictive than those laid down in the 
Directive in question, or which are even more detailed or in any event different, 
as regards the classification, packaging and labelling of solvents and that this 
prohibition on the imposition of restrictions not provided for applies both to the 
direct marketing of the products on the home market and to imported products” 
(cf. par. 27 of the judgment). In accordance with the occupation of the field 
standard, the Community measures represented an exhaustive set of rules and 
thus pre-empted national legislators. See J.A. Usher, The direct effect of 
directives – Case 148/78, Ratti, in European Law Review, 1979, Vol. 4, p. 268-
273. 
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supplementary national action may endanger or interfere with the 
strict uniformity of the Community regime466. The established EC 
legislative standard is considered absolute, coherent, and exhaustive: 
hence Member States measures are considered invalid even when 
such measures do not obstruct the objectives of EC legislation467. 
If compared with other areas, agricultural policy seems to be one of 
the fields where, by the means of the conceptualist-federalist 
approach the ECJ has been more inclined to find that Community law 
made use of its occupying force. Case 31/74, Galli468, embodies one 
of the clearest formulation of this approach. Here the Court was 
faced with the question of the compatibility of a national price 
control system with the common organisation of agricultural 
markets: the Court held that in sectors covered by a common 
organisation of the market Member States could no longer interfere 
unilaterally in price formation procedure established under the 
common organisation; moreover, in the exercise of their retained 
competences Member States could not jeopardise the aims and 
functioning of the common organisation of the market in question. 
However, being the EC Regulations at issue applicable solely at the 
production and wholesale stage, Member States were free to take 
appropriate measures relating to price formation at the retail stage, 
                                                
466 Cf. R. Schütze, Supremacy without Pre-emption? The Very Slowly Emergent 
Doctrine of Community Pre-emption, at 1040. 
467 Cf. case 216/86, Prefetto di Milano, [1987] ECR 2919, at par. 10: “In view 
of the fact that […] the Community has the exclusive legislative power which 
precludes any action on the matter by a Member State, it is not necessary to 
examine the question whether such national rules do or do not jeopardize the 
objectives or the functioning of the common organization in the sectors under 
consideration”. 
468 Case 31/74, Criminal proceeding against Mr. Filippo Galli, [1975] ECR 47. 
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on condition that they did not jeopardise the aims and functioning of 
the common organisation of the market in question. 
Rather than referring to the well-known notion of Regulations’ direct 
applicability, the ECJ made implied reference to that of pre-emption 
by stating that being the aim of the common market to maintain 
prices at a certain level, national measures prejudicial to this 
objective were clearly incompatible with Regulations establishing 
such common market. 
The idea of exhaustiveness was also recalled in case 222/82469, where 
the Court ruled that in presence of an exhaustive system of quality 
standards, national authorities were prevented from imposing 
unilateral quality requirements unless the EC expressly provided for 
such a power. Furthermore, the presence of a comprehensive set of 
rules precluded States from adopting unilateral measures also in 
cases 48/85470 and 218/85471, where the Court held that national rules 
were precluded “[…] either because the extension of those rules 
affects a matter with which the common organization of the market 
has dealt exhaustively or because the rules so extended are contrary 
to the provision of Community law or interfere with the proper 
functioning of the common organization of the market”472. 
                                                
469 Case 222/82, Apple and Pear Development Council v. K.J. Lewis Ltd. and 
others, [1983] ECR 4083. 
470 Case 48/85, Commission v. Germany, [1986] ECR 2549. 
471 Case 218/85, Association comité économique agricole regional fruits et 
legumes de Bretagne (CERAFEL) v. Albert Le Campion, [1986] ECR 3513. 
472 Id. at par. 13. In this judgment the Advocate General was of the opinion that 
the Court should prefer a conflict analysis. The national regulations would be 
presumed lawful, unless they could be proven to conflict with the Community 
measure (cf. Cross, Pre-emption of Member State law in the European 
Economic Community: a Framework for Analysis, at p. 460). 
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The Court also in Bulk Fruit473 drew particular attention on the 
concept of exhaustiveness: on one side a regulation enacted by the 
Kingdom of Belgium required national producers to indicate the 
minimum weight and the numbers of unit on the bulk packages of all 
agricultural products; on the other side the Community provided for 
the common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables by 
adopting Council Regulation no. 1035/72, imposing these same 
requirements only for some specific vegetables. According to the 
ECJ, the common organization of the market at issue was entirely 
governed by Community measures, “which established a Community 
system of quality standards to which the products governed […] must 
comply”474. As the Court reckoned in Apple and Pear475 and 
CERAFEL476, that system of quality standards is “exhaustive”, and 
“even though those additional requirements concern only domestic 
products, they undermine the common nature of the quality standards 
which apply uniformly to all products in the Community”477. 
On many occasion the Court pointed out that where Community rules 
in a given field may be regarded as forming a complete system, 
Member States no longer retain competence in that field: if 
Community secondary legislation covers the specific Union policy 
exhaustively, this legislation has thus full pre-emptive effect on 
national laws and measures478. The exhaustiveness of Community 
measures may be expressly provided for479 or it may follow impliedly 
                                                
473 Case 255/86, Commission v. Belgium (Bulk Fruit), [1988] ECR 693. 
474 Id. at par. 9. 
475 See supra, footnote 469. 
476 See supra, footnote 471. 
477 Id. at par. 11. 
478 See case 264/86, French Republic v. Commission, [1988] ECR 973. 
479 As it happened in Prantl (see supra, footnote 460). 
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from the overall purpose of the provisions480, especially where the 
measures lay down common standards meant to ensure free 
movement481 or equal protection482, or also where EC measures 
provide for procedures for amending the common standards through 
the adoption of appropriate actions at Community level483.  
The rigid conceptualist-federalist approach clearly embodies a model 
according to which Community’s competence are construed as being 
necessarily exclusive: as Weatherill put it, ”in cases where [the ECJ] 
decides on the scope of the occupied field, [it] is not choosing 
between the merits of competing regulatory regimes. It is 
interpreting the Community provisions to determine whether they 
have occupied the field. If they have, they are applicable provisions 
and Member States, pre-empted, may not depart from them”484. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
480 Cf. case C-249/97, Silhouette. 
481 Cf. case C-83/92, Pierrel, where the ECJ held that “[t]he harmonized 
framework set up by the directives […] and the effectiveness of those directives 
would be impaired if the Member States were permitted not only to prescribe 
circumstances entailing revocation other than those contemplated by the 
directives but also other grounds for the termination of authorizations” (id. at 
par. 28). 
482 In case C-215/97, Bellone, the ECJ held that “[…] by referring only to the 
[specified] requirement […], the Community legislature dealt exhaustively with 
the matter in that provision. Member States may therefore not impose any 
condition other than requiring that a written document be drawn up” (id. at 
par. 14). 
483 Cf. case 28/84, Compound Feedingstuffs, where the Court pointed out that 
“[…] the two directives [at issue] have set up a comprehensive system which 
enables account to be taken of the need to amend the directives periodically 
and of urgent problems which may arise in practice” (id. at par. 14). 
484 S. Weatherill, Beyond Preemption? Shared Competence and Constitutional 
Change in the European Community, id. at p. 18. 
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4.2.2 Obstacle pre-emption 
 
Even if in European pre-emption matters it is “[…] almost 
impossible to find an inherent logical system to the question of in 
which cases the Court will apply particular criteria”, the first form 
of implied pre-emption primarily rests on the idea of exhaustiveness, 
the second form of implied pre-emption seems to be based on the 
determination of scope of the debated national measures. 
In obstacle pre-emption cases national measures are regarded as pre-
empted if they provide resistance, delay or obstruction to the full 
attainment of EC objectives. This may happen when they are directly 
incompatible with the contents of a valid EC legal rule or when they 
interfere with the proper functioning of the common organization of 
the European market485. Obstacle pre-emption may be connected with 
a pragmatic approach (as juxtaposed with the conceptualist-
federalist approach described above) according to which Community 
competence is not construed as being necessarily exclusive486: this 
form of pre-emption mainly occurs in areas of concurrent/shared 
competence, hence the Court is tasked with solving the conflict of 
                                                
485 In a large number of cases the Court was asked to decide whether a 
particular national tax was compatible with Community law, and in particular 
with the provisions of the Treaty prohibiting charges having an effect 
equivalent to customs duties. Under such circumstances, the ratio of the 
obstacle pre-emption paradigm is generally based on fundamental concepts of 
free trade philosophy, being several EC directives aimed at ensuring internal 
market economic uniformity objectives (cf. infra, footnote 490 and 491). 
486 Member States retain a “concurrent power to regulate matters falling within 
the reach of Community’s power, as long as in so doing they do not create a 
conflict with the rules adopted by the Community” (cf. M. Waelbroeck, The 
Emergent Doctrine of Community Pre-emption – Consent and Re-delegation, at 
551). 
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powers arising from the coexistence of Community and national 
provisions on the same matter. 
As it happens for the previous form of implied pre-emption, the 
European obstacle pre-emption paradigm clearly resembles the one 
originated within the north American legal context487: as the U.S. 
Supreme Court is asked to interpret Congress’ objectives so as to 
discover whether State law poses an obstacle to their full attainment, 
the ECJ is asked to determine the purposes of conflicting levels of 
legislation. Therefore, the preclusive effect following obstacle pre-
emption is not based on an a priori analysis aimed at defining the 
legislative area occupied by the EC, but on a survey aimed at 
ascertaining whether EC legislation and national measures cover the 
same scope or not488. 
The Court is faced with more than a matter of simple textual 
analysis: the legal analysis embraced by the Court mainly focuses on 
an extended survey of EC laws’ aims and objectives, whilst on the 
                                                
487 Cf. supra, par. 2.1.2.2. 
488 Cf. case 65/75, Criminal proceeding against Riccardo Tasca, [1976] ECR 
291, at par. 6: “It must therefore be concluded that the unilateral fixing by a 
Member State of maximum prices for the sale of sugar […] is incompatible with 
Regulation no. 1009/67 once it jeopardizes the objectives and the functioning of 
this organization […]”; joined cases 88 to 90/75, SADAM and Others v. Italian 
Minister of Industry, [1976] ECR 323, at par. 7; case 5/79, Agricultural Price 
Freeze, [1979] ECR 3203, at par. 22: “[…] the fact that the national price-
freeze rules concerned […] constitute a short-term economic contingency 
measure […] cannot rule out their proving to be incompatible with the 
provisions of Community law dealing with agricultural matters, since even if it 
is merely a temporary contingency measure a price freeze may jeopardize the 
objectives and functioning of the common organization of the market in 
question”; case 216/86, Prefetto di Milano, [1987] ECR 2919, at par. 10: “[…] 
an examination [on the question whether such national rules do or do not 
jeopardize the objectives or the functioning of the common organization in the 
sectors under consideration is necessary] […] when national measures are 
adopted in respect of retail or consumer prices and are thus in a field which 
does not fall within the exclusive powers of the Community”; case 35/88, 
Commission v. Hellenic Republic, [1990] ECR I-3125. 
 197 
other hand particular attention is drawn on how such aims might be 
affected by the adoption of conflicting national measures. In order to 
evaluate the extent of the normative conflict at issue, the Court 
examines the EC objectives and determines whether they can be 
obstructed or hindered by the operation or the effects of national law, 
irrespective of whether the matter has been dealt with exhaustively or 
not489. 
A clear obstacle pre-emption theorisation can be found in landmark 
case Bussone490, where the Court held that the debated national 
measure had to be evaluated “[…] in the light of the aims and 
objectives of the regulation within the context of the principles laid 
down by the Treaty itself”491. According to the Court’s reasoning, 
where Member States are left free to adopt national rules with a view 
to implement EC legislation, in so doing they cannot act in such a 
way as to jeopardize the objective of the Community rules492. The 
mere co-existence of national measures or the presence of an 
insubstantial conflict is generally overlooked by the Court: obstacle 
pre-emption occurs where the ECJ considers the actual effect of 
national measures on the objectives of the EC legislation, and thus 
                                                
489 Cf. case C-1/96, Compassion in World Farming, [1998] ECR I-1251, at par. 
41: “It should be noted at the outset that, where there is a regulation on the 
common organisation of the market in a given sector, the Member States are 
under an obligation to refrain from taking any measures which might 
undermine or create exceptions to it. Rules which interfere with the proper 
functioning of a common organisation of the market are also incompatible with 
such common organisation, even if the matter in question has not been 
exhaustively regulated by it”. See also cases C-27/96, Danisco Sugar v. 
Allmänna Ombudet, [1997] ECR I-6653, at par. 24; C-507/99, Denkavit, [2002] 
ECR I-169, at par. 32; C-332/00, Belgium v. Commission, [2002] ECR I-3609, 
at par. 29. 
490 Case 31/78, Francesco Bussone v. Italian Ministry for Agriculture and 
Forestry, [1978] ECR 2429. 
491 Id. at par. 43. 
492 Cf. par. 16. 
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determines if such unilateral provisions have negative influence on 
the functioning of the EC secondary legislative system493. A clear 
theorisation of this approach may be found in the decision on recent 
case C-360/06494, handed down on 2 October 2008. In its decision the 
European Court of Justice argued that national measures conflicting 
with EC provisions could be justified only after a proper objectives 
assessment which had to prove their effective compatibility with the 
EC Treaty. A similar approach was also adopted in joined cases 36 
and 71/80495, where the ECJ took the chance to point out that the 
touchstone principle for the evaluation of the suitableness of national 
measures consists in assessing the “[…] effects which obstruct the 
working of the machinery established by the common organization of 
the market”496. The same approach features also case 223/78497, 
concerning the interpretation of Community provisions relating to 
free movement of goods: the Court was asked to judge on the 
compatibility of a concurrent national system of maximum retail 
prices, and concluded by affirming that the unilateral imposition of 
national measures “[…] is incompatible with the common 
organization of the market […] only to the extent to which it 
endangers the objectives or the operation of that organization”498. 
                                                
493 Cf. case 9/74, Donato Casagrande v. City of Munich, [1988] ECR 973; case 
36/79, Denkavit Futtermittel Gmbh v. Finanzamt Warendorf, [1979] ECR 3439. 
494 Case C-360/06, Heinrich Bauer Verlag v. Finanzamt für Großunternehmen 
in Hamburg, [2008] ECR 01. 
495 Joined cases 36 and 71/80, Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association and 
others v. Government of Ireland and others, and Martin Doyle and others v. An 
Taoiseach and others, [1981] ECR 735. 
496 Id. at par. 19. 
497 Case 223/78, Grosoli, [1979] ECR 2621. 
498 Id. at par. 13. 
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An interesting a contrario implication stemming from the obstacle 
rationale crystallized in case 53/86, Romkes499, where the Court was 
asked whether in presence of an exhaustive system of measures set 
up by the Community, art. 20(1) of EC Regulation no. 171/83500 
empowered a Member State to adopt, even after the entry into force 
of that Regulation, technical measures for its fishing industry going 
beyond the minimum requirements of that Regulation. 
Although the debated national measure had not been adopted in 
pursuance of any Community directive or protective measure 
provided for in the Treaty, the Court interpreted the vague saving 
clause501 of the EC Regulation by upholding the debated national 
measure. In its reasoning the ECJ focused on the fact that through its 
adoption the Member State tried to pursue a legitimate and 
permissible aim, consisting in “ensur[ing] better management and 
better use […]”502 of the common system established by the EC 
Regulation itself. Therefore, while the presence of a conflict between 
EC measures and national provisions is generally deemed as 
implying obstacle pre-emption, national measures which support and 
enhance the attainment of the Community legislation objectives are 
approved by the Court, given the consistency and homogeneity 
occurring between national and supranational aims. 
From a general point of view, although both obstacle and field pre-
emption may be regarded as effective enforcements of the 
fundamental rule expressed by art. 10 EC, the former pre-emption 
                                                
499 Case 53/86, Officier Van Justitie v. Lubbertie Romkes, et al., [1988] ECR 
2691. 
500 EC Regulation no. 171/83 of 25 January 1983 laying down certain technical 
measures for the conservation of fishery resources (O.J. 1983, L 24/14). 
501 Cf. art. 20(1) of Regulation 171/83. 
502 Cf. par. 16 of the judgment. 
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paradigm is generally believed to be more “significant for the 
preservation of Member State law”503 than the latter: while field pre-
emption utterly precludes the adoption of any national measure in a 
given field, obstacle pre-emption affects only the specific provision 
at issue and not every national measure in the concerned field. For 
this reason, obstacle pre-emption does not have a total blocking 
effect on national competence to act. 
Even in the absence of explicit interpretative guidelines, a precise 
logical path aimed at determining whether national measures are 
compatible with Community law or pre-empted may be retrieved in 
the European Court of Justice case-law. The Court first tries to 
ascertain whether such national measures relate to a sector regulated 
by a common organisation of the market; if they do, the ECJ then 
strives to find out whether the Community provisions are intended to 
establish a comprehensive scheme of regulation, so as to discover 
whether the field pre-emption model may apply. If the debated 
national measures do not concern a sector regulated by the common 
organisation of the market (or if the Community provisions do not 
establish a comprehensive scheme of regulation) further steps are 
taken in order to find out whether – in the light of the scopes and 
effects of the provisions involved – the national provisions at issue 
might interfere with the proper functioning of the Community 
secondary legislation. Again, if the effect hinders Community law 
objectives, national provisions may be deemed as obstacles and thus 
pre-empted. 
                                                
503 E.D. Cross, Pre-emption of Member State law in the European Economic 
Community: a Framework for Analysis, p. 467. 
 201 
However, implied pre-emption classifications are everything but tight 
models: it is not always possible to rigidly follow the 
abovementioned interpretative path, as neither the field nor the 
obstacle model univocally fit for some implied pre-emption cases. 
For example, the ECJ struggled in trying to unambiguously define 
the nature of case 60/86504, concerning the compatibility of a national 
measure with an EC Directive dealing with car lighting installations 
standards. According to the harmonizing Directive at issue, Member 
States could not refuse to authorise the sale or use of vehicles that 
featured certain lighting systems accepted by the Community, and 
the Commission questioned an additional Dim-Dip lighting 
requirement unilaterally imposed by the United Kingdom. Even 
though the Dim-Dip system was not included in the Directive, the 
U.K. prohibited the use of vehicles without that device, arguing 
safety reasons for it. In response, the Court struck down the U.K. 
measure by recalling two different sets of reasons. 
On one hand the exclusion of the U.K. measure originated from the 
fact that the EC Directive had set an “[…] exhaustive […] list of 
lighting and light-signalling devices”505: the Court employed the 
field rationale by implying that having the Directive had entirely 
occupied the field, Member States were subsequently denied 
unilateral competence to further regulate the market. In its reasoning 
the ECJ explicitly referred to the necessity of imposing a harmonized 
                                                
504 Case 60/86, Commission v. United Kingdom (Dim-Dip) (see supra, footnote 
444). 
505 According to the ECJ, the preclusion of further national requirements stems 
from the interpretation of the exhaustive nature of the common system set up by 
the Directive. Furthermore, such nature is consistent with the purpose of the 
Directive itself, which is “[…]to reduce, and even eliminate, hindrances to 
trade within the Community resulting from the fact that mandatory technical 
requirements differ from one Member State to another” (id. at par. 11). 
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and uniform safety standard throughout the whole European territory, 
and to the risk of trade distortions and restrictions caused by the 
existence of different national standards. 
On the other hand, it seems clear that the field model alone did not 
provide full explanation on why the national requirement was 
banned, as the ECJ focused also on the conflicting aims of the 
debated provisions, as well as on the overall system and objectives of 
the EC Directive at issue. The Court impliedly referred to the 
obstacle pre-emption model by suggesting that the conflicting 
national measure hindered the full attainment of the EC law 
objectives: therefore, having the Community established a right of 
free movement, unauthorized national derogations including 
additional or clarifying provisions denoted the existence of a 
conflicting national objective which obstructed the full achievement 
of the free movement objective506. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
506 The Court stated that “Member States cannot unilaterally require 
manufacturers who have complied with the harmonized technical requirements 
set out in Directive 76/756/EEC to comply with a requirement that is not 
imposed by that Directive, since motor vehicles complying with the technical 
requirements laid down therein must be able to move freely within the common 
market” (id. at par. 12). 
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4.3 Exemptions from the pre-emption rule 
 
a) Express saving clauses 
 
Secondary EC legislation may provide Member States with the 
possibility to implement its legislative aims in different ways. Along 
with the express or implied pre-emption rationales, the presence of 
provisions expressly allowing Member States to uphold a specific 
national measure may be considered as an additional interpretative 
criteria in settling pre-emption matters. 
As a ‘mirror image’ to the abovementioned express free movement 
clauses507, saving clauses expressly allowing the adoption of stricter 
(or even different508) national measures may be included in a 
harmonizing Community laws: such provisions are adopted when the 
Community expressly authorizes Member States to legislate 
concurrently in a certain area, thereby preventing a pre-emptive 
interpretation of Community legislation. Member States are 
straightforwardly and expressly allowed to uphold certain national 
measures, being given the space for their own legislation: provisions 
allowing the adoption of stricter national measures are typically 
                                                
507 Cf. supra, par. 4.1. 
508 Cf. for example EC Regulation no. 336/2006 of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 15 February 2006 on the implementation of the International 
Safety Management Code (ISM Code) within the Community, at preamble 
consideration 10: “If a Member State considers it difficult in practice for 
companies to comply with specific provisions of Part A of the ISM Code for 
certain ships or categories of ships exclusively engaged on domestic voyages in 
that Member States, it may derogate wholly or partly from those provisions by 
imposing measures ensuring equivalent achievement of the objectives of the 
Code. It may, for such ships and companies, establish alternative certification 
and verification procedures”. 
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employed in environmental protection legislative acts, being that a 
field of interest embodying one of Europe’s essential objectives. 
A clear example of express saving clause is represented by art. 14 of 
Council Directive 79/409/EEC509, under which “Member States may 
introduce stricter protective measures than those provided for under 
this Directive”. The scope of the act is to cover the conservation of 
all birds510, and within that scope varying levels of protection are set 
for all different birds: the Directive sets thus a minimum level of 
protection, allowing Member States to take more stringent measures 
nationally. Another clear example is provided by art. 16(1) of 
Council Directive 92/43/EEC511 on the conservation of natural 
habitats and of wild fauna and flora, stating that for some specific 
reasons “[p]rovided that there is no satisfactory alternative and the 
derogation is not detrimental to the maintenance of the populations 
of the species concerned at a favourable conservation status in their 
natural range, Member States may derogate […]” from the 
harmonising provisions. Again, Directive 91/629/EEC512 provides 
that “[from] the date set in paragraph 1, Member States may, in 
compliance with the general rules of the Treaty, maintain or apply 
                                                
509 Council Directive 79/409/EEC on the conservation of wild birds (O.J. 1979, 
L 103/1). 
510 According to art. 1(1), “[t]his directive relates to the conservation of all 
species of naturally occurring birds in the wild state in the European territory 
of the Member States to which the Treaty applies. It covers the protection, 
management and controls of these species and lay down rules for their 
exploitation”. 
511 O.J. 1992, L 206/7. 
512 Council Directive 91/629/EEC, laying down minimum standards for the 
protection of calves. 
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within their territories stricter provisions for the protection of calves 
than those laid down in this Directive”513. 
The environmental field represents thus a clear example of 
legislative area where although the Community originally held 
exclusive competence, a shift towards a model of shared/concurrent 
competence with Member States has gradually occurred. This 
approach is marked by the presence of saving clauses aimed at 
promoting greater flexibility and responsiveness with respect to local 
needs, encouraging Member States to regulate in certain areas of 
traditional national concern even where such fields have a super-
national character. Within the framework of Community legislation, 
employing such clauses gives importance to national initiatives that 
must however comply with compulsory standards and core principles 
of the Community, according to which Member States are 
empowered to introduce their own measures. If such national 
measures are enacted without complying with background EC 
principles, they are usually struck down, as it emerges from recent 
ECJ case law514. 
Being courts generally bound to the express terms of the legislation, 
the presence of express pre-emption and/or express saving clauses 
generally restricts or keeps within bounds the need for judicial 
inquiry into the pre-emptive effect or particular provision of EC law. 
However, if compared with the derogation clause of art. 95 par. 4 and 
                                                
513 Id. art. 11(2). 
514 Cf. cases C-507/04, Commission v. Republic of Austria; C-508/04, 
Commission v. Republic of Austria; C-342/05, Commission v. Republic of 
Finland (on which see D. Borghetti, Note on case C-342/05, in Bulletin of 
International Legal Developments, 2007 Issue 12). 
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5, EC515, express saving clauses appear to suffer from clear 
handicaps, as they are considerably less transparent unless 
formulated in great detail516. Furthermore, such provisions may lack 
the rigorous control of the Commission that is part of the derogation 
procedure517, whilst they may be used for instance where there is a 
group of Member States sharing identical concerns518. 
However, being European pre-emption a phenomenon constantly 
featured by a dynamic tension, it is extremely hard to define in 
advance all the possible causes of exemption for Member States. 
                                                
515 “4. If, after the adoption by the Council or by the Commission of a 
harmonisation measure, a Member State deems it necessary to maintain 
national provisions on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 30, or 
relating to the protection of the environment or the working environment, it 
shall notify the Commission of these provisions as well as the grounds for 
maintaining them.  
5. Moreover, without prejudice to paragraph 4, if, after the adoption by the 
Council or by the Commission of a harmonisation measure, a Member State 
deems it necessary to introduce national provisions based on new scientific 
evidence relating to the protection of the environment or the working 
environment on grounds of a problem specific to that Member State arising 
after the adoption of the harmonisation measure, it shall notify the Commission 
of the envisaged provisions as well as the grounds for introducing them”. 
516 Even in presence of saving clauses, the ECJ has been called upon to 
determine whether a specific national measure falls within the protection of the 
clause at issue: see case 53/86 (Officier Van Justitie v. Lubbertie Romkes, et al.: 
see supra, footnote 499), where the Court was asked whether a certain saving 
clause had to be interpreted restrictively (allowing thus only those national 
rules in force at the time that the regulation at issue was adopted) or broadly 
(allowing also the future adoption of stricter national rules). 
Such clauses must be distinguished from the standard derogation regime 
provided by article 95, par. 4 and 5 EC (ex art. 100), which create a Treaty-
based constitutional right for Member State to derogate from a harmonising 
measure under specific circumstances (see infra, b)). 
517 Cf. art. 95, par. 6 EC: “The Commission shall, within six months of the 
notifications as referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5, approve or reject the 
national provisions involved after having verified whether or not they are a 
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States and whether or not they shall constitute an obstacle to the 
functioning of the internal market”. 
518 See supra, Chapter 3, par. 3.4. 
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Apart from those cases where Member States are expressly allowed 
to derogate by the means of an express saving clause or because of 
the presence of a minimum harmonization regime, other principles 
defining the conditions for national derogations emerge from the ECJ 
case law. In case C-158/88, Minimum Stay519 the Court expressed the 
general rule according to which in presence of an exhaustive and 
complete system of EC measures Member States may derogate from 
or add provisions to the common system only if the prescribed 
derogatory procedures are followed. In Minimum Stay action was 
brought by the Commission under Article 169 (now 234) of the EC 
Treaty for a declaration that, by limiting the application of the 
exemptions provided for in Council Directive 69/169/EEC520 to 
goods contained in the personal luggage of travellers arriving at its 
borders after a period of 48 hours outside its territory, Ireland failed 
to fulfil its obligations under the EEC Treaty. In other words, Ireland 
was restricting the benefit of tax exemption provided for in articles 1, 
2 and 4 of Directive 69/169 only to a certain category of travellers, 
whilst the Directive at issue made no distinction as between 
travellers and provided no restrictions based on the period spent 
outside the jurisdiction of a Member State. The European Court held 
that Member States are allowed to derogate from an exhaustive 
system of EC measures only where the prescribed procedures for 
derogation are followed: hence, “[…] where on account of the 
                                                
519 Case C-158/88, Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, [1990] 
ECR I-02367. 
520 Directive 69/169/EEC of 28 May 1969 on the harmonization of provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to exemption 
from turnover tax and exercise duty on imports in international travel (O.J. 
English Special Edition 1969, I, p. 232), as last amended by Council Directive 
85/348/EEC of 8 July 1985 (O.J. 1985, L 183/24). 
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economic situation in a Member States, it becomes necessary to 
adopt exceptional provisions making the grant of exemptions subject 
to a period of time spent outside national territory, such provisions 
may be adopted only in pursuance of a directive derogating from 
Directive 69/169, […] or by way of protective measures, when the 
conditions laid down in Articles 108 and 109 of the Treaty are 
satisfied”521. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
521 C-158/88, par. 9. 
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b) European harmonization and minimum harmonization regime 
 
As already pointed out, the principle of conferral implies that every 
Community action finds its legitimacy on a specific legal basis 
expressly included in the Treaties wording. Whilst on one hand this 
core rule could surely embodies a sort of defensive device against 
potential EC encroachments on Member States’ prerogatives, on the 
other hand such precept could turn itself into a threat, as long as the 
Treaties establish legal basis founded on merely functional – instead 
of material – terms. 
For what it concerns pre-emption, explicit reference must be made to 
all those situations where Community institutions adopted 
harmonizing acts pursuant to EC Treaty articles 94 (dedicated to the 
establishment and functioning of the common market), 95 (dedicated 
to the establishment and functioning of the internal market) and 308 
(dedicated to the adoption of the appropriate measures necessary to 
attain one of the objectives of the Community), granting Community 
institutions new independent powers of action alongside existing 
ones522. As a matter of fact, such provisions deeply influence the EC 
competences asset by enlarging its extent with the inclusion of fields 
not always straightforwardly linked to Community functions. 
According to art. 94 EC, “[t]he Council shall, acting unanimously on 
a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European 
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue directives 
                                                
522 According to the doctrine, such legal basis are usually conceived as 
“general”, as they allow the Community freedom of action in areas 
traditionally linked to Member States’ competence (see K. Lenaerts & M. 
Desomer, Bricks for a Constitutional Treaty of the European Union: Values, 
Objectives and Means, in European Law Review, 2002, at 393). 
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for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment 
or functioning of the common market”. Article 95 EC (formerly art. 
100A, originally conceived as a derogation to the rule set by art. 94) 
was introduced by the Single European Act with a view to favour and 
speed up the establishment of the internal market and the attainment 
of the objectives set by art. 14 EC523. According to its formulation, 
by way of derogation from art. 94 the Council shall “[…] adopt the 
measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as 
their object the establishment and functioning of the internal 
market”. In other words, both article 94 and 95 set up legislative 
procedures allowing the adoption of harmonization measures, with a 
view to remove all those national provisions that may endanger or 
hinder the creation of an integrated market524. 
                                                
523 According to art. 14 EC (formerly art. 7A), “1. The Community shall adopt 
measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market over a 
period expiring on 31 December 1992, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article and of Articles 15, 26, 47(2), 49, 80, 93 and 95 and without prejudice to 
the other provisions of this Treaty. 2. The internal market shall comprise an 
area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. 
3. […]”. 
524 Interestingly, for what it concerns the procedural point of view while art. 94 
requires an unanimous Council action (implying a veto for every Member 
States), art. 95 recalls the less onerous procedure established by art. 251 EC, 
which requires a qualified majority vote. Additionally, art. 94 refers to the idea 
of ‘common market’ (which should include the four fundamental freedom and 
the common policies) whilst art. 95 makes reference to the concept of ‘internal 
market’ (including uniquely the four freedom). However, both the terms seem 
to be used with variance by legal commentators and in jurisprudence (see A. 
Furrer, The principle of pre-emption in European Union Law, in Gerd Winter 
(Ed.), Sources and Categories of European Union Law, Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden 1996, at p. 525). On the harmonization issue 
see M. Cartabia, J.H.H. Weiler, L’Italia in Europa (id. at p. 113); M. Horspool, 
M. Humphreys, European Union Law, (id. at p. 91); R. Schütze, Organized 
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The use of such measures has produced relevant consequences on 
Member States’ prerogatives by increasing the extent of Community 
powers: on the basis of the generic content of arts. 94 and 95 EC, EC 
institutions often took action so as to regulate areas traditionally 
included in States’ competences, only tangentially linked to the idea 
of ‘common’ or ‘internal’ market525. This has happened for instance 
in relation to the fields of environmental protection and consumer or 
workers protection526, even if some Treaty provisions expressly 
exclude the adoption of harmonizing measures in certain fields (such 
                                                                                                                                          
Change towards an ‘Even Closer Union’: Article 308 EC and the Limits to the 
Community’s Legislative Competence, Yearbook of European Law, 2003, p. 79-
115; S. Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law, 6th ed., Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2003, p. 613 et seq.; S. Weatherill, Law and Integration in the 
European Union, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995, p. 49; P. Rott, Minimum 
Harmonization for the Completion of the Internal Market? The Example of 
Consumer Sales Law, 40 CMLReview, 2003, p. 1107-1135; N. De Sadeleer, 
Procedures for Derogations from the Principle of Approximation of Laws under 
Article 95 EC, 40 CMLReview, 2003, p. 889-915. 
525 On the alleged intrusion of EC into Member States’ field of competence by 
the means of art. 94 and 95 see M. Cartabia, J.H.H. Weiler, L’Italia in Europa 
(id. at p. 113); K. Lenaerts, M. Desomer, Bricks for a Constitutional Treaty of 
the European Union: Values, Objectives and Means, id. at 394. 
526 See Directive 1999/44/EC on consumer sales and associated guarantee (O.J. 
1999, L 171/12); Directive 84/450/EC on misleading advertising (O.J. 1984, L 
250/17) as amended by Directive 97/55/EC on comparative advertising (O.J. 
1997, L 290/18); Directive 85/577/EEC on contracts negotiated away from 
business premises (O.J. 1985, L 372/31); Directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms 
in consumer contracts (O.J. 1993, L 95/29); Directive 97/7/EC on distance 
contract (O.J. 1997, L 144/19); Directive 85/374 on product liability (O.J. 1985, 
L 210/29). 
See also the Directive 98/43/EC on advertising and sponsorship of tobacco 
products (O.J. 1998, L 213/9), annulled by the ECJ in case C-376/98, Federal 
Republic of Germany v. European Parliament and EU Council; Directive 
2001/37/EC (replacing Directives 89/622 and 90/239) concerning the 
manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products (O.J. 2001, L 194/26), 
on which see case 491/01, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health, ex parte 
British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. and Imperial Tobacco Ltd. 
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as education, professional training and youth527, culture528, public 
health529). 
To a considerable extent, par. 4 and 5 of art. 95 EC define the 
effective meaning of the Community harmonising powers: even after 
the adoption of a harmonization measure under art. 95, par. 1, 
Member States are allowed to adopt and apply different national 
provisions where such procedure is deemed necessary on grounds of 
major needs referred to in art. 30530 EC, or when the national 
measures at issue may be related to the protection of the natural 
environment531 or the improvement of working conditions, being 
however subject to a notification and to an approval by the 
                                                
527 See arts. 149-150 EC. 
528 See art. 151 EC. 
529 See art. 152 EC. 
530 The justificatory grounds recalled by art 30 EC are the following: public 
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals and plants; the protection of national treasures possessing 
artistic, historic or archaeological value; the protection of industrial and 
commercial property. 
Art. 30 EC is frequently recalled in those cases where although no harmonising 
rules have been adopted, the principle of proportionality requires that the power 
of the Member States to impose restrictions in trade in products from other 
Member States should be limited to what is necessary to attain the objectives of 
protection being legitimately pursued (cf. for example case C-55/99 Diagnostic 
Devices, where the Court held that in the absence of harmonising rules it is for 
the Member States to decide on their intended level of protection of human 
health and life and on whether to require prior authorisation for the marketing 
of such products. In other words, Member States may derogate from or add 
more stringent requirements to Community provisions if the derogative 
measures comply with the proportionality principle, with reference to their own 
standard of protection). 
531 In the U.S. federal system, the Water Quality Act of 1965 (79 Stat. 903, 33 
U.S.C. § 667 (1985)) was the first minimum standards pre-emption act. To 
abate water pollution, the Congress decided that it was essential to have 
national water quality standards: the Water Quality Act allowed each State a 
choice of regulating in accordance with standards at least as stringent as 
national ones, or allowing the federal government to assume complete 
regulatory responsibility. 
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Commission532. On conditions of respect for certain requirements, 
Member States are thus authorized to implement more stringent 
measures than those provided for by the EC harmonizing provision, 
although the Community act at issue does not expressly provide for a 
specific saving clause533. 
The minimum harmonization technique is expressly recalled by the 
EC Treaty in order to promote the adoption of Community actions 
“[…] not prevent[ing] Member States from maintaining or 
introducing more stringent measures”534 in the concerned fields. An 
interesting example of harmonising legislation can be found in 
directive 89/622/EC on the labelling of tobacco products535: on the 
same day (June 22, 1993) the ECJ delivered two (apparently) 
conflicting judgments536 on the interpretation of this directive, which 
was adopted on the basis of art. 100A of the EC Treaty (now art. 95) 
with a view to eliminate barriers to trade which might arise as a 
result of differences in national provisions on the labelling of 
tobacco products, and thereby impede the establishment and 
operation of the internal market. 
In Gallaher Ltd. the Court was asked to interpret the extent of 
Articles 3(3) and 4(4) of the debated directive, requiring the 
prescribed warnings to cover at least 4% of the cigarettes packaging 
                                                
532 Cf. art. 95, par. 6 EC. 
533 See infra, par. 4.1. 
534 Cf. EC arts. 137(4) (Social policy), 152(4) (Public health), 153(5) 
(Consumer protection) and 176 (Environment protection). 
535 Council Directive 89/622/EEC of 13 November 1989 on the approximation 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States 
concerning the labelling of tobacco products (OJ 1989 L 359, p. 1). 
536 Case C-11/92, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health ex parte Gallaher, 
[1993] ECR I-3545, and case C-222/91, Ministero delle Finanze and Ministero 
della Sanità v. Philip Morris Belgium SA, [1993] ECR I-3469. 
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surface. In accordance with the free movement clause included in the 
directive, the British implementer regulation537 provided that the 
warnings had to cover at least 6% of the surfaces on which they were 
printed. The applicant tobacco companies sought judicial review 
before the English High Court of national Regulations, on the ground 
that these Regulations were incompatible with the relevant EC 
provisions: their concern was essentially that the UK’s more 
restrictive requirements would have placed them at a competitive 
disadvantage compared to the manufacturers of cigarettes in other 
Member States, since the larger the health warnings required the less 
space was available to make the packets commercially attractive. The 
UK government, however, successfully argued that the EC directive 
was a minimum directive, forcing to comply with the 4% requirement 
and at the same time allowing for the imposition of stricter rules on 
domestic productions, as long as such rules did not impede the free 
movement of goods between Member States. In response, the 
European Court of Justice upheld the UK argument, holding the 
national regulation valid by stating that a less favourable treatment 
for national products in comparison with imported products and the 
existence of some subsequent inequalities in conditions of 
competition are attributable to “[…] the degree of harmonization 
sought by the provision in question, which laid down minimum 
requirements”538. 
In Philip Morris the Court was asked to interpret Article 4(2) of the 
same harmonising directive: such provision required that a large 
portion of each tobacco packet carried warnings to be selected from a 
                                                
537 Tobacco Products Labelling (Safety) Regulations 1991 (S.I. 1991 No. 1530). 
538 Cf. C-11/92 at par. 22. 
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specific list. The Italian Government interpreted the plural word 
‘warnings’ as enabling it to require the printing of multiple warnings 
whose total surface area met the 4% requirements, and subsequently 
the Italian tobacco labelling law imposed such interpretation on all 
tobacco packets sold in Italy. Many foreign tobacco producers 
challenged this interpretation, because allowing Italian tobacco 
manufacturers to split the 4% surface area requirement between two 
smaller warnings gave them a competitive advantage. 
The ECJ took the opportunity to further clarify the extent and the 
implications arising from the adoption of a minimum harmonization 
directive: in the Court’s opinion, being the act at issue primarily 
designed to eliminate trade barriers potentially arising from the 
enforcement of different national provisions on the labelling of 
tobacco products, no discretion to impose requirements stricter than 
those provided for in the directive itself (or even to impose more 
detailed or at any rate different requirements) was given to Member 
States. According to the Court’s reasoning, some provisions of the 
directive granted Member States a degree of discretion so as to adapt 
the labelling of tobacco products to the requirements of public health 
protection. Art. 4(2) is one of such provisions, as it “[…] allows 
Member States to select the specific warnings which must appear on 
cigarette packets […]”539: however, Member States which have made 
use of the powers conferred by the provisions containing minimum 
requirements cannot prohibit or restrict the sale within their territory 
of products imported from other Member States which comply with 
the directive. Therefore, although Member States are not prevented 
from requiring manufacturers of tobacco products to ensure that the 
                                                
539 Cf. C-222/91 at par. 11. 
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general warning covers a minimum of 4% of the surface to which it 
is affixed, “[…] such requirements cannot be imposed with regard to 
imported products which comply with the directive”540. 
To summarize, the ECJ supported minimum harmonization in one 
case but not in the other, being the stricter national law upheld in 
Gallaher Ltd. and, on the contrary, rejected in Philip Morris. 
However, rather than demonstrating that “[…] the implementation of 
European directives may give rise to conflicting interpretations by 
the same court”541, such allegedly incoherent approach reveals the 
ECJ’s remarkable attention for the individual relationship occurring 
between national law and secondary EC legislation in each specific 
case. While the Italian tobacco labelling law was binding for all 
products sold in Italy (both national and foreign), the British one 
imposed stricter requirements only for those products produced or 
labelled in the UK, without hindering the import of foreign tobacco 
products labelled in accordance to the requirement of the EC 
directive. Therefore, while the British regulation’s aims were 
perfectly consistent with those of the EC directive at issue (i.e. 
maintaining the health and well-being of human beings), the Italian 
labelling rule was pre-empted because of its conflict with the 
harmonisation aims of the debated EC act. 
As highlighted in the Ratti case542, comprehensive harmonization 
stemming from European directives prevents Member States from 
adopting any type of supplementary regulation; on the contrary, 
many harmonization directives addressing environmental, consumer 
                                                
540 Id. at par. 17. 
541 N. Fernanda, F. Marchetti, Constitutionalizing Tobacco: the Ambivalence of 
European Federalism, Harvard Int. Law Journal 46 (2005), at p. 515. 
542 See supra, footnote 442. 
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and employee protection make use of the minimum harmonization 
technique by explicitly allowing Member States to adopt tailored 
rules if they wish to achieve higher standards543. Such approach 
allows both the Community and Member States to regulate the 
concerned field, sharing thus responsibilities even after the EC had 
acted. 
Two main reasons justify the concept of minimum harmonization: on 
one hand such legislative technique ensures the enforcement of 
                                                
543 Many EC consumer law directives follow and apply the concept of minimum 
harmonization: see art. 8(2) of directive 1999/44/EC on consumer sales and 
guarantees (O.J. 1999, L 171/12), reading that “Member States may adopt or 
maintain in force more stringent provisions, compatible with the Treaty in the 
field covered by this directive, to ensure a higher level of consumer 
protection”. See also art. 7(1) of directive 84/450/EEC on misleading 
advertising (O.J. 1984, L 250/17), as amended by directive 97/55/EC on 
comparative advertising (O.J. 1997, L 290/18); art. 8 of directive 85/577/EEC 
on contracts negotiated away from business premises (O.J. 1985, L 372/31); art. 
8 of directive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts (O.J. 1993, L 
95/29); art. 14(1) of directive 97/7/EC on distance contracts (O.J. 1997, L 
144/19). 
As the ECJ acknowledged in case C-183/00, M.V. Gonzalez Sánchez v. 
Medicina Asturiana SA, [2002] ECR I-3901, the Product Liability directive 
85/374/EEC (O.J. 1985, L 210/29) provides an exception among consumer 
protection directives, as it fully defines the balance of interests between 
producers and consumers, rather than prescribing a minimum harmonization 
regime. Hence, Member States are allowed to deviate from the common system 
only if the directive expressly provide so: the identification of a complete and 
exhaustive system of harmonisation aimed at building an internal market 
emerges also from the ECJ’s two other rulings delivered on the same day, 
dealing with the same directive (case C-52/00, Commission v. France, [2002] 
ECR I-3827, and case C-154/00, Commission v. Grece, [2002] ECR I-3879). 
According to the Court, the margin of discretion available to Member States in 
order to make provisions for product liability is entirely determined by the 
directive, and must be inferred from its wording, purpose and structure. In other 
words Member States are not authorised to adopt more stringent provisions, and 
possibility of derogations apply only in regard to the matters exhaustively 
specified and it is narrowly defined. See P. Rott, Minimum Harmonization for 
the Completion of the Internal Market? The Example of Consumer Sales Law, 
40 CMLReview, 2003, p. 1107-1135; see also N. De Sadeleer, Procedures for 
Derogations from the Principle of Approximation of Laws under Article 95 EC, 
40 CMLReview, 2003, p. 889-915. 
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uniform standards on the whole European territory, being Member 
States in great difficulties particularly when it comes to find an 
agreement on common levels of protection; on the other hand, such 
flexible approach grants Member States discretion in defining higher 
level of protection, respecting thus the role of national regulatory 
initiatives within the framework of Community legislative activity. 
In my opinion, the pre-emption model arising from the minimum 
harmonisation technique stands upon a partial application of the 
classic field pre-emption paradigm. In order to ensure the right level 
of flexibility and intra-State integration, the pre-emption rule 
concerns only the compulsory observance of minimum standards, 
rather than all the regulatory set of provisions enacted by the 
Community in a given field. While the application of the field pre-
emption standard generally leads to EC exclusive competence 
(following the adoption of an exhaustive set of measures or total 
harmonization acts544) minimum harmonization acts generally rely on 
the concept of relative exhaustiveness, which implies a partial 
application of the classic pre-emption rationale. The European 
legislator defines exhaustively the lowest standard to be complied 
with: on the one hand Member States cannot deviate from such 
minimum standard, but on the other hand rather than being forced to 
comply with the whole set of Community measures they are allowed 
to impose more stringent standards. Therefore, Member States 
                                                
544 Cf. directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce (O.J. 2000, L 178/1), or 
directive 2002/65/EC on the distance marketing of consumer financial services 
(O.J. 2002, L 271/16), expressly adopted so as to ensure a “high common level 
of consumer protection” (cf. Council Resolution on Community consumer 
policy strategy 2002-2006, O.J. 2003, C 11/1, at I). Obviously, a total 
harmonization approach serves the purposes of the internal market better than 
minimum harmonization one, since the latter still allows for different sets of 
rules in the Member States. 
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complying with the minimum asset of EC standards are somehow 
allowed to derogate from the pre-emption rule. Minimum 
harmonization pre-emption has the advantage of ensuring that a floor 
is established for regulatory standards, while some State regulatory 
discretion is preserved. From this point of view, this form of pre-
emption applies only partially to national measures, affecting only 
national provisions not complying with the common set of minimum 
standards. Accordingly, minimum harmonization pre-emption favours 
the shift towards a pragmatic model of EC shared competences, 
where European objectives are not only for the Community, but also 
for national authorities. In other words, such model of legal 
integration would genuinely reflect the diversity of interests in the 
EC, and enhance the hopeful European sensitivity to national 
preferences and initiatives. 
In resuming the findings developed here with a view to the 
construction of an effective pre-emption framework for the European 
legal experience, one comes across a series of marked considerations. 
Although a comparison may be drawn between the North American 
federal system and the European Community, we must of course 
acknowledge the fundamental difference between “maintaining a 
semblance of balance in the power relations between the federal 
Government and the States in a system designed along federal lines 
from its very beginning”545 and “consciously imposing a new multi-
                                                
545 G.A. Bermann, “Taking Subsidiarity seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States”, 94 Columbia Law Review, 1994, No. 2, p. 
449. 
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layered legal system on a continent historically dominated by 
sovereign Nation-States, themselves mostly unitary in structure”546. 
Such fundamental dissimilarity is clearly resembled by the fact that 
while the U.S. federal law is featured at the same time by a limited 
scope (embodied by the express constitutional enumeration of powers 
belonging to the federal Government) and a wide constitutional 
significance (supporting and encouraging the creation of a single 
national system of uniform law), the European legal experience relies 
on the hopeful coordination of systems which today remain separate 
and independent at the Member State level. 
Trying to apply the North American pre-emption taxonomy to the 
European legal experience clearly helps in analyzing and discussing 
the ways in which the division of power is organized among the 
different levels of government in the EC, although differences are 
easily noticeable. Both legal experiences are characterized by 
sovereignty being shared and divided between different levels of 
government, rather than being located at one level exclusively, and 
the study of the pre-emptive mechanism helps in defining where 
competences’ boundary lines should be located. Just like North 
American pre-emption, the European mechanism for the 
displacement of State law concerns indeed the very essence of the 
federal dimension, playing“[…] a crucial role in the allocation of 
competences and the exercise of powers”547 between a central entity 
and several peripheries. The European process of coordination is 
protected at the EC level by the mechanism of the Community legal 
                                                
546 Id. 
547 M. Cappelletti, M. Seccombe, J.H.H. Weiler, Integration through Law, Book 
1, p. 34. 
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system, and the interpretation of European integration instruments 
remains within the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. 
As highlighted above, when the Court is faced with solving conflicts 
occurring between laws enacted by different legal orders (which by 
the way occupy different levels in the legal hierarchy) it generally 
tends to relate the whole issue to the idea of EC exclusive 
competences or the Supremacy theory: as a consequence, European 
pre-emption has increasingly been identified with the sole field 
paradigm, i.e. the most invasive form of pre-emption. 
Such interpretative tendency has been favoured by the fact that while 
the American system is featured by the presence of different levels of 
government – whose institutional autonomy is emphasized through 
the recourse both to express and implied pre-emption so as to define 
a clear vertical separation of powers where each level has an 
autonomous sphere of responsibilities – the European legal 
experience is featured by the lack of an EC autonomous sphere of 
legislative and executive competences in certain fields. 
The general ECJ tendency to adopt the abovementioned 
conceptualist-federalist approach on one hand hinders the full 
realization of the ‘transmigration of models’ from the U.S. 
experience to the European one, whilst on the other hand frequently 
causes the disproportionate compression of Member States’ 
prerogatives because of the overwhelming effects arising from field  
pre-emption. From this point of view, a constant effort towards a 
complete and effective application of the North American pre-
emption taxonomy would hopefully lead to a better resolution of 
conflicts occurring between different legal orders. The lack of a 
conceptual independence for the idea of pre-emption within the 
 222 
European legal context seems to be primarily caused by the ECJ 
reluctance in solving conflict of powers by explicitly referring to the 
existence of a common European legal order: in case of conflict, 
Member States are to be deprived of those powers whose exercise 
creates a conflict with the European ones. Hopefully, such 
intermediate stage will be over when Member States will univocally 
share the common political willing to give up further portions of 
their national sovereignties, with a view to effectively establish such 
common European legal order and move from the current quasi-
federal experience to a federal one. Hopefully, pre-emption will be 
seen as a juridical device aimed at solving laws conflict with a view 
to ensure the full attainment of EC Treaty objectives548 within the 
European territory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
548 Cf. arts. 23 (freedom of goods), 39 (free movement of persons), 43 (freedom 
of establishment) and 49 (freedom to provide services) EC. 
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